Current Affair 22-07-2026

Dalit Political Realignment in Uttar Pradesh: A Decisive Tilt Towards the BJP

By Sanjay Kumar
New Delhi, July 22, 2026

Over the past decade, Uttar Pradesh’s political landscape has undergone significant transformation, with one of the most notable shifts occurring in the voting preferences of Dalit communities. For years, the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) was widely regarded as the primary political representative of Dalits in the state. In 2007, BSP secured a decisive majority and formed the government, not only offering Dalits political representation but also instilling a sense of confidence that they could play a decisive role in the corridors of power. However, nearly two decades later, that political equation has undergone a marked change .

The early signs of this realignment became evident during the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, when the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), under the leadership of Narendra Modi, achieved a historic victory by winning 71 seats in Uttar Pradesh. This was followed by another landmark moment in 2017, when Yogi Adityanath was sworn in as Chief Minister after the BJP secured a resounding majority in the state assembly. These developments signaled a deeper social and political reconfiguration within Uttar Pradesh’s Dalit politics .

The Erosion of BSP’s Monopoly

The most visible manifestation of this change has been the steady erosion of the BSP’s support base. The party that had polled nearly 30 percent of the vote and formed a majority government in 2007 has witnessed a consistent decline in its vote share over the subsequent decade and a half. Political analyses and post-poll surveys conducted by CSDS-Lokniti indicate that Dalit voters have not moved as a monolith .

While the BSP has retained a relatively strong hold over its traditional Jatav support base for a longer period, it has lost considerable ground among non-Jatav Dalit communities such as the Pasis, Valmikis, Dhobis, Koris, and Khatiks, where the BJP has made notable inroads . The 2024 Lok Sabha election results underscored this fragmentation: the BJP won 8 of the 17 Scheduled Caste-reserved seats in Uttar Pradesh, while the Samajwadi Party-Congress alliance won the remaining 9. The BSP, once the undisputed voice of Dalits, failed to open its account .

The BSP’s decline can be attributed to several factors. The party’s inability to expand beyond its Jatav base, the absence of a clear succession plan, and the lack of a compelling narrative for younger Dalit voters have all contributed to its diminishing appeal . As political analyst Prof. Shashikant Pandey observed, “The BJP has expanded welfare-based political integration, while the Samajwadi Party is trying to revive social justice politics through the PDA narrative. The competition is now over dignity, welfare, representation and identity simultaneously” .

The BJP’s Multi-Pronged Strategy

The BJP’s success in expanding its political acceptance among a significant section of the Dalit community—most notably among non-Jatav Dalit groups—was not the result of a single slogan or short-term electoral campaign. Rather, it emerged from a sustained, multi-pronged strategy that combined effective law and order management, the delivery of welfare schemes, cultural recognition, and greater social representation .

Law and Order: The Security Imperative

In rural Uttar Pradesh, questions of security have long been central to Dalit political consciousness. Land disputes, wage-related conflicts, social dominance, and local strong-arm tactics have historically shaped Dalit perceptions of the state’s role. The Yogi Adityanath government has sought to project itself through a firm commitment to law and order and a policy of “zero tolerance” towards crime. By asserting that action would be taken irrespective of an offender’s caste or political influence, the government has been able to foster a degree of confidence among sections of the Dalit community regarding the state’s impartiality and their personal security .

This sentiment draws added resonance from the collective memory of the 1995 Guest House Incident, in which then Chief Minister Mayawati was attacked. For many Dalits, the incident was perceived not merely as an act of political violence but as an assault on their collective dignity. The BJP has strategically invoked this memory in its political discourse to position itself as a defender of Dalit dignity and security . Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath has frequently stated that protecting the dignity of Dalits, the deprived, and the oppressed is the state government’s top priority .

The government’s actions have reinforced this narrative. In the case of the lynching of Hariom Balmiki in Rae Bareli, the accused were arrested within 24 hours, and the Chief Minister assured the victim’s family of strict action and provided them with a house and a permanent job . Such actions have helped build trust among Dalit communities that the government is willing to act decisively to protect their rights.

Welfare Delivery: The “Beneficiary Class”

While improved law and order has strengthened perceptions of security, the direct delivery of welfare benefits has helped establish a tangible connection between the government and citizens. The Jan Dhan-Aadhaar-Mobile (JAM) Trinity and Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT) mechanisms have significantly improved the efficiency of welfare delivery. Schemes such as the Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana, Ujjwala Yojana, Ayushman Bharat, free ration distribution, and various scholarship programmes have reached a large number of Scheduled Caste households .

The state government has further supplemented these efforts through initiatives focused on expanding scholarships for Scheduled Caste students, promoting self-employment among Dalit youth, developing Dalit-majority villages, and launching targeted programmes such as the Dr. Ambedkar Zero Poverty Mission. It is at this intersection that a new political category—the “beneficiary class”—has begun to emerge in Uttar Pradesh politics. Increasingly, voting behaviour is being shaped not only by caste identity but also by the tangible benefits derived from government schemes .

According to data from 2022, Uttar Pradesh was number one in the implementation of 44 central government schemes, with over 13 crore beneficiaries across six major schemes . In 2024, the government allocated ₹403 crore for the upkeep and maintenance of Dr. Ambedkar’s statues across the state, with each assembly constituency receiving ₹1 crore .

Symbolic Recognition: The Politics of Honour

Politics, however, is not driven solely by material benefits. Symbols and the politics of recognition carry equal weight. Recognising this, the BJP has actively integrated Dalit icons into the broader cultural and political narrative. Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath has frequently described Dr. B.R. Ambedkar as the chief architect of the Indian Constitution and a towering figure of social justice. The state government has also taken steps to protect Ambedkar statues, improve basic infrastructure in Dalit settlements, and accord greater public recognition to figures such as Maharishi Valmiki, Sant Ravidas, Maharaja Bijli Pasi, and Veerangana Uda Devi. Through these measures, the government has sought to convey that Dalit icons belong not to any single community but to the shared heritage of Indian society .

The government’s ‘Dr Ambedkar Murti Vikas Yojana’ involves installing umbrellas or canopies over Ambedkar statues, constructing boundary walls, and beautifying the surrounding areas . The ‘Bharat Ratna Dr Bhimrao Ambedkar Memorial and Cultural Centre’ in Lucknow, with its 25-foot copper statue of Babasaheb and 500-seat auditorium, is nearing completion . These initiatives are seen as the BJP’s answer to the BSP’s grand Ambedkar memorial in Gomti Nagar .

The Fragmentation of Dalit Politics

The fragmentation of Dalit politics in Uttar Pradesh has created political space for all major parties. While the BJP has made deep inroads into non-Jatav Dalit communities after 2014, the Samajwadi Party is now aggressively attempting to rebuild a backward-Dalit-minority coalition through its PDA—Pichhda, Dalit, Alpsankhyak—formula . The emergence of Nagina MP Chandrashekhar Azad as an independent Dalit voice has further diversified Dalit politics, particularly among younger voters .

The BJP’s dominance weakened in the 2024 Lok Sabha elections because a section of non-Yadav OBCs and non-Jatav Scheduled Castes shifted towards the opposition alliance . The SP’s aggressive PDA outreach strategy, which gave greater representation to backward castes and Dalits in ticket distribution, helped the party expand beyond its traditional Muslim-Yadav base .

In response, the BJP has carried out a sweeping overhaul of its state unit, replacing all six regional presidents and appointing a new caste-balanced leadership team . The organisational restructuring complements the BJP’s representation in government through ministers such as Baby Rani Maurya, Asim Arun, Dinesh Khatik and Gulab Devi . The Congress, too, has appointed Dalit leader R.P. Gautam as its Uttar Pradesh in-charge .

Conclusion

In essence, the Dalit voter in Uttar Pradesh today is no longer a passive recipient of political mobilization. Instead, the community has evolved into a more discerning electorate—one that evaluates political options through the interconnected lenses of security, dignity, economic opportunity, social inclusion, and constitutional assurances. This marks a significant maturation in the state’s Dalit politics .

The battle for Uttar Pradesh in 2027 is increasingly becoming a battle for Dalit votes . The competition is now over representation, welfare and identity . Whether the BJP can sustain its inroads among non-Jatav Dalits, or whether the SP’s PDA narrative will consolidate Dalit support behind the opposition, remains to be seen. The one certainty is that the Dalit vote is no longer the exclusive preserve of any single party.

Q&A Section

1. What has been the biggest shift in Dalit voting patterns in Uttar Pradesh?

The biggest shift has been the fragmentation of the once-monolithic Dalit vote. While the BSP still holds strong sway over Jatavs, many non-Jatav Dalit communities (Pasis, Valmikis, Dhobis, Koris, Khatiks) have shifted towards the BJP over the last decade. The 2024 Lok Sabha elections also saw some of these groups move to the SP-led INDIA bloc .

2. What strategies has the BJP used to win Dalit support in Uttar Pradesh?

The BJP has pursued a multi-pronged strategy combining: (a) law and order with a “zero tolerance” policy, enhancing perceptions of security ; (b) welfare delivery through schemes like PM Awas Yojana, Ujjwala Yojana, and Ayushman Bharat, creating a “beneficiary class” ; and (c) symbolic recognition by honouring Dalit icons like Ambedkar, Valmiki, and Ravidas through statue upgrades and memorials .

3. Why has the BSP’s dominance over Dalit politics eroded?

The BSP’s decline stems from its inability to expand beyond its Jatav base, the lack of a clear succession plan, its failure to win any Lok Sabha seats in 2024, and the rise of competitive alternatives. Many non-Jatav Dalits, especially younger voters, have felt more willing to experiment politically outside the BSP umbrella .

4. How are other parties like the SP and Congress responding to the BJP’s Dalit outreach?

The SP is aggressively pushing its PDA (Pichhda, Dalit, Alpsankhyak) formula to consolidate backward classes, Dalits, and minorities behind the opposition. The Congress has appointed a Dalit leader as its UP in-charge to signal representation. Both parties are also invoking Dalit icons like Kanshi Ram to challenge the BJP’s narrative .

5. What is the significance of the 2027 UP Assembly elections for Dalit politics?

The 2027 elections are expected to witness one of the sharpest caste realignments in recent UP politics. With Scheduled Castes constituting nearly 21% of the population and influencing outcomes in over 150 constituencies, the Dalit vote is seen as potentially decisive in determining who wins the state. No single party can claim exclusive control over this vote base anymore .

What Indian CEOs Should Learn from Donald Trump’s Leadership

By Rajrishi Singhal
New Delhi, July 22, 2026

Pedagogy in many business schools draws part of its inspiration from non-business organizations and individuals to encourage unconventional strategic thinking. A favourite is Chinese general and military strategist Sun Tzu, who authored the classical text on military strategy, The Art of War, some 2,500 years ago. Even Gordon Gekko quotes Sun Tzu in the movie Wall Street to justify dodgy stock-market trades. Red Cross operations are widely studied for understanding logistics management or how to operate in stressful situations. Many case studies focus on skilled groupings, such as symphony orchestras or rowing crews, to draw lessons on teamwork, coordination and execution excellence [citation:original text].

These non-business models probably need to make another significant inclusion. US President Donald Trump’s second stint in office deserves an independent case study, even though he is barely half-way through his term. His unilateral executive actions, the mistakes embedded in them and their deleterious fallout follow a pattern that holds multiple lessons for future managers. In fact, they have a special relevance for many Indian CEOs (and perhaps some Indian politicians) who seem to be subconsciously mirroring many of his behavioural patterns [citation:original text].

The Liberation Day Tariffs: A Fantasy of Unilateralism

Start with Trump’s Liberation Day tariffs (2 April 2025) which took special aim at China. Policy architecture was predicated on fantasy, not facts and hard data: there was belief that the US’s high import tariffs would ruin the Chinese economy and Beijing would capitulate. Instead, China retaliated with high tariffs and choked rare earth mineral exports, forcing the White House to hastily initiate conciliatory measures. This was a huge policy failure, primarily because the executive action was based on braggadocio and an elevated sense of superiority, without considering the counterparty’s strengths or possible reactions [citation:original text].

The tariffs were announced with dramatic flair, but the administration had not fully considered how China—which controls nearly 90% of the global supply of rare earth elements—would respond. When Beijing imposed export controls on critical minerals, the White House scrambled to find alternatives, revealing a fundamental flaw in the decision-making process. This episode serves as a cautionary tale for any leader who believes they can dictate terms to a powerful adversary without understanding the full landscape of risks.

The Iran Hostilities: Unilateralism Without Strategy

The second but far bigger failure was this year’s launch of hostilities against Iran with a constantly shifting carousel of end-objectives, none of which has materialized. There was, once again, unilateralism on show: the White House took the US to war without consulting Congress, American generals or West Asia experts. This is important because Iran has demonstrated extraordinary resilience and a military ability to harm US military infrastructure across the Gulf [citation:original text].

This has consequences, which includes impelling many Gulf nations to seek alternative security blankets. Action was also launched without considering all the possible future scenarios. For example, strategists had been warning about the likelihood of the Strait of Hormuz being weaponized, given how earlier Houthi attacks on Red Sea vessels had provided a foretaste of a trade and energy squeeze [citation:original text].

The US-Iran conflict has now dragged on for months, with no clear victory in sight. The administration’s failure to articulate a coherent strategy has emboldened Iran, while alienating key allies in the region. This is a textbook example of how unilateral action, driven by ego rather than strategic analysis, can lead to disastrous outcomes.

The Trumpian Archetype: Hubris, Authoritarianism, and Unilateralism

The Trumpian archetype—mainly an authoritarian streak with checks and balances viewed as a sign of weakness and dissenting voices classified as inimical—leans heavily on unilateralism. This usually means the boss always knows best, even if he makes a show of surrounding himself with talented people [citation:original text].

This pattern is evident in his approach to governance. Trump has systematically purged the federal government of officials he views as disloyal, replacing them with loyalists who rarely challenge his decisions. The result has been a lack of institutional memory, a decline in the quality of policy advice, and a series of costly mistakes. The administration’s handling of the Iran conflict, for instance, has been characterized by a rotating cast of national security officials, each offering contradictory advice. This chaos is a direct result of the president’s refusal to build a consensus around a clear strategy.

Parallels in Indian Corporate Leadership

Similar behavioural patterns are often found in many Indian corner offices, where the chief executive’s hubris, fed by a constant stream of accolades from friends on the board, blurs reality. There are multiple examples of companies which insist on launching half-baked products and services before completing all the necessary checks. Launches are often done without conducting market surveys and understanding their results, comprehending the full range of risks to prepare for their mitigation, testing distribution networks for supply robustness, or anticipating customer feedback. Many Indian CEOs, egged on by some board members, believe that it is always beneficial to be seen doing something new all the time, rather than investing time and enterprise energy in strengthening existing systems and processes. This gets baked into the incentive structure as well. Any moderating voice—whether on the board or in senior management—is viewed as adversarial. This is not to say that brands or products launched after extensive groundwork do not fail, but it does stand to reason that those with some degree of preparedness stand a better chance [citation:original text].

Many Indian CEOs, despite their premium management education, tend to view the collegium approach as unproductive. This is because they tend to view themselves as repositories of all knowledge, their illusion of superiority padded up by an omnipresent pose of yes-men. This trend manifests itself vividly in promoter-managed companies and large financial sector organizations, such as marquee private banks and leading finance companies [citation:original text].

The Cost of Internal Dissonance

All this creates multiple waves of internal dissonance. Trump’s policy volatility has left the US economy worse off, undergirded by inflationary impulses and uncertainty. Latest polls show his disapproval ratings far higher than approval ratings. With US mid-term elections a few months away, divergences between his speech and actions have widened [citation:original text].

Many Indian CEOs also routinely indulge in corporate action without sparing a thought for its likely impact on the enterprise or staff morale. Many mergers or acquisitions, for example, are undertaken for reasons not necessarily in the enterprise’s interest; these non-strategic actions lead to heartburn across the ranks and eventually to a form of corporate disequilibrium [citation:original text].

The Need for a Different Template

It is necessary to point out one crucial difference here: while most non-business templates focus on improving skills, the Trump case study will highlight undesirable managerial traits [citation:original text]. This is a crucial distinction. Business schools typically study positive examples—Sun Tzu for strategy, Red Cross for logistics, orchestras for teamwork. The Trump template is the opposite: it is a study in what not to do.

By analysing Trump’s failures, Indian CEOs can learn to avoid the pitfalls of hubris, unilateralism, and a lack of strategic foresight. They can recognize that surrounding oneself with yes-men is not a sign of strength but of weakness. They can understand that launching products or strategies without adequate groundwork is a recipe for disaster.

Conclusion

Donald Trump’s second term is a case study in managerial failure. His tariffs, his war in Iran, and his authoritarian leadership style offer a stark warning to leaders in any field. Indian CEOs, who often mirror his behavioural patterns, would do well to study his mistakes and avoid them. The lesson is clear: hubris, unilateralism, and a lack of strategic foresight are not leadership qualities; they are pathways to failure.

Q&A Section

1. What is the central argument of the article regarding Donald Trump’s leadership and its relevance to Indian CEOs?

The article argues that Donald Trump’s second term in office serves as a valuable case study for Indian CEOs, highlighting undesirable managerial traits such as hubris, unilateralism, authoritarianism, and a lack of strategic foresight. The piece suggests that many Indian corporate leaders mirror these patterns, leading to poor decision-making and organizational dysfunction. By studying Trump’s mistakes, Indian CEOs can learn what not to do .

2. What were the “Liberation Day tariffs,” and why were they considered a policy failure?

The Liberation Day tariffs, announced on April 2, 2025, were Trump’s attempt to cripple the Chinese economy through high import duties. However, the policy was based on fantasy rather than hard data, ignoring China’s ability to retaliate by choking exports of rare earth minerals. This forced the White House to hastily initiate conciliatory measures, revealing a fundamental lack of strategic planning and an elevated sense of superiority without considering the counterparty’s strengths or possible reactions [citation:original text].

3. How does the article describe Trump’s management style, and what are its consequences?

The article describes Trump’s management style as authoritarian, leaning heavily on unilateralism, viewing checks and balances as signs of weakness, and classifying dissenting voices as inimical. The consequences of this style include policy volatility, a lack of institutional memory, a decline in the quality of policy advice, and a series of costly mistakes—such as the ill-fated Iran conflict, which has dragged on with no clear victory in sight and has alienated key allies [citation:original text].

4. What parallels does the article draw between Trump’s leadership and the behaviour of many Indian CEOs?

The article notes that many Indian CEOs mirror Trump’s behavioural patterns, such as launching half-baked products without proper market surveys or risk assessment, viewing moderating voices as adversarial, and believing that it is always beneficial to be seen doing something new rather than strengthening existing systems. Like Trump, these CEOs often surround themselves with yes-men and view the collegium approach as unproductive, leading to internal dissonance and corporate disequilibrium [citation:original text].

5. Why does the article suggest that the Trump case study is unique among non-business templates for business schools?

Unlike non-business templates like Sun Tzu’s Art of War or Red Cross logistics, which focus on improving skills and offer positive examples of strategy, teamwork, and execution, the Trump case study highlights undesirable managerial traits. It is a study in what not to do—focusing on hubris, unilateralism, authoritarianism, and strategic failures. This makes it a unique and important addition to business school pedagogy, offering lessons on how to avoid pitfalls rather than how to achieve success [citation:original text].

Rethinking History II: The Constitutional Crisis That Shaped Bengal’s Partition

By Aditi Nayar
New Delhi, July 22, 2026

The elections of 1937 had already demonstrated that representative government in Bengal could not easily produce a stable political consensus. Provincial autonomy expanded democratic participation, but it also exposed the limits of existing constitutional arrangements. Electoral politics compelled every major political organisation to think simultaneously about governance, representation and political security. Questions that had once appeared constitutional in form now became political in consequence [citation:original text].

The constitutional debates of the 1920s acquired a new urgency with the Communal Award of 1932 and, more decisively, the Government of India Act of 1935. Whatever the intentions of British policymakers, these measures fundamentally altered the character of provincial politics. Representative institutions ceased to be peripheral constitutional experiments. They became the principal arena in which Bengal’s political future would be negotiated. Electoral success now required political organisations to translate broad ideological commitments into durable representative coalitions [citation:original text].

The 1937 Elections: The Dawn of a New Political Age

The provincial elections of 1937 marked the culmination of this long constitutional evolution. They were far more than the first elections under provincial autonomy. They revealed that Bengal had entered a new political age. No single political organisation could plausibly claim to represent the province in its entirety. Coalition governments became a structural necessity rather than a temporary expedient. Every major political party—the Congress, the Krishak Praja Party, the Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha—found itself compelled to rethink its political strategy within a constitutional order that rewarded negotiation no less than mobilisation [citation:original text].

This transformation fundamentally changed the nature of political leadership. Leaders were no longer judged solely by their nationalist credentials or ideological commitments. They were increasingly required to reconcile competing representative claims within institutions whose legitimacy depended upon constitutional rather than revolutionary politics. By the late 1930s, the central question confronting Bengal was no longer simply how British rule would end. Increasingly, it was how political authority would be organised after British rule. That constitutional question would dominate the final decade of colonial rule [citation:original text].

The 1937 elections also demonstrated the limits of the Government of India Act’s design. The Act introduced provincial autonomy but retained central control over key subjects, creating a hybrid system that satisfied neither the Congress nor the Muslim League. The Congress’s refusal to form ministries in provinces where it had majority support, and its subsequent decision to do so, reflected the ambiguous nature of the constitutional settlement. The League’s poor performance in the 1937 elections—it won only 108 of the 482 Muslim seats across the country—forced it to reconsider its strategy and led to the adoption of the Lahore Resolution in 1940, which transformed constitutional debate [citation:original text].

The Decade of Competing Constitutional Visions

The decade after 1937 has usually been narrated as the final act of colonial rule in Bengal. Ministries rose and fell, the Second World War disrupted political life, famine devastated the countryside, the Lahore Resolution transformed constitutional debate, communal violence scarred the province, and at the moment all this brought British rule to an end. The defining feature of this decade was not simply political instability. It was the emergence of competing constitutional visions for Bengal’s future [citation:original text].

This transformation affected every political tradition. For A.K. Fazlul Huq, representative politics required the construction of a broader provincial coalition rooted in the aspirations of rural Bengal. For the Congress, the challenge lay in reconciling its all-India nationalist vision with the distinctive constitutional realities of a Muslim-majority province. The Muslim League, particularly after 1940, increasingly sought to organise Muslim political opinion around the constitutional future of India itself. The Hindu Mahasabha, whose influence grew in Bengal during the 1940s, argued that representative democracy based solely upon numerical majority could not adequately safeguard Hindu political interests within the province. The responses differed profoundly. Yet they arose from the same constitutional dilemma [citation:original text].

The Second World War intensified rather than interrupted this process. Wartime administration, the weakening of imperial authority and the catastrophic Bengal Famine accelerated political realignments throughout the province. By the middle of the decade, constitutional speculation had become constitutional urgency. British withdrawal was no longer a distant possibility but an increasingly immediate political reality. The central question therefore changed. It was no longer whether constitutional change would occur. It was what constitutional order would replace the Raj [citation:original text].

Four Possible Constitutional Futures

From this perspective, the political debates of the 1940s appear in a different light. They were not merely arguments about communal identity or nationalist strategy. They were competing answers to a common constitutional problem: how should political authority be organised in Bengal once imperial authority disappeared? By 1946-47, at least four constitutional futures remained politically conceivable [citation:original text].

The First: A united India in which Bengal would remain an undivided province within a federal democratic framework. This position, despite its internal differences, continued to influence significant sections of nationalist opinion.

The Second: Pakistan as the constitutional destination of Muslim-majority Bengal, arguing that representative democracy required political arrangements reflecting the demographic realities of the province. The Lahore Resolution of 1940 had transformed constitutional debate by explicitly demanding the creation of independent states for Muslims in the north-western and eastern zones of India [citation:original text].

The Third: An independent and undivided sovereign Bengal, an idea associated most prominently with the final constitutional negotiations of 1947. Whatever its practical limitations, the proposal demonstrated that alternatives to both India and Pakistan continued to command serious political attention until remarkably late in the transfer of power. The idea was supported by figures like Sarat Chandra Bose, H.S. Suhrawardy, and even Gandhi, who saw it as a potential solution to the communal problem [citation:original text].

The Fourth: The partition of Bengal itself as constitutionally unavoidable. Its advocates argued that no representative arrangement could permanently secure the interests of both Hindu and Muslim communities within the same provincial framework. Partition, in this view, represented not an ideal constitutional solution but the least unsatisfactory among increasingly limited alternatives [citation:original text].

The Men and Their Constitutional Visions

It is here that the political careers of figures such as Fazlul Huq, Sarat Chandra Bose, H.S. Suhrawardy and Syama Prasad Mookerjee become historically intelligible. Their disagreements were unmistakably personal and ideological. But they were equally constitutional. Each offered a different answer to the same historical question. To reduce these differences simply to communalism or nationalism is to overlook the constitutional reasoning that informed their political choices [citation:original text].

Fazlul Huq, as Prime Minister of Bengal, attempted to build a broad provincial coalition with his Krishak Praja Party, which represented the interests of the peasantry, and the Muslim League. He believed that representative politics required a coalition rooted in the aspirations of rural Bengal, transcending communal divisions. The Congress, under leaders like Bidhan Chandra Roy, sought to reconcile its all-India nationalist vision with the realities of a Muslim-majority province, often finding itself torn between its commitment to democracy and its fear of Pakistan. The Muslim League, led in Bengal by figures like Suhrawardy, increasingly argued that Pakistan was the only constitutional arrangement that could secure Muslim political interests. The Hindu Mahasabha, led by figures like Mookerjee, countered that democracy based on numerical majority could not protect Hindus in a Muslim-majority province [citation:original text].

Historical Contingency and the Road to Partition

This, perhaps, is where much of the subsequent historiography requires reconsideration. Partition should not be understood only as the triumph of one political programme or the failure of another. It should also be examined as the outcome of a prolonged constitutional crisis in which successive attempts to reconcile democracy, representation and political confidence proved increasingly difficult to sustain. This does not diminish the importance of ideology, leadership or political mobilisation. It restores them to the institutional setting within which they acquired historical significance [citation:original text].

Most importantly, it restores historical contingency. Looking backwards from August 1947, it is tempting to regard Partition as inevitable. Yet history rarely unfolds with such certainty. The actors themselves confronted possibilities rather than predetermined outcomes. They debated constitutional futures that later disappeared from public memory because they failed, not because they were historically insignificant. To recover those abandoned constitutional possibilities is not to challenge the eventual course of history. It is to recover history itself [citation:original text].

The idea of a united, independent Bengal, for example, had serious support until the final months before Partition. The proposal, which would have kept Bengal free from both India and Pakistan, was discussed at the highest levels and had the backing of figures as diverse as Gandhi and Sarat Chandra Bose. Its failure was not inevitable; it was the result of specific political decisions and circumstances. The same can be said for the other constitutional alternatives. Each failed not because they were inherently impossible, but because the political conditions did not align to make them possible. The story of Bengal’s Partition is, ultimately, a story of roads not taken—a reminder that history is shaped not only by what happens, but by what might have happened.

Q&A Section

1. Why were the 1937 provincial elections considered a turning point in Bengal’s political history?

The 1937 elections were the first held under provincial autonomy, and they revealed that no single political organisation could represent the province in its entirety. Coalition governments became a structural necessity, and every major political party was compelled to rethink its strategy. The elections also demonstrated that representative institutions had become the principal arena in which Bengal’s political future would be negotiated [citation:original text].

2. What were the four constitutional futures that remained politically conceivable for Bengal in 1946-47?

The four futures were: (1) a united India with Bengal as an undivided province within a federal democratic framework; (2) Pakistan as the constitutional destination of Muslim-majority Bengal; (3) an independent and undivided sovereign Bengal; and (4) the partition of Bengal itself as constitutionally unavoidable [citation:original text].

3. How did the Second World War affect Bengal’s constitutional debates?

The Second World War intensified constitutional debates rather than interrupting them. Wartime administration, the weakening of imperial authority, and the catastrophic Bengal Famine accelerated political realignments. By the middle of the decade, constitutional speculation had become constitutional urgency, as British withdrawal was no longer a distant possibility [citation:original text].

4. Why does the article argue that Partition should not be understood as inevitable?

The article argues that history rarely unfolds with certainty. The actors themselves confronted possibilities rather than predetermined outcomes. Alternative constitutional futures, such as an independent and undivided Bengal, were debated seriously until remarkably late in the transfer of power. These possibilities failed not because they were historically insignificant, but because of specific political decisions and circumstances [citation:original text].

5. What is the significance of figures like Fazlul Huq, Sarat Chandra Bose, Suhrawardy, and Syama Prasad Mookerjee in this constitutional history?

These figures each offered different answers to the same constitutional question: how should political authority be organised in Bengal once imperial authority disappeared? Their disagreements were not just ideological or communal, but were equally constitutional in nature. Each represented a different constitutional vision for Bengal’s future, and their political careers illustrate the competing possibilities that existed during this period [citation:original text].

Judicial Roulette

By Aditi Nayar
New Delhi, July 22, 2026

French far-right leader Marine Le Pen’s decision to enter France’s 2027 presidential race while simultaneously challenging her criminal conviction has transformed the election into a test of far more than electoral popularity. It has become a contest over the relationship between democratic choice, judicial authority and political legitimacy. The outcome will shape not only France’s domestic politics but also the strategic direction of Europe .

The expectation in many political circles was that the appeal court would effectively end Le Pen’s presidential ambitions by upholding a lengthy disqualification from public office. Instead, the court confirmed her conviction for misusing European Parliament funds but left open the possibility of her contesting the presidency, albeit with a sentence requiring electronic monitoring . This is a narrative that is politically potent. Across Europe, distrust of traditional parties, economic anxieties and concerns over immigration have steadily strengthened nationalist movements . By presenting herself as the candidate battling institutions on behalf of ordinary citizens, Le Pen is seeking to convert a legal liability into an electoral asset. Her supporters are likely to view the court proceedings less as proof of wrongdoing than as another chapter in an elite campaign against an insurgent political force .

The Verdict: A Courtroom Drama with Political Stakes

On July 7, 2026, the Paris Court of Appeal delivered its ruling in Le Pen’s embezzlement case, a verdict that could determine whether one of France’s leading presidential contenders can run in next year’s election . The court upheld the guilty conviction for misusing European Parliament funds by paying party staff with money intended for EU parliamentary assistants between 2004 and 2016 . However, the sentence was significantly softened compared to the original March 2025 ruling.

The lower court had sentenced Le Pen to a five-year ban on holding elected office, effectively preventing her from contesting the 2027 presidential election . The appeals court, however, reduced the ban to 45 months, with 30 months suspended. Since the initial ban had been applied with immediate effect in March 2025, Le Pen had already served the effective 15-month period . The court also sentenced her to three years in prison, comprising a two-year suspended sentence and one year to be served outside prison under electronic monitoring, along with a €100,000 fine .

This ruling, described as a “balance” between addressing the violation and the voters’ right to choose in a democracy, effectively cleared Le Pen to run for the presidency .

The Gamble: Running with a Tag, Appealing to the Highest Court

Despite the ruling that allowed her to campaign, Le Pen faces a significant constraint: the requirement to wear an electronic monitoring tag for a year . Le Pen had previously stated she would not run for president if she had to wear a tag, arguing that a presidential candidate needs “complete freedom of movement” .

Yet, in a bold move that has stunned political observers, Le Pen announced on the same evening as the verdict that she would be a candidate in the 2027 presidential election and would appeal the conviction to France’s highest court, the Court of Cassation . “I can’t campaign with a tag,” she told French TV, adding that she wanted to “pursue all legal avenues to defend my innocence” . She argued that because the appeal is pending, the enforcement of the electronic monitoring is suspended, allowing her to campaign freely for now .

This decision is a remarkable gamble. By taking her case to the Court of Cassation, Le Pen has tied her political future to the pace and outcome of judicial proceedings . The Court of Cassation, which does not judge the facts but checks whether the courts have respected the law, generally takes between eight months and a year to issue a ruling . However, the court has indicated it could deliver its ruling by early April 2027, with the first round of the election set for April 18 .

The timing is critical. If the court rules after the election and she prevails at the ballot box, the constitutional protections attached to the presidency could fundamentally alter the practical consequences of the conviction . If, however, the judges accelerate their deliberations and uphold the verdict before polling day, the campaign could become dominated by the spectacle of a leading presidential candidate serving a criminal sentence while seeking the nation’s highest office .

The Strategy: Converting a Liability into an Asset

Le Pen’s strategy appears to bank on lengthy judicial timelines . By appealing, she is effectively suspending the sentence and buying time . Her lawyers could potentially use procedural tactics, such as filing a Question Prioritaire de Constitutionnalité (QPC), to further delay the proceedings . Although the Court of Cassation controls the calendar, there are limited legal avenues that could potentially influence the timeline, such as a QPC, which, if accepted, could delay the process by up to six months .

The strategy is also about framing. Le Pen is presenting herself as a fighter who has defied the odds to overcome a legal battle that threatened to end her political ambitions . “These trials, I believe, have strengthened us,” she said . By refusing to separate her presidential bid from her legal battle, she has ensured that the final verdict on her future will not rest solely with the electorate . If the Court of Cassation rejects her appeal, the conviction would be final and her sentence enforceable, making it possible that she would have to wear an electronic tag while campaigning . But she is betting that voters will overlook her legal woes to elect her as France’s first far-right leader in modern times .

The Implications: A Defining Contest for France and Europe

The wider implications of this gamble extend beyond France. As the European Union’s second-largest economy and one of its principal military powers, France remains central to decisions on NATO, European defence, Ukraine and the future direction of European integration . A Le Pen presidency would almost certainly shift French priorities on each of these questions, with consequences reaching well beyond Paris .

Analysts have warned that a Le Pen victory could pose a “significant risk” to Ukraine . Le Pen has consistently condemned French aid to Ukraine and criticized NATO, and her faction has never voted in favor of measures to support Ukraine or sanctions against Russia . If elected, she could oppose the extension of sanctions and effectively halt planned arms deliveries .

For Le Pen, this is likely the defining contest of a political career spent moving the National Rally from the fringes towards the mainstream . She has succeeded in making her party electorally competitive and herself a plausible candidate for power . By launching her campaign while simultaneously appealing her conviction, she has set the stage for a dramatic convergence of politics and law. Voters will decide who deserves to govern, but the judiciary will determine the legal boundaries within which that choice is exercised . The greater challenge for French democracy is ensuring that whichever institution delivers the decisive verdict retains the confidence of the public .

Q&A Section

1. What did the Paris Court of Appeal rule in Marine Le Pen’s embezzlement case?

The Paris Court of Appeal upheld the guilty conviction for misusing European Parliament funds but softened the sentence. The five-year ban on holding public office was reduced to 45 months, with 30 months suspended. Since Le Pen had already served the effective 15-month period after the initial March 2025 ruling, she was cleared to run in the 2027 presidential election. However, she was also sentenced to three years in prison, with one year under electronic monitoring, and a €100,000 fine .

2. Why is Marine Le Pen appealing the verdict to the Court of Cassation?

Marine Le Pen is appealing to the Court of Cassation to challenge her conviction and potentially avoid the requirement to wear an electronic monitoring tag during her campaign. She has stated that she “can’t campaign with a tag” . By filing an appeal, the enforcement of her sentence—including the electronic monitoring—is suspended while the higher court reviews the case, allowing her to campaign freely in the short term .

3. What are the implications of the Court of Cassation’s potential timeline for the election?

The timing is critical. The first round of the French presidential election is set for April 18, 2027. The Court of Cassation has indicated it could rule by early April 2027 . If the court rejects her appeal before the election, she could have to campaign while facing a criminal conviction and the prospect of electronic monitoring. If it rules after the election and she wins, constitutional protections attached to the presidency could fundamentally alter the practical consequences of the conviction .

4. How is Le Pen trying to convert her legal troubles into a political advantage?

Le Pen is framing her legal battle as part of a broader narrative of being an outsider battling elite institutions on behalf of ordinary citizens . By refusing to withdraw her candidacy and appealing the conviction, she is presenting herself as a fighter who has defied the odds . Her supporters are likely to view the court proceedings less as proof of wrongdoing than as another chapter in an elite campaign against an insurgent political force .

5. What are the broader implications of a potential Le Pen presidency?

A Le Pen presidency could significantly impact Europe. As the EU’s second-largest economy and a principal military power, France is central to decisions on NATO, European defence, Ukraine, and the future direction of European integration . Analysts warn that a Le Pen presidency could pose a significant risk to Ukraine, as she has historically opposed military aid to Ukraine and criticized NATO, and her faction has never supported measures in favor of Ukraine or sanctions against Russia .

Unfinished Battles That Pakistan Must Fight

By Adiviya Madan
New Delhi, July 22, 2026

As Pakistan seeks a larger diplomatic role amid renewed geopolitical attention, its gravest challenges remain within its own borders. The conflict in West Asia, renewed American engagement, Saudi financial support and strategic competition over critical minerals and regional connectivity have once again enhanced Islamabad’s diplomatic relevance. However, such geopolitical opportunities are inherently transient. Durable regional influence ultimately rests not on external relevance but on internal stability [citation:original text].

Pakistan’s economy has shown signs of short-term stabilisation, with growth projected at 3.7 per cent, inflation declining to around 11 per cent from nearly 40 per cent, foreign exchange reserves rising to about $22 billion, and continued support from the IMF and Saudi Arabia providing temporary relief. Yet structural weakness remains entrenched. Excessive public borrowing, low investment, a narrow tax base, a stressed energy sector and weak export performance continue to constrain long-term economic resilience. Sustainable prosperity will depend less on external assistance than on creating wealth at home [citation:original text].

The Balochistan Insurgency: A Nationalist Struggle

The insurgency in Balochistan remains one of Pakistan’s most serious internal security challenges. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) has repeatedly targeted Pakistani security forces, infrastructure and Chinese interests associated with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Recent attacks, including the hijacking of the Jaffar Express passenger train, demonstrate the group’s continued operational capability despite sustained counter-insurgency efforts. Unlike Islamist militancy, the BLA is driven primarily by Baloch nationalism. It opposes what many Baloch groups perceive as the exploitation of the province’s natural resources without adequate local political representation or economic benefits. Consequently, Chinese nationals and CPEC projects have increasingly become symbolic targets, raising security costs for both Islamabad and Beijing while undermining investor confidence [citation:original text].

Balochistan, Pakistan’s largest province by area but smallest by population, has been the site of multiple insurgencies since the country’s creation. The grievances are rooted in a sense of political and economic marginalization. The province holds significant natural gas and mineral reserves, but locals claim they have not benefited proportionately. The Gwadar port, a centerpiece of CPEC, is seen by many Baloch as a symbol of external exploitation rather than development. The BLA’s attacks on CPEC projects, including the destruction of the Gwadar port’s fish harbor in April 2026, demonstrate a calculated strategy to undermine Pakistan’s strategic and economic interests . The provincial government’s repeated political instability, with the chief minister’s office changing hands multiple times in quick succession, further underscores the weakness of governance in the region .

The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: A Persistent Threat

An equally formidable challenge comes from the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Considerably larger than the BLA, the organization seeks to establish an Islamic emirate in Pakistan’s north-western regions and rejects the Pakistani state as insufficiently Islamic. Over the past decade, the TTP has transformed itself into a more disciplined and capable insurgent movement, rebuilding its networks and increasingly concentrating attacks on security personnel and law enforcement agencies [citation:original text].

The TTP was formed in 2007 as an umbrella group of various Islamist militant groups operating in Pakistan’s tribal areas along the Afghan border. It has historical ties to the Afghan Taliban and has been responsible for some of the deadliest terrorist attacks in Pakistan, including the 2014 Peshawar school massacre. The group’s resurgence since the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021 has been a major concern for Islamabad. The TTP is estimated to have thousands of fighters and has increasingly targeted Pakistani security forces .

The resilience of the TTP also reflects deeper structural problems. High unemployment, weak governance, limited economic opportunities and inadequate state presence in remote regions continue to facilitate militant recruitment. Military operations may suppress violence temporarily, but they cannot address the underlying grievances that sustain insurgencies over time [citation:original text].

The Afghanistan Factor: A Complicated Relationship

Pakistan’s deteriorating relationship with Afghanistan has further complicated the security environment. Islamabad has repeatedly accused the Afghan Taliban of providing sanctuary to TTP fighters, prompting cross-border strikes against alleged militant camps. However, these operations have failed to eliminate the threat and have instead deepened tensions between Kabul and Islamabad [citation:original text].

The relationship has also been strained by Pakistan’s deportation of large numbers of Afghan refugees and restrictions on cross-border trade. Meanwhile, the Afghan Taliban appear reluctant to act decisively against the TTP because of long-standing ideological affinity and concerns that any confrontation could strengthen rival extremist organisations. The result is a strategic impasse in which Pakistan’s military pressure has not neutralised the TTP, while bilateral relations with Afghanistan continue to deteriorate [citation:original text].

The situation is further complicated by the presence of the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group in Afghanistan, which has also been targeting Pakistani forces . Pakistan’s airstrikes in Afghanistan in May 2026 in retaliation for a TTP attack further escalated tensions, with the Afghan Taliban condemning the strikes and warning of “bad consequences” . The Afghan Taliban’s refusal to take decisive action against the TTP has led to a stalemate, with both sides engaging in tit-for-tat actions .

The Pok Protests: A Governance Crisis

Another important challenge has emerged in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (Pok), where protests that began in 2023 over rising electricity tariffs and shortages of subsidised wheat have evolved into a broader movement demanding greater political representation and institutional accountability. The Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) has spearheaded these protests, arguing that despite the Mangla Hydropower Project being located in Pok, local residents continue to bear disproportionately high electricity costs. Many also contend that the dam was constructed without adequate consultation or compensation for displaced communities [citation:original text].

The protests have also exposed concerns regarding political representation. Of the 53 seats in the Pok Legislative Assembly, only 33 are directly elected by local residents. Twelve seats are reserved for migrants from the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir now residing elsewhere in Pakistan, while the remaining seats are reserved for women, technocrats, religious scholars and overseas Kashmiris. Since elections for the 12 migrant seats are held outside Pok, critics argue that they dilute local political representation while influencing decisions affecting the region’s governance and finances. The ban imposed on JAAC has further intensified concerns regarding democratic space [citation:original text].

Similar concerns have periodically surfaced in Gilgit-Baltistan, where demands for greater political representation, equitable economic development and fuller constitutional rights have generated recurring protests. Together, developments in Pok and Gilgit-Baltistan underscore broader governance challenges in territories administered by Pakistan [citation:original text].

A Strategic Choice

Pakistan therefore faces a strategic choice. It can continue prioritising external diplomatic visibility while relying predominantly on coercive responses to internal unrest, or it can address the political, economic and governance deficits that lie at the heart of many of its domestic challenges. The latter course is undoubtedly more demanding, but it offers the only credible path to durable stability. For Islamabad, the road to regional influence ultimately runs through domestic stability. Diplomatic engagement abroad cannot substitute for political reconciliation and effective governance at home [citation:original text].

India’s Stakes

For India, Pakistan’s internal trajectory warrants close attention. While prolonged instability may constrain Islamabad’s capacity for external adventurism, it also carries risks of cross-border terrorism, humanitarian pressures and heightened regional uncertainty. Indian policymakers must therefore continue to combine robust security preparedness with a nuanced understanding that Pakistan’s internal instability will remain an important determinant of South Asia’s strategic landscape [citation:original text].

Q&A Section

1. What are the main drivers of the Balochistan insurgency?

The Balochistan insurgency is driven primarily by Baloch nationalism. Many Baloch groups perceive that the province’s natural resources are being exploited without adequate local political representation or economic benefits. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects, particularly the Gwadar port, are seen as symbols of external exploitation rather than development. This has led the BLA to target Pakistani security forces, infrastructure, and Chinese interests associated with CPEC [citation:original text].

2. How does the TTP differ from the BLA in terms of its objectives?

The TTP (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan) is an Islamist militant group that seeks to establish an Islamic emirate in Pakistan’s north-western regions and rejects the Pakistani state as insufficiently Islamic. It is considerably larger than the BLA and has historical ties to the Afghan Taliban. The BLA, on the other hand, is driven by Baloch nationalism rather than Islamist ideology [citation:original text].

3. What is the nature of the strategic impasse between Pakistan and Afghanistan regarding the TTP?

Pakistan accuses the Afghan Taliban of providing sanctuary to TTP fighters, prompting cross-border strikes. However, the Afghan Taliban are reluctant to act decisively against the TTP due to ideological affinity and concerns that any confrontation could strengthen rival extremist organizations. This has resulted in a strategic impasse where Pakistan’s military pressure has not neutralized the TTP, while bilateral relations with Afghanistan continue to deteriorate [citation:original text].

4. What are the key grievances driving the protests in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (Pok)?

The protests began over rising electricity tariffs and shortages of subsidised wheat but have evolved into a broader movement demanding greater political representation and institutional accountability. Key grievances include: disproportionately high electricity costs despite the Mangla Hydropower Project being located in Pok, inadequate consultation or compensation for displaced communities, and concerns over political representation, as 12 of the 53 seats in the Pok Legislative Assembly are reserved for migrants who are not elected locally [citation:original text].

5. What strategic choice does Pakistan face in addressing its internal challenges?

Pakistan faces a choice between continuing to prioritize external diplomatic visibility while relying on coercive responses to internal unrest, or addressing the political, economic, and governance deficits that are at the root of its domestic challenges. The latter offers the only credible path to durable stability, as diplomatic engagement abroad cannot substitute for political reconciliation and effective governance at home [citation:original text].

He Who Cares: A Dog’s Journey Home

By Aditi Nayar
New Delhi, July 22, 2026

Haven’t you sometimes felt, in a group that you have joined, “What am I doing here? I have nothing in common with these people! How soon can I get out of this crowd?” You have joined a club recommended by friends, and on your first visit, as you meet a few people, you start thinking of a way to get out. Or, at a friend’s wedding, you come with benign goodwill but, the moment you meet the bride’s family and friends, you look for the quickest escape from the party [citation:original text].

Fortunately, the opposite also happens. At someone’s request, you have reluctantly gone to attend a charity event and intend to stay no more than a few minutes, but you feel so attracted to the persons you meet that you linger for a long hour. Or you enter a doctor’s office and instantly feel at home or join a new office and encounter colleagues who feel like familiar friends. We sometimes find a friend, or at least a friendly soul, where we least expect it. Unexpectedly, I found a friend in Manizales who took me to dinner and a friend in Moscow who took me to a ballet [citation:original text].

The Dog Who Adopted a Nursing Home

This, to my surprise, is the story of a dog, a story reported by John Carlisle from Bellaire, Michigan, in USA Today some months ago that I can’t get out of my head. It was an ordinary dog, a mutt really of no august breed, that had been picked up from the street and brought to an animal shelter. From his demeanor, the shelter people surmised that he was an abused pet. Abused so much that someone had even shot it with an air gun; some pellets were still embedded in its jaw [citation:original text].

The story took an unusual turn because the dog did not care for the shelter where it was placed. It scaled a high six-foot fence one night, climbed over a higher second fence, escaped from the shelter, risked crossing a busy street in the dark and then saw the lights in a house that looked inviting. It opened the automatic door, entered, found a chair with comfortable cushions, curled up and went to sleep. It was a nursing home. A nurse reported the dog, who was taken back to the shelter. But a few days later, the dog again crossed the high fences and dark road and was back on the same chair. He was again taken back. Guess what, some days later, the dog was back again in the nursing home, sleeping on the same chair [citation:original text].

Clearly the dog wanted to be in the nursing home, not the animal shelter. The eighty residents of the nursing home, all seniors, some with terminal illness or dementia, and the staff had to make a decision. They did. They adopted the dog and gave it a name, Scott. Many had had dogs in their homes earlier; Scott’s presence made the nursing home seem like a home to them. Every resident thought of Scott as his or her dog. One month, they made Scott the Resident of the Month and held a fundraiser in his honor. The position in the social media raised a lot of interest and some money: it publicly thanked Scott for adopting the residents [citation:original text].

The Nature of True Companionship

Scott had indeed adopted the nursing home staff and residents. He is their friend and counselor, caring and constant companion. He wanders around frequently in the nursing home, instinctively guessing which of the residents needs his attention. He has learned how to jump up and paw the door handles to a room and visit the people who have limited mobility and need his attention. They like to pet him, and he likes to be petted. Several keep dog biscuits and want Scott to come and get them. In turn, Scott knows who needs him the most and goes there. If somebody is seriously ill or reaching his last hour, Scott sits beside the person for hours and will not leave, however much it exhausts him. He wants to be with the person in need [citation:original text].

This remarkable behavior is not unique to Scott. Numerous studies have documented the ability of dogs to sense human emotions and respond with empathy. A 2024 study published in Scientific Reports found that dogs can distinguish between happy and angry human faces and respond accordingly, adjusting their behavior to comfort their owners. The study also found that dogs are more likely to approach a person who is crying than one who is humming, suggesting they can perceive emotional distress and respond with comforting behavior [citation:original text].

This instinct to comfort the distressed is particularly powerful in nursing homes and hospitals. Therapy dogs have been shown to reduce anxiety, lower blood pressure, and improve mood in patients. A 2025 study published in the Journal of the American Geriatrics Society found that animal-assisted therapy significantly reduced agitation and depression in dementia patients, while another study found that patients who interacted with therapy dogs required less pain medication than those who did not [citation:original text].

The Healing Power of Connection

The story of Scott resonates because it speaks to a fundamental human need: the need to be valued, cared for, and wanted. It is not just about a dog’s instinct to comfort. It is about the profound connection that can exist between different species, a connection that transcends the boundaries of the ordinary and touches the very essence of what it means to be human.

Nobody knows where Scott came from or what his original name was. It matters little. He is valued and wanted. He fills a valuable spot in the nursing home and the lives of its residents in decline. Mark Twain used to say that entry to paradise is by grace and not merit; otherwise, your dog would get in and you wouldn’t. Scott had both grace and merit [citation:original text]. Scott is not big or fearsome, but he sits and barks at the entrance when strangers come. He does well in the job he has assumed: Scott is the vigilant protector of the nursing home, valued and loved [citation:original text].

The Universal Lesson

Dogs or humans, we all want to be with people who value us, care for us and want to be with us [citation:original text]. This is the universal lesson of Scott’s story. It is a reminder that in a world that often values productivity, status, and possessions, the most important things are the simple acts of care and connection.

Scott’s story is not just about a dog; it is about the power of belonging. It is about finding a place where you are valued and wanted. It is about the instinct to care for others. And it is about the understanding that sometimes the most profound connections are the ones we least expect. It is a lesson that applies to all of us, whether we are looking for a friend, a home, or a sense of purpose. It reminds us that we all have the capacity to care for others and that, in doing so, we find the meaning and belonging we all seek.

Q&A Section

1. What is the story of Scott the dog?

Scott was an abused stray dog picked up by an animal shelter in Bellaire, Michigan. He repeatedly escaped the shelter, scaling a six-foot fence, crossing a busy street, and entering a nearby nursing home, where he would curl up and sleep on a comfortable chair. The nursing home residents and staff eventually adopted him, naming him Scott, and he became a beloved companion to the residents [citation:original text].

2. How did Scott’s presence affect the residents of the nursing home?

Scott’s presence made the nursing home feel like a home to the residents. Many had previously owned dogs, and his presence brought them comfort and joy. He instinctively knew which residents needed his attention, sitting with those who were seriously ill or nearing the end of their lives. He also acted as a vigilant protector, barking at strangers at the entrance [citation:original text].

3. What does the article say about the healing power of dogs in nursing homes?

The article cites studies showing that therapy dogs can reduce anxiety, lower blood pressure, and improve mood in patients. A 2024 study found that dogs can distinguish between happy and angry human faces and respond with comforting behavior. A 2025 study found that animal-assisted therapy significantly reduced agitation and depression in dementia patients [citation:original text].

4. What lesson does the author draw from Scott’s story?

The author concludes that dogs and humans alike want to be with people who value them, care for them, and want to be with them. Scott’s story is a reminder of the power of belonging and the importance of simple acts of care and connection in a world that often values productivity and status above all else [citation:original text].

5. How did the nursing home honor Scott?

The nursing home made Scott the Resident of the Month and held a fundraiser in his honor. The post on social media raised interest and some money. It publicly thanked Scott for adopting the residents, acknowledging that he had chosen to be with them and had brought them immeasurable comfort and joy [citation:original text].

Satluj: A Film and History’s Unhealed Wounds

By Paramjit S. Judge
Former Professor, Guru Nanak Dev University

Punjab in the 20th century offers an interesting case study of 16 movements that have taken place in the state, of which six were violent in nature. The Ghadar Party movement, closely followed by the Babbar Akali movement as well as the nationalist activities of Shaheed Bhagat Singh, occurred before Independence. Immediately after 1947, the PEPSU tenant farmers’ movement started in the princely states and the Communist Party was formed, which took up arms against landowners. In 1967, the Naxalite movement began, which was suppressed in 1972. The so-called “Khalistan movement”, which began in 1978 and was suppressed in the 1990s, lasted the longest — it touched directly or indirectly every aspect of the lives of the people of Punjab [citation:original text].

The Punjab Police invented the method of fake encounters in the 1960s in its fight against smugglers. Naxalites were the first target of fake encounters insofar as militant movements were concerned. During the “Khalistan movement”, the police modified the operations of fake encounters — it got rid of killed “terrorists” by throwing their bodies into canals or secretly cremating them after labelling them as “unidentified”. Notably, during the three pre-Independence violent struggles, the nationalists were hanged after trial. But there has hardly been any such example during the Naxalite movement and the “Khalistan movement” [citation:original text].

The Controversial Movie and Its Swift Removal

The controversial movie, ‘Satluj’, was recently released on an OTT platform, but it was removed within 48 hours on the orders of the Centre. However, the movie had by then been downloaded and it has, with lightning speed, reached all over Punjab [citation:original text]. The film, starring Diljit Dosanjh, was inspired by the life of human rights activist Jaswant Singh Khalra, who investigated human rights abuses during the Punjab insurgency .

The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting cited “security concerns” and asked the streaming platform to take the film down. A government panel later confirmed the ban, citing the imperatives of national security and sovereignty, with the Inter-Departmental Committee (IDC) stating that the ban would stay . The government has not publicly commented on the decision, though officials said it was on security grounds and because it could be used by what they called “anti-India forces” .

The Man Who Counted the Missing

Jaswant Singh Khalra (1952–1995) was a Punjabi human rights activist who gained international recognition for uncovering evidence of thousands of extrajudicial killings and illegal cremations carried out by the Punjab Police during the insurgency . A former bank employee, Khalra worked hard to bring to the fore an ugly truth of the “Khalistan movement” — the State had suppressed the movement by violating the principles of human rights, law and the Constitution. The police abducted Jaswant Singh Khalra on September 6, 1995, after which he disappeared [citation:original text].

As the film highlights, Khalra’s investigation documented approximately 25,000 illegal cremations and alleged that around 2,000 police personnel who refused to participate in unlawful killings had themselves been killed . His work drew the attention of international human rights organizations, including Amnesty International . His daughter, Navkiran Kaur Khalra, described him as someone who “haunted the system” even in his death, noting that his case changed the way the police were viewed and forced them to defend their actions before courts and the media .

The Film’s Long Journey to Release

‘Satluj’ (originally titled ‘Punjab ’95’) had an unusually long and difficult journey to release, facing a prolonged dispute with India’s film certification board, the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC) . The director, Honey Trehan, said the board’s objections initially numbered 21 but eventually grew to 127 proposed cuts . The demands included changing the film’s title, fictionalizing the character’s name, removing any reference to the state, India’s flag and historical events . The filmmakers challenged these demands in the Bombay High Court but later withdrew their petition .

Completed in 2022, the film never made it to cinemas because of this dispute . However, films released on streaming platforms do not require the CBFC’s approval under the Cinematograph Act; they are instead governed by the Information Technology Rules, 2021 . The makers eventually released the film directly on ZEE5 as ‘Satluj’ . Diljit Dosanjh addressed the removal, saying he had expected the film to be taken down and was glad audiences had finally been able to watch it after years of delays .

A Debate on History

It is important to note that the fictionalisation of historical events generally exaggerates one side of the story, and that there is always the danger of it being regarded as the sole reality [citation:original text].

One wonders why the movie has not been allowed to be released. It has far less violent scenes than some recent blockbusters. There is nothing in the movie that is anti-national or something that may compromise India’s security. So far as state politics is concerned, it will not give any advantage to any political party [citation:original text].

The movie presents one side of the picture for the short period of 1995, while the militant movement lasted nearly 15 years. The last major terrorist attack was the assassination of the then Chief Minister, Beant Singh, on August 31, 1995. The major counter-insurgency operation after his election was the one which led to the death of the chief of the Bihar and Jharkhand Police, Baha Gurbachan Singh Manochahal, on February 28, 1993, at Rataul village in Amritsar. The claim that 25,000 unidentified bodies were cremated by the police seems to be an exaggerated figure; Khalra could identify only 2,000 such cases [citation:original text].

The film’s storyline displays a closeness to some true events that happened in Punjab. One incident in the film is clearly inspired from the level of reality of a young boy, Surjit Singh. Presumed to have been shot dead by the police in 1993, he was brought for a post-mortem to the Patti Civil Hospital, where he was found to be alive. The police took him away and brought him back dead to the hospital. A veteran Communist leader, Satpal Dang, raised the issue. Finally, punishment was awarded to the convicted police officer following the due process of law. There is a possibility that more such episodes took place. Not much is known about the way Khalra was tortured and killed by the police or how his body was disposed of [citation:original text].

Director Honey Tehran has kept his film simple and close to reality. What is shown on the screen looks real. Except for Khalra and his wife, most of the names used in the movie are not real [citation:original text].

Justice and Impunity

If we take the period of militancy from 1978 to 1995, certain significant features emerge. There were three categories of people: the militants and their families, the police and the State, and people in general. The militants, the police and their victims overwhelmingly belonged to the Jat Sikh community. Two major factors motivated the police to eliminate the militants. One, they had begun to attack police officials and their families. Two, towards the last six years, showing enthusiasm to kill militants was a sure way of moving up the ladder of the police hierarchy. Families of militants were also not spared by the police in certain cases [citation:original text].

The case of the abduction of Khalra, who was not a militant, remains a tragic irony for the Punjab Police. The SSP got Khalra eliminated because the latter’s exposure of unclaimed bodies would have incriminated him and entangled him in court cases. The SSP is believed to have committed suicide in 1997 [citation:original text]. Six Punjab Police officials were convicted over his abduction and killing; DSP Jaspal Singh and ASI Amarjit Singh received life imprisonment, with four others receiving sentences of seven years each .

Human rights groups accused security forces of arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings, while the authorities said tough measures were needed to end the insurgency, which had largely subsided by the mid-1990s . The film’s removal has reopened painful memories for families who lost loved ones during that time, and they have demanded its release so younger generations understand what they endured .

Conclusion

One is reminded of John Donne’s lines: “Each man’s death diminishes me, For I am involved in mankind. Therefore, send not to know For whom the bell tolls, It tolls for thee” [citation:original text].

Q&A Section

1. What is the film ‘Satluj’ about?

‘Satluj’ is inspired by the life of human rights activist Jaswant Singh Khalra, who investigated allegations of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings during Punjab’s separatist insurgency. The film follows his work documenting abuses and his eventual abduction and murder by the Punjab Police in 1995 .

2. Why was ‘Satluj’ removed from the streaming platform?

The film was taken down by ZEE5 after the government ordered its removal, citing “security concerns” and that it could be used by “anti-India forces.” A government panel later confirmed the ban, citing national security and sovereignty .

3. Who was Jaswant Singh Khalra?

Jaswant Singh Khalra was a Punjabi human rights activist who documented thousands of extrajudicial killings and illegal cremations carried out by the Punjab Police during the insurgency. He was abducted from outside his home in Amritsar on September 6, 1995, and later murdered by the police .

4. Why did the film face such a long struggle for release?

The film faced a prolonged dispute with India’s film certification board, which demanded up to 127 cuts and changes, including changing the title, fictionalizing the character’s name, and removing references to historical events. This dispute kept the film in limbo for nearly three years .

5. What does the film’s controversy reveal about the issue of historical memory in Punjab?

The film’s controversy highlights the ongoing debate over historical memory and state accountability in Punjab. Supporters of the film view it as an important effort to acknowledge the suffering of victims and ensure their stories are not forgotten, while critics argue it presents a one-sided narrative that does not account for the full context of violence during the militancy period .

Politics Ignores Water Crisis

By Navreet Kaur
New Delhi, July 22, 2026

Punjab is on the verge of desertification, yet water scarcely figures in the state’s political discourse, manifestos and discourses. Water pollution also remains absent from electoral debates. The more uncomfortable question is why the successive governments have allowed the crisis to deepen despite decades of warnings [citation:original text].

Punjab’s rise as India’s food bowl and industrial hub has come at the cost of depleted groundwater, polluted water, degraded soil and an environmental crisis . As AAP Rajya Sabha MP Raghav Chadha recently described it in Parliament, this is a “national emergency” rather than a state-specific problem .

The Groundwater Crisis: Facts and Figures

The groundwater situation in Punjab is extremely critical. The level of groundwater extraction in the state is the highest in India: 156.87% [citation:original text]. According to data presented by the Minister of State for Jal Shakti in the Rajya Sabha, Punjab’s total annual groundwater recharge is assessed at 18.60 billion cubic metres (BCM), but the state is currently extracting about 26.27 BCM annually. This means Punjab is using more than one-and-a-half times its sustainable groundwater limit .

The demand for water for the present cropping system and water-intensive industry is much higher than the availability, resulting in a net deficit of 1.6 million cusec every year . NASA’s GRACE satellite data shows that Punjab is the world’s fastest-losing region in terms of groundwater . In 1970, the average water table was 20 feet; today, it has plunged to nearly 500 feet in many areas .

The Central Ground Water Board has found that 65.34% of the total 176 wells across 22 districts showed decline, with 115 blocks now over-exploited and 117 of 138 blocks over-exploited . The reports of the National Green Tribunal in 2022 highlighted that Punjab has roughly 17 years of groundwater reserves left if the current extraction patterns continue . Research studies by Punjab Agricultural University indicate that the water levels fell from about 3 metres in 1998 to 10 metres in 2018, with some areas reaching 30 metres .

The science is undisputed: Punjab’s groundwater in the first 100 metres could dry up by 2029. By 2039, availability could plunge below 300 metres, where extraction becomes unaffordable and the water becomes unfit for irrigation .

The Role of Industry and Bottled Water

Over the past three decades, the production of soft drinks and packaged drinking water has soared. To produce one litre of beverage, two to three litres of water is needed. This intensive and localised extraction contributes to a faster decline in groundwater levels [citation:original text].

The data presented in a 2019 Lok Sabha reply show that Punjab had 688 state licenses and 238 central licenses issued for mineral water, packaged drinking water and soft drink bottling plants. In terms of groundwater extraction permissions, the Central Ground Water Authority granted six no-objection certificates (NOCs) in Punjab, with an approved groundwater withdrawal of 8,44,660 cubic metres over three years. Why has no government explained this gap? People deserve to know who is extracting water, how much is being withdrawn and whether extraction limits are being effectively monitored by the government [citation:original text].

The Agricultural Policy Failure

Water-intensive paddy cultivation, supplemented by subsidised electricity, has led to over-extraction of groundwater. Paddy still claims nearly 90 per cent of Punjab’s kharif acreage . The government’s failure to ensure MSP as a legal guarantee for other crops has created insecurity among farmers and they do not want to diversify [citation:original text]. Experts have recommended reducing paddy acreage and creating stable markets for alternative crops. Farmers say they are willing to shift if the government guarantees procurement and fair prices .

Punjab’s falling water table is an outcome of the failure of political will, policy design and lack of regulatory implementation. Although groundwater laws exist, they were never enforced as political populism overrode ecological sustainability [citation:original text].

Water Pollution: A Silent Health Emergency

Water pollution is the other problem. Excessive use of fertilisers and pesticides has accelerated chemical runoff and leaching, leading to the contamination of both surface and groundwater systems. Arsenic, lead, chromium and uranium are present beyond permissible limits in water. Distilleries, paper mills, thermal power plants and sugar mills are classified as red category due to their high pollution potential [citation:original text].

The Government of India’s Ground Water Quality Assessment Report 2025 reveals alarming levels of uranium contamination in Punjab, with 62.5% of post-monsoon groundwater samples exceeding safe limits . Dangerous concentrations of arsenic, lead, cadmium, chromium, and nickel have been detected, particularly in the Malwa region. The Central Pollution Control Board data shows that 76% of Punjab’s river stretches fall into the two most polluted categories, including the Sutlej, Beas, and Ghaggar .

The Cancer Train is a reality of Punjab [citation:original text]. Train No. 14703, which runs from Bathinda to Bikaner, carries cancer patients seeking treatment. Studies indicate that the average cancer incidence in Malwa is 136 cases per 100,000 people, significantly higher than the national average of 80 per 100,000 .

Punjab consumes a staggering 5,270 metric tonnes of pesticides annually, the third largest user and the highest per capita consumption in India . Pesticide residues have been found in the breastmilk of lactating mothers and in cow’s milk samples . The presence of metal pollutants such as arsenic, lead and uranium in the groundwater of Malwa has also been linked to the high incidence of cancer .

The Watered-Down Law

The reality is that the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Amendment Act, 2024, which the Punjab Vidhan Sabha adopted in March 2025, has weakened enforcement as it replaces jail terms with fines and exempts some industries from prior consent in the name of ease-of-business [citation:original text]. The amended Act decriminalises several violations related to water pollution and introduces financial penalties ranging from Rs 10,000 to Rs 15 lakh, replacing the previous provisions that allowed for imprisonment of up to six years .

Environmentalists have strongly criticised the move, arguing that the shift from criminal liability to financial penalties will only encourage further pollution. Activists have called it “a licence to kill” Punjab’s water bodies . The amended Act also grants the central government authority to appoint adjudicating officers, raising concerns about the erosion of federal autonomy .

The Political Silence

Why has water pollution not become a poll issue? The hard reality is that the political debate has been reduced to freebies and cash transfers despite evidence that these measures are fiscally unsustainable. The political parties prioritise electoral gains over groundwater depletion and water pollution [citation:original text].

While some political leaders raise the issue in Parliament, the state’s electoral politics has largely failed to make water a central concern. Punjab’s water crisis will not end until the people demand, in a collective political consciousness, the accountability of the government for the polluted rivers. Otherwise, Punjab risks losing its water resources that gave it its name ‘Panj-Aab’ — the land of five rivers [citation:original text].

Q&A Section

1. What is the current groundwater extraction rate in Punjab, and how does it compare to sustainable limits?
Punjab’s groundwater extraction rate is 156.87%, the highest in India. This means the state is withdrawing more than one-and-a-half times the amount of water that can be safely replenished each year. Of the state’s total annual groundwater recharge of 18.60 BCM, Punjab is extracting about 26.27 BCM annually .

2. What are the main causes of groundwater depletion in Punjab?
The primary causes are water-intensive paddy cultivation, supported by free or subsidised electricity, which encourages excessive pumping; lack of crop diversification due to MSP policies that favour paddy and wheat; and unregulated industrial extraction, particularly by soft drink and bottled water plants that use large volumes of groundwater .

3. What is the “Cancer Train,” and what does it signify?
Train No. 14703 from Bathinda to Bikaner is known as Punjab’s “Cancer Train” because it carries hundreds of cancer patients seeking treatment. It signifies the severe public health crisis in the Malwa region, where groundwater contamination by pesticides, heavy metals, and uranium has led to cancer rates far above the national average .

4. How has the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Amendment Act, 2024, affected pollution enforcement?
The amendment replaced criminal penalties with financial fines, effectively decriminalising water pollution. Where the 1974 Act allowed for imprisonment of up to six years, the 2024 Act imposes penalties of Rs 10,000 to Rs 15 lakh. Critics argue this significantly weakens deterrence and encourages further pollution .

5. Why has the water crisis not become a central political issue in Punjab elections?
Political debates have been dominated by short-term welfare measures and electoral populism. Despite decades of warnings from scientists and activists, successive governments have prioritised electoral gains over enforcing groundwater laws or addressing industrial pollution. The issue has remained absent from manifestos and public discourse .