A New Dawn in Dhaka, India and Bangladesh Must Sidestep Short-termism to Rebuild a Vital Partnership

A New Dawn in Dhaka, India and Bangladesh Must Sidestep Short-termism to Rebuild a Vital Partnership

For nearly two decades, Delhi and Dhaka crafted one of the Subcontinent’s most significant and stable bilateral relationships. The foundation of this partnership was the conducive atmosphere created by the Sheikh Hasina-led Awami League government, which prioritised connectivity, trade, energy cooperation, and security coordination with its giant neighbour. Hasina’s perceived “pro-India” stance, however, became a politically charged issue in Bangladesh, contributing to domestic unrest and culminating in her ouster in August 2024. The subsequent period was marked by political instability, including deeply troubling attacks on religious minorities, which strained the bilateral fabric. But with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) securing a decisive victory in the February elections, a new chapter has opened. The recent visit of Bangladesh Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman to New Delhi signals that a more mature leadership on both sides is ready to reset ties. The challenge now is to sidestep short-termism—to resist the temptation to let past grievances or political posturing derail the relationship. For the sake of the people of both nations, Delhi and Dhaka must insulate their partnership from the vicissitudes of electoral politics and focus on the immense, exponential gains of working together.

The Political Earthquake: Hasina’s Ouster and the BNP’s Return

The ouster of Sheikh Hasina in August 2024 was a political earthquake in Dhaka, with immediate and profound implications for India. Hasina had been India’s most reliable partner in the neighbourhood, consistently prioritising bilateral ties even when it carried domestic political costs. Under her leadership, Bangladesh and India resolved long-standing disputes, including the historic Land Boundary Agreement (2015), enhanced cross-border rail and road connectivity, deepened energy cooperation, and coordinated closely on security matters, particularly in countering insurgent groups operating from Bangladesh’s territory.

However, Hasina’s perceived closeness to New Delhi was also a political liability. Domestic critics accused her of being a “stooge” of India, sacrificing Bangladesh’s sovereignty for economic and security benefits. This narrative, amplified by the BNP and other opposition parties, gained traction over the years, particularly among segments of Bangladeshi society that harbour historical grievances or nationalist sensitivities. The political instability that followed Hasina’s ouster included attacks on minorities—particularly Hindus, who are often scapegoated in South Asian political crises—which India viewed with deep concern. The bilateral relationship, once a model of regional cooperation, entered a period of uncertainty.

The February elections, which brought the BNP back to power under the leadership of Prime Minister Tarique Rahman, marked a decisive turning point. The BNP had historically been more nationalist and less overtly aligned with India than the Awami League. There were genuine fears in New Delhi that a BNP government would pivot towards China or Pakistan, or at minimum, allow bilateral ties to cool significantly. Those fears have not materialised—at least not yet.

The Foreign Minister’s Visit: A Reset in the Making

Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman’s visit to New Delhi was an important step in the journey of resetting ties. The Bangladeshi side came with a clear agenda, balancing political messaging with pragmatic cooperation.

The Extradition Demand: According to the Bangladesh Foreign Ministry, the minister “reiterated its request to extradite Sheikh Hasina and her Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal to Bangladesh, who have been awarded the death penalty by the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT).” On the surface, this is a dramatic demand. Hasina, India’s former ally, is now a convicted fugitive in the eyes of the new Bangladeshi government. India, however, cannot acquiesce to this request, not least because the ICT has been widely condemned by international human rights organisations and foreign governments as a politically partisan body, established without proper judicial safeguards and used to target opposition leaders. India has its own experience with extradition requests from neighbours—it has consistently refused to hand over political figures who claim they would not receive a fair trial. The demand must be read for what it is: a political statement by a new government seeking to legitimise its own legal processes and to signal that it will not be seen as soft on the previous regime. It is not a deal-breaker, nor should it be.

The Ganga Water Treaty: Much more consequential was the discussion on renewing the Ganga Water Treaty, which is set to expire in December. This treaty, first signed in 1996, governs the sharing of Ganga river waters at Farakka, a lifeline for both countries’ agriculture and drinking water supplies. A failure to renew it would be catastrophic for bilateral relations and for the millions of farmers and residents who depend on predictable water flows. Both sides reportedly discussed the importance of renewal, and the technical talks are expected to intensify in the coming months. This is an area where India can demonstrate good faith by offering a fair, transparent, and long-term arrangement that addresses Bangladesh’s legitimate concerns about dry-season flows.

Fuel, Fertilisers, and Trade: Bangladesh also expressed the need for greater supplies of fuel and fertilisers from India. The country has been facing energy shortages and agricultural input constraints, exacerbated by global supply chain disruptions and its own foreign exchange crunch. India, as a large producer of both, is well-positioned to step in—not as a donor, but as a reliable trading partner. This is a win-win: Bangladesh secures essential supplies, and Indian exporters gain a stable market.

Visa Normalisation: Both countries have agreed to normalise the issuance of visas, which had become severely restricted during the political turmoil. For students, medical tourists, businesspersons, and families with cross-border ties, the resumption of normal visa services is a tangible, people-centric benefit. It signals that the relationship is moving from a defensive crouch to an open posture.

The Salient Issue: Securing the 1,156 km Border

For India, the most salient issue in the bilateral relationship is securing the 1,156 kilometre border it shares with Bangladesh. This border is unique: it is one of the most complex and densely populated land borders in the world, with enclaves, riverine boundaries, and cross-border movement of people and goods. Cooperation along the border has, in recent years, helped maintain a stable frontier for both sides, including along India’s northeastern states, which are connected to the rest of the country largely through the narrow “Chicken’s Neck” corridor.

The Border Security Force (BSF) and Bangladesh’s Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) have established robust coordination mechanisms, including joint patrols, flag meetings, and real-time intelligence sharing. This cooperation has reduced cross-border smuggling of contraband, arms, and fake currency; curtailed illegal migration; and prevented insurgent groups from using Bangladeshi territory as a sanctuary. Any disruption to this cooperation would have immediate and severe consequences for India’s internal security, particularly in Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Mizoram. The new BNP government has signalled its commitment to continuing this cooperation, recognising that a stable border is in its own interest as well.

Connectivity, Energy, and Multilateral Forums

Beyond the immediate bilateral agenda, there is a broader framework of cooperation that depends on Delhi and Dhaka being on the same page. Connectivity projects—including rail links, bus services, inland waterway routes, and the proposed India-Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline—have transformed the economic geography of the region. Energy cooperation, including electricity transmission from Indian power plants to Bangladesh and the potential for joint hydropower development in Nepal and Bhutan (transiting through India to Bangladesh), can unlock immense value. And multilateral initiatives under bodies such as BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) depend on Dhaka and Delhi acting as co-anchors of regional integration.

If the bilateral relationship sours, these initiatives will stall. If it thrives, they can accelerate. The choice is stark, and the stakes are high.

Tarique Rahman’s Conciliatory Note: A Foundation to Build On

To his credit, Prime Minister Tarique Rahman has struck a conciliatory note since his appointment. He has called for ties to be based on “mutual trust and respect and reciprocal benefit.” This is not the language of a leader seeking confrontation; it is the language of a pragmatist who recognises that geography is destiny. Bangladesh and India share a history, a culture, and a geography that make the gains of working together exponential. The task now is not to let the past—including the Hasina issue—become a roadblock.

Rahman faces his own domestic constraints. The BNP’s political base includes elements that are sceptical of India, and he must manage those sensitivities. He cannot be seen as “pro-India” in the way Hasina was, because that label would be politically toxic. But he can be “pro-Bangladesh”—and a pro-Bangladesh foreign policy will, of necessity, include constructive engagement with India. There is no alternative. China is a distant power; its investments in Bangladesh have come with strings attached and have not translated into the kind of day-to-day cooperation that India can offer. Pakistan is a historical partner but lacks the economic heft and geographic proximity to be a meaningful counterweight. The United States is focused on its strategic competition with China and the crises in West Asia and Ukraine. For Bangladesh, India is not just a neighbour; it is an inevitability.

Sidestepping Short-termism: A Call for Mature Statecraft

The greatest risk to the relationship is short-termism—allowing immediate political calculations or emotional reactions to derail long-term strategic interests. This manifests in several ways:

• On the Indian side: A temptation to punish Bangladesh for Hasina’s ouster, or to view the BNP government through the lens of past grievances (the BNP had a more distant relationship with India during its previous stints in power). India must resist this. The BNP government of 2026 is not the BNP government of 2001. Circumstances have changed, and India’s approach must change with them.

• On the Bangladeshi side: A temptation to use India as a domestic political punching bag, blaming Delhi for everything from water scarcity to price inflation. This is a familiar pattern in South Asian politics, but it is ultimately self-defeating. Bangladesh needs Indian cooperation on water, trade, energy, and connectivity. Demonising India may win short-term political points, but it loses long-term benefits.

• On both sides: A tendency to let the Hasina extradition issue dominate the agenda. This is a political statement, not a practical demand. India will not extradite Hasina; Bangladesh knows this. The issue should be allowed to fade into the background while the two sides focus on areas where cooperation is possible and mutually beneficial.

Conclusion: Exponential Gains Await

The India-Bangladesh relationship has weathered many storms. It survived the 1971 Liberation War, the 1975 assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the rise and fall of military regimes, and the periodic cycles of democratic transitions. Through it all, the fundamental logic of cooperation—shared geography, shared history, shared culture, shared economic interests—has prevailed.

The BNP’s return to power is not a crisis; it is an opportunity. An opportunity to demonstrate that the relationship is bigger than any single leader or party. An opportunity to build a mature, resilient partnership that can withstand political transitions. An opportunity to deliver tangible benefits to the 1.6 billion people of the Subcontinent.

The task now is not to let the past become a roadblock. For the sake of the people of India and Bangladesh, their governments must insulate the relationship from short-term politics. The gains of working together are exponential. The costs of drifting apart are incalculable. Delhi and Dhaka must choose wisely.

Q&A: India-Bangladesh Relations After the BNP Victory

Q1: What was the political context of Sheikh Hasina’s ouster, and why did it strain India-Bangladesh relations?

A1: Sheikh Hasina was ousted in August 2024 after nearly two decades in power. Her government had crafted one of the Subcontinent’s most stable bilateral relationships with India, prioritising connectivity, trade, energy cooperation, and security coordination. However, Hasina’s perceived “pro-India” stance became a domestic political liability, with critics accusing her of sacrificing Bangladesh’s sovereignty. The political instability following her ouster included attacks on religious minorities, which India viewed with deep concern. The Awami League’s fall and the subsequent rise of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)—historically more nationalist and less overtly aligned with India—created uncertainty about the future of bilateral ties.

Q2: What is the BNP government’s demand for the extradition of Sheikh Hasina, and why is India unlikely to comply?

A2: The Bangladesh government has requested the extradition of Sheikh Hasina and her former Home Minister, who have been awarded the death penalty by the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT). India cannot acquiesce to this request for several reasons. First, the ICT has been widely condemned as a politically partisan body, established without proper judicial safeguards and used to target opposition leaders. Second, India has a consistent policy of not extraditing political figures who claim they would not receive a fair trial. The demand is best understood as a political statement by the new government seeking to legitimise its own legal processes and signal that it will not be seen as soft on the previous regime. It is not a deal-breaker for the broader bilateral relationship.

Q3: What are the key areas of cooperation discussed during the Bangladesh Foreign Minister’s visit to New Delhi?

A3: The visit covered several important areas:

• Ganga Water Treaty: Both sides discussed the importance of renewing the treaty, which expires in December. This is a lifeline for agriculture and drinking water for millions on both sides.

• Fuel and Fertilisers: Bangladesh expressed the need for greater supplies from India, addressing its energy shortages and agricultural input constraints.

• Visa Normalisation: Both countries agreed to normalise visa issuance, benefiting students, medical tourists, businesspersons, and families with cross-border ties.

• Border Cooperation: While not explicitly part of the visit’s headline agenda, securing the 1,156 km border remains India’s most salient issue, and both sides have signalled commitment to continued BSF-BGB cooperation.

Q4: Why is the India-Bangladesh border so critical for India’s security, particularly for its northeastern states?

A4: The 1,156 km border is one of the most complex and densely populated land borders in the world. Cooperation between the Border Security Force (BSF) and Bangladesh’s Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) has been essential for:

• Preventing cross-border smuggling of contraband, arms, and fake currency.

• Curtailing illegal migration.

• Preventing insurgent groups from using Bangladeshi territory as a sanctuary.
  India’s northeastern states—Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Mizoram—are connected to the rest of the country largely through the narrow “Chicken’s Neck” corridor. Any disruption in border cooperation would have immediate and severe internal security consequences for this region.

Q5: What does “sidestepping short-termism” mean in the context of India-Bangladesh relations, and why is it important?

A5: “Sidestepping short-termism” refers to resisting the temptation to let immediate political calculations, emotional reactions, or past grievances derail long-term strategic interests. For India, this means not punishing Bangladesh for Hasina’s ouster or viewing the BNP government through the lens of past grievances. For Bangladesh, this means not using India as a domestic political punching bag or allowing the Hasina extradition issue to dominate the agenda. Both sides share a history, culture, and geography that make the gains of working together exponential. Short-term political posturing—whether in New Delhi or Dhaka—risks losing these long-term benefits. The relationship must be insulated from electoral cycles and domestic political pressures to realise its full potential.