Atmanirbharata Is Managing External Dependencies, India’s Struggle with Big-Power Rivalries
The recent weaponisation of India’s oil imports by the United States, linking the sourcing of crude to the terms of a bilateral trade deal, is a stark and uncomfortable reminder of the enduring constraints imposed by external dependencies on a nation’s security and foreign policy. This is not a new dilemma for India. Since the dawn of independence, the country has navigated a complex web of critical dependencies—on food, on foreign exchange, on defence equipment, and on energy. Each era has brought its own crisis, and each crisis has forced policymakers to learn difficult lessons about the price of dependence and the strategic imperative of self-reliance. The current moment, with the US-Israel war on Iran disrupting global energy markets and the Trump administration wielding trade as a weapon, is the latest and most severe test of India’s ability to manage its vulnerabilities in a world of great-power rivalry.
Independent India began its development journey with four critical external dependencies. The foreign exchange crisis of 1957-58 was the first to alert policymakers to the constraints imposed by a lack of financial autonomy. The humiliating war with China in 1962 starkly exposed the shortage of modern defence equipment and the dangers of military unpreparedness. The devastating droughts of 1965-67 drew urgent attention to the nation’s critical dependence on food imports, a vulnerability that was quickly exploited for political purposes. President Lyndon B. Johnson, in a move that still resonates in India’s strategic memory, tried to link food aid to a change in India’s stance on the Vietnam War. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, in a display of the personal courage and strategic confidence that the article’s author admires, stood her ground and refused to bend to American pressure. The lesson was clear: food security was national security.
The Gulf War of 1990 triggered a spike in oil prices that contributed directly to a balance-of-payments crisis the following year. Forced to approach the International Monetary Fund for support, India found that neither the United States nor other developed economies were willing to help unless the government of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao undertook major changes in both economic and foreign policy. The diplomatic recognition of Israel, a long-standing demand of the US, was one direct consequence of that pressure. The pattern was consistent: external dependence created a lever that other nations could pull to shape India’s choices.
More recently, the weaponisation of finance by the G7 economies following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and now the weaponisation of energy supplies by President Donald Trump, have drawn renewed attention to these enduring constraints. They highlight, with painful clarity, the strategic importance of greater self-reliance. It is little wonder, then, that Prime Minister Narendra Modi has rediscovered the relevance of Jawaharlal Nehru’s policy of self-reliance, atmanirbharata, even as the first prime minister is routinely criticized by the ruling party’s ideological affiliates. The term may have been revived, but its strategic logic is as old as the republic.
Given the direction of American policy, it should now be abundantly clear to India’s national security managers that the US will persist in its policy of weaponising all forms of trade, especially trade in energy, defence equipment, and access to advanced and critical technologies. The optimism generated by last February’s joint statement, “US-India COMPACT,” which promised a new era of military partnership and accelerated technology commerce, should now be set aside. The events of the last 12 months, and particularly the last fortnight, have rendered that document a relic of a more hopeful, but now vanished, moment.
Prime Minister Modi and President Trump had envisioned a partnership built on “TRUST”—an acronym for “Transforming the Relationship Utilising Strategic Technology.” They had agreed that “energy security is fundamental to economic growth, social well-being and technical innovation in both countries.” Trump personally signed a statement that promised to “ensure energy affordability, reliability and availability, and stable energy markets.” By initiating a war that has destabilized the entire Gulf region and by threatening to use oil imports as a bargaining chip, Trump has reneged on that promise and undone a quarter-century of painstaking trust-building between the US and India. The TRUST statement had committed both countries to an Energy Security Partnership, covering oil, gas, and civil nuclear energy. India can no longer trust Trump’s America on energy security.
Joining hands with Israel, the US has engulfed all of West Asia in a war with serious consequences not just for India’s energy security, but for the larger economic interests it has carefully cultivated in the region over decades. Millions of Indian workers live and work in the Gulf, sending home billions of dollars in remittances. Indian companies have invested heavily in the region. The stability of the Gulf is a direct national interest of India. By igniting this conflict without regard for the consequences on partners like India, the US and Israel have committed an act of strategic betrayal. The Prime Minister, it is argued, ought to stand up in Parliament and say as much, clearly and forcefully.
Indian national security managers would be well-advised to adopt a policy of extreme caution. They should not get locked into any more binding agreements with the US during the remainder of the Trump administration, given the direction of his economic and geopolitical policies. The Modi government’s policy of atmanirbharata requires it to stand up to the challenge of neo-imperialism posed by Trump’s aggressive moves around the world. Self-reliance is not a slogan; it is a strategic posture that must be earned through difficult choices and sustained investment.
Even as India continues to grapple with these longstanding external dependencies in an increasingly uncertain environment, new and more subtle vulnerabilities have come to the fore. Over the past decade, the emigration of India’s elite has emerged as a new source of external vulnerability. For a long time, India has viewed the diaspora’s reach and standing, especially in developed countries and in West Asia, as a symbol of “soft power” and a reliable source of foreign exchange through remittances. Trump’s anti-immigration and “America First” policies, and the war in the Gulf, have exposed the tenuous foundations of this diaspora outreach. The status and security of Indians abroad can no longer be taken for granted.
More insidiously, a globalised Indian power elite is being actively used, especially by the US and its allies, to influence public opinion and shape policy narratives at home. This is an attempt to draw India into their conflicts by shaping the domestic discourse. The last time this kind of external influence-mongering was experienced on such a scale was during the Cold War, in the 1960s and 1970s, when a non-aligned India became an important theatre for external actors to wage proxy battles. Once again, there is a noticeable increase in the activities of what are now fashionably referred to as “influencers”—academics, journalists, and thought leaders who are subtly, and sometimes not so subtly, aligned with foreign power centres.
The difference between the earlier Cold War era and now is a profound paradox. On the one hand, India has become more developed, more economically powerful, and more influential on the global stage. And yet, on the other hand, it appears to have become more vulnerable to external pressure and influence. The levers of influence are no longer just food aid and military hardware; they are access to technology, social media narratives, and the co-option of a globally mobile elite. While Prime Minister Modi seems to have adopted Indira Gandhi as his role model on a range of policy issues and in his style of prime ministerial governance, he has not yet demonstrated her sense of personal courage and confidence in standing up to such external pressures. She faced down the might of the United States over Vietnam; the current leadership has yet to show a similar willingness to confront a friendly power when its actions harm Indian interests.
Managing big-power rivalry—which in the contemporary era is a three-way contest between the US, Russia, and China—while not allowing any one of them to exploit India’s external strategic dependencies as weapons against India, is what leadership has to be about. It requires a clear-eyed assessment of national interest, a willingness to make difficult choices, and the strategic confidence to say no when necessary. Atmanirbharata is not about autarky or isolation; it is about building the resilience and capacity to navigate a dangerous world without being bent to the will of others. That is the challenge that now confronts India’s leadership, and the stakes have never been higher.
Questions and Answers
Q1: What are the four critical external dependencies India has faced since independence, and what crises highlighted each?
A1: The four critical dependencies and their associated crises are:
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Foreign Exchange: The crisis of 1957-58.
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Defence Equipment: Shortages exposed during the 1962 war with China.
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Food: The droughts of 1965-67, which led to pressure from the US.
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Energy: The Gulf War of 1990, which spiked oil prices and triggered a balance-of-payments crisis.
Q2: What historical example is given of the US using food aid to try to influence India’s foreign policy?
A2: The article cites President Lyndon B. Johnson’s attempt in the mid-1960s to link food aid to a change in India’s stance on the Vietnam War. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi is praised for standing her ground and refusing to bend to this external pressure, making it a powerful example of strategic autonomy.
Q3: Why does the article argue that India can no longer trust the US on energy security, despite the “TRUST” statement signed by Modi and Trump?
A3: The “TRUST” statement promised energy affordability, reliability, and stable markets. By initiating a war that has destabilized the Gulf, and by threatening to weaponise oil imports in trade negotiations, Trump has “reneged on that promise” and undone decades of trust-building. The war directly harms India’s energy security and economic interests in the region.
Q4: What “new vulnerabilities” does the article identify as emerging over the past decade?
A4: The article identifies two new vulnerabilities:
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Elite Emigration: The status and security of the Indian diaspora, once seen as a source of soft power and remittances, is now vulnerable to US anti-immigration policies and Gulf instability.
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External Influence: A globalised Indian elite is being used by foreign powers (especially the US) to influence public opinion and shape policy narratives at home, similar to Cold War-era influence-mongering.
Q5: What is the core argument about the true meaning of atmanirbharata (self-reliance) in the context of this article?
A5: The article argues that atmanirbharata is not about isolation or autarky. It is about strategically managing external dependencies in a world of great-power rivalry. It means building the resilience and capacity to navigate a dangerous world without allowing any single power to use those dependencies as weapons to dictate India’s foreign policy choices. It is a strategic posture earned through difficult choices, not a slogan.
