Debunking the ‘Destitute Bangladeshi’ Myth, Economic Realities, Cultural Prejudices, and the Politics of Comparison
The idea of Bangladesh is a major polarising factor in India. We expect the entire nation to be grateful to us because our Army liberated them in 1971. And if some among them speak against India and in favour of Pakistan, we are incensed. For those in the Hindutva camp, Bangladesh’s turn towards Islamic fundamentalism is a sign that religion can never be separated from nationalism and that India truly only belongs to Hindus. The fact that Bangladesh has twice overtaken us in IMF per capita GDP calculations, including in the latest projections for 2026, is a matter of great shame for people on both sides of the political divide. For those who oppose the BJP government, it is a sign that India’s economy has not flourished during the Modi era. For those who support the BJP, it is an embarrassing data point which has to be explained away through technical arguments about economic growth. But behind these intense, and often acerbic, disputations lies a deeper, more pernicious assumption: that Bangladesh represents the worst economic and social conditions in the Indian subcontinent. In fact, Bangladesh’s development has been called ‘kanglu’ on social media—a variation of the word kangal or destitute—and there are thousands of references about how the ‘kanglu’ is still living in the age of bullock carts and mud huts. Most of this is untrue. The idea of a destitute Bangladesh is a myth, rooted not in economic data but in cultural prejudice, colonial history, and the Bengali bhadralok imaginary.
The Economic Data: What the IMF Really Says
Let us interrogate the point of immediate contention: that the IMF says Bangladesh will cross India in terms of per capita GDP this year. This is not the first time; it happened in 2020 as well, during the COVID-19 recession. However, this comparison is based on a direct conversion of per capita GDP in local currencies to US dollars, using the current market exchange rate. This tells us nothing about the actual purchasing power of the money people earn in their local currencies. So, the IMF has a tool called the International Dollar, which adjusts for local inflation and recalculates all data in terms of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP).
When we compare our per capita GDP with that of Bangladesh in PPP terms, we find that an average Bangladeshi will earn 17 per cent less than an average Indian in PPP projections for 2026. Now you could say that this reflects badly on us, given that Bangladesh is a ‘kanglu’. But a longer historical perspective tells a different story.
A look at the IMF’s PPP per capita income data shows us that Bangladesh was actually above India from 1800 to 1993. India moved ahead only in 1994, and it wasn’t till 1999 that the gap between our per capita GDP (PPP) and Bangladesh’s crossed 10 per cent. In the UPA period (2004-2014), the gap remained roughly stable. Bangladesh’s growth rate slowed down in the mid-2010s, but it has since recovered. The IMF projects that by 2030, India’s per capita GDP in purchasing power parity terms will be 24 per cent higher than that of Bangladesh.
This shows that an average Indian continues to have more or less the same purchasing power advantage over an average Bangladeshi as it had during the time when Manmohan Singh was Prime Minister. The Modi government has neither done better nor has it fared any worse. More importantly, it tells us that our idea of the ‘kanglu’ Bangladesh is entirely false. Bangladesh’s per capita purchasing power might have trailed that of India, but it has been consistently higher than that of large Indian states like Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and also West Bengal.
The Historical Roots: Bangladesh Was Never a ‘Kanglu’
Where does this image of the destitute ‘kanglu’ stereotype come from? It originates in the Bengali bhadralok ‘imaginary’ that the Muslims of East Bengal, who stayed on in East Pakistan after the Partition, were mostly poor peasants. This, as the political scientist Partha Chatterjee showed 45 years ago, was largely a myth.
In the Muslim-majority divisions of Bengal in 1911, there were more Muslims who earned a living from agricultural rent than there were Hindus. While the share-cropping peasantry was largely Muslim, many from the Muslim community were also big rent receivers. The real difference between the Bengali ‘bhadralok’ upper-caste Hindu and their affluent Muslim peers lay in access to higher education, professional employment, and jobs in the colonial government. It is here that Hindus had a clear advantage, and by the early 20th century, they had become more urbanised and ‘modernised’ than their Muslim counterparts.
So, the old ‘rustic’ cultural and aesthetic practices, from which the bhadralok Hindu had gradually deviated, continued in use in East Bengal. This continues today in terms of language and attire. In post-Partition West Bengal, the Hindu refugees progressively gave up the eastern dialect or ‘Bangal bhasha’ and their customary linguistic heritage. These were seen as ‘plebeian’ symbols not compatible with bhadralok society. Both of these are normal in Bangladesh.
It is these cultural practices of the Bangladeshi, identified as ‘low-class’ on this side of the border, that has fed into the image of the ‘kanglu’ Bangladesh. The stereotype of the impoverished, illiterate, backward Bangladeshi Muslim is not a reflection of economic reality but a projection of upper-caste Hindu anxieties about status, purity, and modernity.
The Political Economy of Comparison: Why We Care So Much
Why does India care so much about whether Bangladesh has a higher per capita GDP? The answer lies in India’s self-image as a regional hegemon. India expects to be not just larger but richer than its neighbours. When a neighbour surpasses India on any metric—even a flawed metric like nominal per capita GDP—it challenges that self-image.
For the BJP, which built its economic pitch on the promise of growth, a Bangladesh that grows faster than India is an embarrassment. For the Congress, which governed during the 1991 reforms and the subsequent growth acceleration, a Bangladesh that overtakes India undermines their claim to economic stewardship. For both, the response is to minimise the achievement: “It’s just nominal GDP,” “It’s because of the base effect,” “It’s temporary.”
But the deeper discomfort is not about economics; it is about status. The ‘kanglu’ stereotype allows Indians to feel superior. By believing that Bangladeshis are destitute, we can overlook our own poverty. By focusing on Bangladesh’s problems—cyclones, floods, political instability, religious extremism—we can ignore our own.
The IMF data tells us that Bangladesh’s per capita purchasing power has been higher than that of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and West Bengal. The average Bangladeshi is better off than the average Bihari, the average UPite, the average Madhyapradeshi, and the average Bengali on the Indian side of the border. This is not a reflection on India’s economic policies; it is a reflection of the vast disparities within India. The ‘kanglu’ is not in Bangladesh; the ‘kanglu’ is in the cow belts of northern India.
The Cultural Prejudice: Language, Attire, and the Bhadralok Gaze
The stereotype of the destitute Bangladeshi is not an economic judgment; it is a cultural one. The Bangladeshi speaks a dialect of Bengali that the West Bengali bhadralok considers rustic. The Bangladeshi dresses in a manner that the West Bengali bhadralok considers unsophisticated. The Bangladeshi eats a different cuisine, celebrates different festivals, and has different aesthetic preferences.
These differences are not markers of poverty; they are markers of cultural divergence. The West Bengali bhadralok, having been shaped by colonialism, urbanisation, and higher education, adopted the cultural norms of the British-educated elite. The East Bengali Muslim, having been excluded from those institutions, retained older, more indigenous practices.
After Partition, when Hindu refugees from East Bengal settled in West Bengal, they were looked down upon by the established bhadralok. Their dialect was mocked. Their customs were derided. They were called ‘Bangal’ (a term that originally meant ‘from East Bengal’ but acquired derogatory connotations) and treated as inferior. The same cultural prejudices were then projected onto the Bangladeshi across the border.
The truth is that Bangladesh has never really been a destitute nation, despite its poverty, and there should be no shame if it catches up with us. The shame is not in Bangladesh’s success; the shame is in our inability to recognise it. The shame is in our reliance on stereotypes to maintain a false sense of superiority.
Bangladesh’s Achievements: Beyond Per Capita GDP
Even if we accept the flawed narrative of Bangladesh’s poverty, we must also acknowledge its achievements. Bangladesh has made remarkable progress in reducing infant mortality, extending life expectancy, improving access to health and education, and even setting up radical systems to enable rural women to get easy loans (through the Grameen Bank and other microfinance institutions). The country has virtually eliminated open defecation. It has achieved near-universal primary school enrolment. It has made significant strides in women’s empowerment, with women participating in the labour force at higher rates than in India.
These are not the markers of a ‘kanglu’ nation. They are the markers of a country that, despite its many challenges, has prioritised human development.
Conclusion: Let Go of the Stereotype
The ‘destitute Bangladeshi’ is a myth. It is a myth born of colonial history, maintained by cultural prejudice, and weaponised by political rivalry. The data tells a different story: a story of a country that has consistently performed well in human development, that has a per capita purchasing power higher than many Indian states, and that has twice overtaken India in nominal per capita GDP.
We can continue to cling to the stereotype, calling Bangladesh ‘kanglu’ on social media, or we can confront the economic reality: that our neighbour is not as poor as we imagine, and that our own states are not as rich as we pretend. The choice is ours. But let us at least be honest. The ‘kanglu’ is not Bangladesh. The ‘kanglu’ is our own prejudice.
Q&A: Debunking the ‘Destitute Bangladeshi’ Myth
Q1: What is the ‘kanglu’ stereotype, and why does the article argue it is a myth?
A1: The ‘kanglu’ stereotype (derived from kangal, meaning destitute) portrays Bangladesh as an extremely poor, backward nation where people live in the “age of bullock carts and mud huts.” The article argues this is a myth for several reasons:
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Bangladesh’s per capita purchasing power (PPP) has been consistently higher than large Indian states like Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and West Bengal.
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The stereotype originates from the Bengali bhadralok ‘imaginary’ that East Bengali Muslims were mostly poor peasants—a claim that political scientist Partha Chatterjee showed was “largely a myth” 45 years ago.
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In 1911, there were “more Muslims who earned a living from agricultural rent than there were Hindus” in Muslim-majority divisions of Bengal.
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The real difference was in access to higher education and colonial government jobs, not in wealth.
The stereotype is rooted in “cultural prejudice, colonial history, and the Bengali bhadralok imaginary.”
Q2: What does the IMF data actually show about the comparison between India and Bangladesh’s per capita GDP?
A2: The article explains two different IMF metrics:
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Nominal per capita GDP (converted at market exchange rates): Bangladesh has twice overtaken India, including in 2026 projections. This metric is misleading because it “tells us nothing about the actual purchasing power of the money people earn.”
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Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) per capita GDP (adjusted for local inflation, measured in International Dollars): An average Bangladeshi will earn 17 per cent less than an average Indian in 2026. Historically, Bangladesh was actually “above us from 1800 to 1993.” India moved ahead only in 1994. The gap remained stable during the UPA period. The Modi government has “neither done better nor has it fared any worse.” By 2030, India’s PPP per capita GDP will be 24 per cent higher than Bangladesh’s.
Q3: Why does India care so much about whether Bangladesh has a higher per capita GDP?
A3: The article argues that the concern stems from India’s self-image as a “regional hegemon.” India expects to be “not just larger but richer than its neighbours.” When a neighbour surpasses India on any metric, it “challenges that self-image.” The response from both the BJP and Congress is to “minimise the achievement” through technical arguments. However, the “deeper discomfort is not about economics; it is about status.” The ‘kanglu’ stereotype allows Indians to “feel superior” and “overlook our own poverty.” The article points out that India’s poverty is not in comparison to Bangladesh but within India itself: “The ‘kanglu’ is not in Bangladesh; the ‘kanglu’ is in the cow belts of northern India.”
Q4: What are the historical and cultural roots of the ‘kanglu’ stereotype, according to the article?
A4: The stereotype originates from the “Bengali bhadralok ‘imaginary'” that East Bengali Muslims were “mostly poor peasants.” The real difference between Hindu bhadralok and affluent Muslim peers lay in “access to higher education, professional employment and jobs in the colonial government.” Hindus had a “clear advantage” and became “more urbanised, and ‘modernised’.” The “old ‘rustic’ cultural and aesthetic practices, from which the bhadralok Hindu had gradually deviated continued in use in East Bengal.” After Partition, Hindu refugees from East Bengal were mocked for their dialect and customs, called ‘Bangal’ (derogatory), and treated as inferior. These same cultural prejudices were then “projected onto the Bangladeshi across the border.” The stereotype is not an economic judgment but a “cultural one” based on language, attire, and other markers.
Q5: What achievements of Bangladesh does the article highlight beyond per capita GDP?
A5: The article notes that even if one accepts the “flawed narrative of Bangladesh’s poverty,” one must also acknowledge its achievements:
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Reducing infant mortality
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Extending life expectancy
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Improving access to health and education
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Microfinance systems (Grameen Bank) enabling rural women to get easy loans
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Virtually eliminated open defecation
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Near-universal primary school enrolment
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Significant strides in women’s empowerment (higher labour force participation than India)
The article concludes that these are “not the markers of a ‘kanglu’ nation” but markers of a country that has “prioritised human development.” The ‘destitute Bangladeshi’ is a myth “born of colonial history, maintained by cultural prejudice, and weaponised by political rivalry.” We should “let go of the stereotype” and confront the economic reality: “our neighbour is not as poor as we imagine, and our own states are not as rich as we pretend.” The ‘kanglu’ is “our own prejudice.”
