Don-a-Lago Ain’t America, Why India Must Separate the Nation from Its Misrepresentative President
As President of the United States, Donald Trump is the commander-in-chief of the most powerful military the world has ever known. He has the authority to launch attacks on foreign shores, to start wars, and to reshape the global order with a tweet. Yet, for all his formal power, he does not represent the United States of America in its entirety. It is entirely possible, and increasingly necessary, to argue that Donald Trump misrepresents the US, that he is, in fact, a misrepresentative for his nation. This distinction between a transient, erratic leader and the nation itself has profound implications for how India, and the world, should engage with Washington.
Distinguishing between a temporary occupant of the White House and the enduring American republic has one strong, immediate implication. India has compelling, long-term reasons to maintain good relations with the United States as an institutional partner. The two nations share converging interests in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in countervailing China’s rise. They have built deep ties in trade, technology, defence, and people-to-people exchanges over decades. These are relationships that transcend any single administration. But India has no reason whatsoever to accommodate or defer to the personal misadventures and irrational expectations of Misrepresentative Trump. The latitude exists to condemn his actions, to push back against his demands, and to defend its own sovereign interests without jeopardising the broader bilateral relationship.
This is not a terribly novel proposition. In fact, countries follow this principle in their conduct of international relations all the time. Consider Iran’s lenient attitude towards India’s request to let India-bound ships pass through the Strait of Hormuz without harm. Iran does this not because it approves of the current Indian regime’s policies, but because it makes a clear distinction between the temporary government in New Delhi and India as a nation with which Iran has had friendly and mutually respectful relations for centuries. Iran understands that governments come and go, but nations endure. India would be wise to apply the same logic to its dealings with Washington.
India’s current leadership, unfortunately, has not always followed this principle. It did not condemn the US’s unprovoked breach of Iran’s sovereignty, the assassination of its ayatollah, or the bombing of its cities without any legal sanction. The United Nations exists precisely to authorise collective international action against violators of the rules of mutual coexistence that nations sign up to as members. Yet, even as India remained silent on the US-Israeli attack, it found its voice to condemn Iranian defensive fire. This asymmetry is not only strategically unwise, but it also signals a deference to American power that is both unnecessary and unbecoming of a nation with India’s aspirations.
India holds the BRICS chair this year. The grouping, which includes Iran as a full member since January 1, 2024, was founded with a clear mission: to bring the largest emerging economies together to advance their collective interests, particularly to reform the global architecture of economic, political, and financial power. That mission acquires ever-greater salience with the emergence of Misrepresentative Trump at the helm of the US, a leader who is actively wrecking the already imperfect global rules-based order and is ready to use military might against anyone with cavalier disregard for norms of any kind.
Yet, BRICS has, for all practical purposes, ceased to operate as a countervailing force. India has taken no effort to push back against Trump’s tariff tantrums, or his threat to punish BRICS if it tried to weaken the US dollar’s hegemony. This is precisely the time for India to lead BRICS to redouble its efforts to launch a new global currency to settle international financial transactions that do not involve an American entity as a counterparty. Ideally, such a currency should be on blockchain technology, like India’s own e-rupee or China’s digital yuan, to facilitate instantaneous, low-cost, cross-border payments, bypassing the dollar-dominated SWIFT system.
The need for such a hedge against American unilateralism has never been more urgent. During the bombing of Iran, Trump said he would drop “a few more bombs on Iran, just for fun.” He had no clear war aims. He told Keir Starmer that the US had already won the war and had no need for British aircraft carriers. Now, he threatens the same scorned allies with grave damage to NATO if they do not come to join the war, about the start of which he did not consult them. This is not statecraft; it is the behaviour of a capricious despot.
The war will end, sooner or later. If the US fails in its objective to finish off the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iran will decide when to stop firing missiles and drones, and thus end the war. When that happens, the only gainer, of sorts, would be Israel, which would emerge as the region’s hegemonic power. But the costs will be staggering. Dubai is no longer the global billionaire’s beckoning playground, a financial centre rivalling Singapore. It is now a place of high geopolitical risk. Saudi Arabia’s modernisation ambitions have been hit hard. Qatar will have second thoughts about hosting a massive US military base. All Gulf Arab regimes are under immense pressure from their own public opinion to stop pretending they are little chicks nestling under the protective wing of Mama US.
The damage to American standing goes far beyond the region. Republicans have lost their reputation at home for being the party to be trusted with the economy. The rise of gold as a safe haven asset signals an erosion of faith in the US dollar as a safe haven for global wealth. In terms of its hegemonic role in global finance, the dollar is now in terminal decline, a process that Trump’s reckless policies have only accelerated. A significant setback for Trump’s side in the November midterm elections to the US House and Senate seems increasingly inevitable. Even prior to Trump 2.0, US science and technology had ceded its leadership to China in many strategic areas. That trend has accelerated dramatically with Trump’s attacks on US academia and his cuts in grants for scientific research.
In the 1960s, when India was not just far weaker than it is today relative to the US, but also dependent on it for scarce foreign exchange needs, New Delhi had the gumption to criticise Washington over Vietnam and other imperialist ventures. That India did not bow to American pressure; it charted its own course. Today, India is a far more powerful and self-confident nation. It should not be acting as if it belongs to the MAGA base.
The distinction between a nation and its current misrepresentative leader is one that countries like Iran already make in their dealings with India. Iran separates the current Indian regime from India as a nation. India must now learn to do the same with the United States. It must cultivate the strategic maturity to maintain its long-term institutional relationship with the US while firmly resisting the reckless impulses of a president who does not represent the best of his country. To do otherwise is to surrender India’s hard-won strategic autonomy at the very moment it is most needed. The world is watching, and the choices India makes now will define its role in the 21st century.
Questions and Answers
Q1: What is the central argument about how India should treat the United States under President Trump?
A1: The article argues that India must distinguish between the United States as a long-term institutional partner and Donald Trump as a “misrepresentative” leader. India should maintain its enduring relationship with the US while firmly resisting Trump’s “personal misadventures and irrational expectations,” including condemning his attacks and refusing to defer to his demands.
Q2: What example does the article give of a country already applying this principle in its dealings with India?
A2: The article cites Iran, which allows India-bound ships to pass through the Strait of Hormuz unharmed despite India’s silence on the US-Israeli attack. Iran makes a distinction between the current Indian regime and “India as a nation with which Iran has had friendly and mutually respectful relations for centuries.” Iran understands that governments come and go, but nations endure.
Q3: What role does the article suggest India should play in BRICS, especially given Trump’s policies?
A3: The article argues that India, as BRICS chair, should lead the grouping to redouble efforts to launch a new global currency for settling international transactions without American involvement. It should push back against Trump’s tariff threats and his attempts to weaken the US dollar’s hegemony. Instead, BRICS has “ceased to operate” as a countervailing force, which is a missed opportunity.
Q4: How does the article assess the long-term damage Trump is causing to American power and influence?
A4: The article argues Trump is causing significant, perhaps irreversible, damage: eroding faith in the US dollar (as gold rises as a safe haven), damaging US science and technology leadership, turning Gulf allies against the US, and causing Republicans to lose their reputation for economic competence. It predicts a setback for Trump in the November midterms.
Q5: What historical precedent does the article cite to argue that India can and should be more assertive with the US?
A5: The article cites India’s stance in the 1960s, when India was far weaker and dependent on the US for foreign exchange, yet had the “gumption to criticise Washington over Vietnam and other imperialist ventures.” If a much weaker India could do so then, today’s more powerful and self-confident India should not defer to a president who does not represent the best of his country.
