The Structural Dominance of the BJP, Beyond Charisma to the Machinery of Power

The Structural Dominance of the BJP, Beyond Charisma to the Machinery of Power

The phase of Indian politics since 2014 has been widely termed the fourth party system, with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) constituting a dominant pole that increasingly structures the field of competition at both the national and State levels. Some observers have periodically asked whether this BJP-dominant system represents a durable structural dominance or a more fleeting electoral dominance, largely built on and sustained by the charismatic leadership of Narendra Modi. The recent rounds of State elections (in Assam, West Bengal, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Puducherry) should settle that question in favour of structural dominance. The setback received by the National Democratic Alliance in the 2024 general election suggested that Modi’s charismatic appeal had begun to recede from the dizzying heights it had scaled over the previous decade. Yet, the BJP has performed much better in the phase of elections between 2024-26 than it did either in 2014-16, when Modi still carried the transformative aura of the vikas purush, or in 2019-21, when he became the pro-poor messiah embodying an unmatched reservoir of popular trust. It is only in the present cycle that the BJP has managed to storm to power in Odisha, Delhi, and West Bengal—the biggest prize of them all. What drives this juggernaut is not merely a leader, but a sprawling machinery.

Beyond Charisma: The Machinery of Structural Dominance

Of course, Modi’s leadership remains important in terms of his ability to direct and manage the machinery of the system of power. But it is the sprawling machinery itself, involving the close nexus of party organisation, wider Sangh networks, big industrial houses, and key state institutions, which drives the juggernaut of the BJP-dominant system. This is the difference between electoral dominance (winning elections) and structural dominance (shaping the terms of political competition itself).

In Haryana and Maharashtra, the mobilisation of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) helped the BJP blunt the spectre of anti-incumbency (especially among Dalits) that was stalking the ruling alliance after a decade in power. Similarly, in West Bengal, the Sangh Parivar laid the groundwork for the BJP campaign to mobilise scattered caste and community grievances (such as of Matuas and Rajbanshis) into a coherent, state-wide narrative of Hindu exclusion. The RSS is not a political party; it is a cultural organisation with a network of shakhas across the country. But its ability to mobilise cadres, shape public opinion, and provide grassroots intelligence to the BJP is a structural advantage that no other party can match.

In addition, the BJP has, in the course of this period, also built up an architecture of power that has made it the “natural party of governance” (in the mould of the Congress period of dominance). The instruments of this power include informal alliances and control over public institutions, through which the BJP is able to structure the party system to its advantage, breaking factions of opponent parties and co-opting its leaders. But it also involves manipulating the administrative machinery to deepen the ideological hold of Hindutva.

Assam and West Bengal: The Architecture of Communalism

In Assam, the Himanta Biswa Sarma government has made the category of the “Bangladeshi Muslim immigrant” (read: Bengali-speaking Muslim) the master signifier coursing through the everyday functioning of bureaucratic institutions and the public regulation of land and resources. The category of the ‘Bangladeshi immigrant’ has been embedded at the core of the policies and practices of the National Register of Citizens (NRC), the ‘D-voter’ category (Doubtful Voter), detention centres, delimitation, eviction drives, policing, and surveillance. The interpellate capacity of the government procedures has turned the distinction between indigenous (Hindu) and outsider (Muslim) into the organising idea for Assamese society in terms of imagining collective life and approaching the political world. The communalism of the Himanta Biswa government thus goes much beyond the regular hate speeches; it is indeed baked into the very architecture of governance and how people relate to it.

In West Bengal, the BJP campaign was characterised by underhanded tactics and partisan use of state institutions such as the Enforcement Directorate (ED), the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), and paramilitary forces, which were heavily deployed in an unprecedented manner in a state election (outside of Kashmir and the Northeast). Meanwhile, the shambolic and discriminatory rollout of the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls by the Election Commission of India ensured that a substantial chunk of the Trinamool Congress (TMC) support base (primarily Muslims) were struck off from the electoral list. The combination of institutional pressure (central agencies) and procedural manipulation (electoral roll revision) created a playing field that was tilted decisively in the BJP’s favour. This is structural dominance: not just winning, but shaping the rules of the game.

The Failure of the Electoral-Professional Party

To withstand the juggernaut of the BJP-dominant system requires a politics of counter-hegemony. The Congress in Assam has failed to imagine such a politics over the last decade, let alone execute it. Instead, it turned to the scion of the Gogoi dynasty, who was dispatched from Delhi and given charge of the state a year before the election. The party relied on a dominant caste (Ahom)-led consolidation in upper Assam and Muslim-led consolidation in lower Assam. Meanwhile, the TMC banked on its narrative of Bengali pride, along with cash transfers to women and Muslim consolidation, to secure a fourth consecutive term. Both these strategies failed spectacularly.

The declining fortunes of both the established regional parties as well as the Congress can be traced back to the form of their organisation, which is the electoral-professional party. As theorised by political scientist Angelo Panebianco, this is a party organised around the professional apparatus of campaign managers, consultants and pollsters (as opposed to ideologically motivated cadres), whose primary focus revolves around electoral competition. The rise of the electoral-professional party is an institutional adaptation to the prevailing developmental paradigm. For State governments to attract big capital and deliver on economic growth (and amass the funds for social welfare), they are constrained to follow a similar bouquet of ‘good governance’ policies: pro-business reforms and big infrastructure projects. This led first to the shift of the prevailing party form from the (ideological/identity-based) mass party to the (centrist) catchall party. The rise of technology-enabled direct cash transfers seeded the next transmutation from the catchall party to the electoral-professional party. The parallel professional framework becomes indispensable to connect these “techno-patrimonial” leaders with their broad welfare constituency.

As Neelanjan Sircar has noted from his fieldwork in Bengal, TMC cadres have been repurposed from overseeing delivery of benefits (outsourced to professionals) to the mobilising of voters for elections. In Tamil Nadu, even the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) has been transformed by M.K. Stalin’s ‘CEO’ style leadership, from a decentralised organisation of strong district secretaries into a centralised, disciplined and welfare-driven machine. A similar story could be told in Kerala of Pinarayi Vijayan’s transformation of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), or CPI(M), as a disciplined party under his personalistic management.

The Southern States: Managerial Politics and Its Fragility

While M.K. Stalin, Pinarayi Vijayan, and Mamata Banerjee achieved some success after turning their parties from cadre-based to electoral-professional outfits, it masked the electoral fragility of such politics. The downside of a managerial, ideologically feeble politics is that it depoliticises the electorate, and makes them turn to either the populist outsider solution (as in C. Joseph Vijay’s Tamizhaga Vetri Kazhagam in Tamil Nadu) or the Hindu nationalist solution (as in the BJP in Assam). When parties cease to offer a coherent ideological alternative, they leave a vacuum. Into that vacuum steps either a charismatic outsider or a well-organised ideological machine. The BJP is the latter. Vijay’s TVK is the former. Both are threats to the established regional parties.

In Kerala, the CPI(M) has been transformed under Pinarayi Vijayan into a disciplined, centralised, welfare-driven machine. But in opposition, it is not yet clear whether this deformed CPI(M) would be able to protect its space from the rising BJP any better than it has managed in Tripura and West Bengal. In Tripura, the CPI(M) was wiped out by the BJP. In West Bengal, it has been reduced to an also-ran. The pattern is consistent: where the BJP has made inroads, the Left has collapsed.

While Kerala has gone for the conventional alternative in the Congress, it is not yet clear whether the Congress can hold the line. The Congress in Kerala has its own structural weaknesses: factionalism, lack of a clear ideological vision, and dependence on a traditional vote bank that is slowly eroding. If the BJP makes a concerted push in Kerala, leveraging its organisational machinery and the RSS’s grassroots presence, it could make significant gains. The 2026 election results in Kerala will be watched closely.

Conclusion: A Dominant System, Not a Permanent One

The recent round of elections has confirmed that the BJP’s dominance is structural, not merely electoral. It is built on a machinery of power that includes the RSS, central agencies, electoral manipulation, and the ideological embedding of Hindutva in governance. The opposition, trapped in the electoral-professional model, has failed to mount a counter-hegemonic challenge. The result is a party system that is increasingly structured around the BJP, with other parties reduced to regional shrinks or electoral-professional shells.

But structural dominance is not permanent. The Congress system of dominance lasted from 1952 to 1967, and then again from 1971 to 1977. It was broken by internal fragmentation, the rise of regional parties, and the Emergency. The BJP’s dominance could be broken by economic crises, coalition fatigue, or a successful counter-hegemonic project. But that project has not yet emerged. Until it does, the BJP will continue to structure Indian politics.

Q&A: The BJP’s Structural Dominance

Q1: What is the distinction between “electoral dominance” and “structural dominance” as used in the article?

A1: Electoral dominance refers to winning elections, often built on the charismatic appeal of a leader like Narendra Modi. Structural dominance goes further: it means “shaping the terms of political competition itself.” The article argues that the BJP’s dominance is structural, built on a “sprawling machinery” involving the “close nexus of party organisation, wider Sangh networks, big industrial houses, and key state institutions.” The setback in the 2024 general election suggested Modi’s “charismatic appeal had begun to recede,” yet the BJP performed better in 2024-26 than in previous cycles, winning Odisha, Delhi, and West Bengal. This proves that “what drives the juggernaut is not merely a leader, but a sprawling machinery.”

Q2: How did the BJP use institutional and procedural mechanisms to its advantage in West Bengal?

A2: The article identifies two mechanisms:

1. Partisan use of central agencies: The Enforcement Directorate (ED), Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), and paramilitary forces were “heavily deployed in an unprecedented manner in a state election (outside of Kashmir and the Northeast).”

2. Discriminatory electoral roll revision: The “shambolic and discriminatory rollout of the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls by the Election Commission of India ensured that a substantial chunk of the Trinamool Congress (TMC) support base (primarily Muslims) were struck off from the electoral list.”
   The combination created a “playing field that was tilted decisively in the BJP’s favour,” demonstrating structural dominance: “not just winning, but shaping the rules of the game.”

Q3: What is the “electoral-professional party,” and why has it failed to counter the BJP?

A3: The “electoral-professional party” (theorised by Angelo Panebianco) is organised around “professional apparatus of campaign managers, consultants and pollsters (as opposed to ideologically motivated cadres), whose primary focus revolves around electoral competition.” It is an adaptation to the prevailing developmental paradigm of pro-business reforms and welfare delivery via direct cash transfers. The decline of the Congress and regional parties can be traced to this form. The downside is that “managerial, ideologically feeble politics… depoliticises the electorate, and makes them turn to either the populist outsider solution or the Hindu nationalist solution.” The opposition has failed to mount a “counter-hegemonic challenge” because they lack an ideological alternative.

Q4: How has the RSS contributed to the BJP’s structural dominance in specific states?

A4: In Haryana and Maharashtra, RSS mobilisation “helped the BJP blunt the spectre of anti-incumbency (especially among Dalits) after a decade in power.” In West Bengal, the “Sangh Parivar laid the groundwork for the BJP campaign to mobilise scattered caste and community grievances (such as of Matuas and Rajbanshis) into a coherent, state-wide narrative of Hindu exclusion.” The RSS is not a political party but a “cultural organisation with a network of shakhas across the country.” Its ability to “mobilise cadres, shape public opinion, and provide grassroots intelligence to the BJP is a structural advantage that no other party can match.”

Q5: What are the vulnerabilities of the BJP’s structural dominance, and what would it take to break it?

A5: “Structural dominance is not permanent.” The Congress system of dominance lasted from 1952-1967 and 1971-1977, broken by “internal fragmentation, the rise of regional parties, and the Emergency.” The BJP’s dominance could be broken by:

• Economic crises

• Coalition fatigue

• A “successful counter-hegemonic project”
  The article notes that the opposition, trapped in the “electoral-professional model, has failed to mount a counter-hegemonic challenge.” The Congress in Assam relied on a “dominant caste (Ahom)-led consolidation” and Muslim-led consolidation; the TMC relied on “Bengali pride, cash transfers to women, and Muslim consolidation.” Both failed. In the south, “managerial, ideologically feeble politics” has made electorates turn to “populist outsider solution” (Vijay’s TVK in Tamil Nadu) or “Hindu nationalist solution” (BJP in Assam). The article concludes: “Until [a counter-hegemonic project] emerges, the BJP will continue to structure Indian politics.”