The Gandhi Precedent, How Rajiv Gandhi’s Restraint Offers a Lesson for a Nuclear Age
Donald Trump’s menacing threat to Iran that “A whole civilization will die tonight, never to be brought back again” has unintentionally brought to light Rajiv Gandhi’s genius in anticipating that India and Pakistan might do just this to each other unless protected from such an eventuality in times of tension and war. The current US-Israel war against Iran, with its explicit threats to nuclear facilities at Bushehr, Natanz, Fordow, Isfahan, and Arak, has stripped away the civilian protections supposedly guaranteed by international humanitarian law. The Additional Protocols of 1977, designed to protect “civilian persons and objects” in all types of armed conflict, have been rendered toothless by the very nuclear powers that drafted them. In contrast, a quiet bilateral agreement signed between India and Pakistan in December 1988—the Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities—has held firm for nearly four decades, surviving wars, crises, and the acquisition of overt nuclear weapons by both nations. The story of how Rajiv Gandhi conceived and executed this agreement offers a powerful lesson in leadership, restraint, and the art of the possible in a nuclear-armed neighbourhood.
The Geneva Conventions and Their Limitations
After the unspeakable horrors of World War II, the international community decided to newly codify humanitarian law through four conventions adopted in August 1949 in Geneva, including the fourth relating to the “protection of civilian persons in time of war.” The recognition was that casualties were no longer confined to combatants on battlefields; modern war was hugely destructive and damaging to civilians caught up in it.
However, as the realisation grew that it was more proxy wars, civil wars, and terrorism than openly declared inter-state wars that were causing asymmetric death and injury to civilian life and property, it became apparent that the Fourth Geneva Convention was not adequate to meet the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of these new kinds of inhuman war—labelled “indiscriminate” wars.
Accordingly, additional protocols relating to “civilian persons and objects” in all types of armed conflict were adopted in 1977. But not before the nuclear weapons powers, particularly the United States, had reduced the “protections” of practical significance by inserting codes into the text and interpretations to legitimise their right to attack civil nuclear facilities, whatever the damage might be. Thus, for example, Ronald Reagan denounced the humanitarian provisions of the additional protocols as “unacceptable and thoroughly distasteful.” Meanwhile, India under Indira Gandhi refused to accede to these dodgy additional protocols, sensing that they offered more cover for nuclear weapon states than protection for civilians.
The Rajiv Gandhi Insight: The Kamikaze Problem
It was at this time of crisis in the prospects of the survival of the planet and humanity itself that Rajiv Gandhi became India’s prime minister in 1984-85. As his speechwriter, the author of this tribute was deeply involved in the exposition of his views on the nuclear threat. As they were working on his magnum opus—his address to the UN General Assembly at its Third Special Session on Disarmament, June 1988—Rajiv looked at him quizzically and said, “You know, Mani, Pakistan and we already have the bomb.” The author was stunned—and puzzled. How, he asked? Rajiv replied, “Because the Canadians have gifted both of us nuclear reactors. A single Pakistani kamikaze pilot can blow up the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre outside Bombay, as easily as an Indian kamikaze pilot can blow up the CANDU reactor outside Karachi, causing as deadly damage to both cities as a nuclear bomb.”
This was a profound insight. The nuclear threat between India and Pakistan was not merely about deliverable weapons; it was about the vulnerability of civilian nuclear facilities. A reactor core hit by a conventional aircraft, a missile, or even a suicide pilot could release radiation equivalent to a nuclear weapon. The two countries were living with a dormant doomsday machine, and neither side had acknowledged it.
The Bilateral Solution: An Agreement Without Ambiguity
Contemplating the prospect of becoming the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Pakistan in 28 years, Rajiv decided that to make the historic breakthrough meaningful, he needed to bring back from the Islamabad SAARC meeting in December 1988 a signed bilateral agreement that would protect each country’s nuclear facilities even if war were to break out between them. The key point was that there should be no ambiguity about the purpose of the agreement, as had overtaken the Additional Protocols of 1977.
Behind-the-scenes moves were initiated which led to the “Agreement between India and Pakistan on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities,” signed in Islamabad by the two foreign secretaries in the presence of both prime ministers on the last day of the 1988 calendar year.
The agreement binds both countries to “refrain from undertaking any action causing ‘destruction’ or ‘damage’ to ‘any nuclear installation or facility’.” Moreover, such installations or facilities are explicitly deemed to include nuclear reactors, fuel fabrication, uranium enrichment, separation of isotopes, reprocessing, and “storage” of “radioactive materials.” Further, the contracting parties are obligated to inform each other on the first day of January every year of the “longitude and latitude” of their respective “nuclear installations and facilities.”
Straightforward, with all ambiguity excised, this bilateral agreement freed the India-Pakistan nuclear relationship from the ambiguities of the Geneva Additional Protocols. It did not require either side to admit to possessing nuclear weapons. It simply recognised that certain facilities, if attacked, would cause catastrophic damage, and therefore they should be off-limits—in peace and in war.
The Contrast with Trump’s Iran Policy
The contrast with the current US-Israel war against Iran could not be starker. The threat against the Bushehr VVER light water 915 MW reactor, and the multiple high voltage lines connecting it to the off-site grid which are critical to the plant’s safety, and the grave threats to the facilities at Minzadehei and the Shahid Khondab heavy water reactor at Arak, besides the Ardakan yellowcake production facility in Iran, strip Additional Protocols’ civilian protection from these installations and facilities, notwithstanding Trump’s facile claims that at Natanz, Fordow, Isfahan, and Parchin Taleghan 2, he had “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions.
Massively escalating the danger of uninhibited nuclear destruction in the region, with all its long-term, and perhaps perpetual consequences, Iran reacted to Israel’s attack on Bushehr’s surroundings by attacking the surroundings of Israel’s nuclear installations at Dimona. Further, given the US military involvement in the Gulf States threatening Iran’s security, Iran has warned that, in retaliation, it might take out the four units of the Barakah nuclear plants in the United Arab Emirates, underlining that while this will not affect Tehran, it will render “life impossible” in the capitals of the Gulf’s Arab states.
This frightful prospect has been legitimated by the Additional Protocols detracting from absolute immunity to civil nuclear installations and facilities by allowing such dehumanising acts if the “civil facility” supports “the enemy’s war efforts” and provided there is no “massive radiation leak.” The protocols, drafted by nuclear weapon states, created loopholes that they are now exploiting. The bitter irony is that these supplementary “protections” become operational only after immense and indefinite human suffering has been inflicted and irreparable environmental damage caused.
The Enduring Value of the India-Pakistan Agreement
The India-Pakistan agreement of 1988 has been renewed annually, year after year, without fail. The two countries exchange lists of their nuclear facilities on January 1 each year. Even during the Kargil War of 1999, even after the 2001-2002 military standoff, even after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the agreement has held. It survived the overt nuclearisation of both countries in 1998. It survived the change of governments, the rise of Hindutva and Islamist politics, the cross-border terrorism, and the periodic crises.
Why? Because the agreement is in both countries’ self-interest. Attacking a nuclear facility would be an act of madness. It would invite retaliation in kind. It would cause catastrophic casualties. It would end any international sympathy. And it would not achieve any military objective worth the cost. By taking the option off the table, the agreement made both countries safer.
The Lesson for Trump and for the World
What inspired Rajiv to recuse himself from the conundrums of international law to insulate Indo-Pak nuclear relations from such ambiguities? Perhaps—and Trump would do well to note this—it was Mahatma Gandhi’s reply to a question: “What do you think of Western civilisation?” Gandhiji paused for a moment and gently replied, “I think that might be a good idea!”
The lesson is that international law, for all its flaws, is better than no law. And bilateral agreements, for all their limitations, are better than unilateral threats. Rajiv Gandhi understood that nuclear danger could not be eliminated, but it could be managed. He understood that ambiguity was the enemy of restraint. He understood that the first step to preventing a catastrophe was to acknowledge that the catastrophe was possible—and then to agree, explicitly, not to cause it.
Trump’s rhetoric of annihilation may play well with his domestic base. It may intimidate some adversaries. But it also legitimises the very nuclear threats that the world has spent seven decades trying to contain. If the United States threatens to annihilate a civilisation, what moral authority does it have to prevent others from doing the same? If the US and Israel attack nuclear facilities, what stops Iran from doing the same?
The India-Pakistan agreement offers a different model: mutual restraint, reciprocal transparency, and the recognition that some lines should never be crossed. It is not a glamorous agreement. It has not brought peace to the subcontinent. But it has prevented one particular nightmare from coming true. In a nuclear-armed world, that is no small achievement. Trump should take note.
Q&A: Rajiv Gandhi’s Nuclear Agreement with Pakistan
Q1: What was the key insight that led Rajiv Gandhi to propose a bilateral agreement with Pakistan on protecting nuclear facilities?
A1: Rajiv Gandhi’s key insight was that India and Pakistan “already have the bomb”—not necessarily deliverable nuclear weapons, but nuclear reactors that could be attacked by a “kamikaze pilot” or conventional strike, causing radioactive release equivalent to a nuclear bomb. He reasoned that a single Pakistani pilot could blow up the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre outside Mumbai, killing hundreds of thousands and rendering the area uninhabitable for decades, just as an Indian pilot could do the same to the CANDU reactor outside Karachi. This “kamikaze problem” meant that the two countries were living with a dormant doomsday machine, and neither side had acknowledged it. The agreement he negotiated in 1988 was designed to explicitly take this option off the table.
Q2: What does the India-Pakistan Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities (1988) actually require?
A2: The agreement, signed on December 31, 1988, requires both countries to “refrain from undertaking any action causing ‘destruction’ or ‘damage’ to ‘any nuclear installation or facility’.” Covered facilities explicitly include nuclear reactors, fuel fabrication plants, uranium enrichment facilities, isotope separation plants, reprocessing plants, and storage of radioactive materials. The agreement also requires both countries to exchange lists of their nuclear installations and facilities on the first day of every January, including their precise longitude and latitude. The agreement is straightforward, with all ambiguity excised. It has been renewed annually for nearly four decades, surviving wars, crises, and the overt nuclearisation of both countries in 1998.
Q3: How does the article contrast Rajiv Gandhi’s approach with Donald Trump’s approach to Iran’s nuclear facilities?
A3: The article contrasts the “quiet bilateral agreement” between India and Pakistan with the current US-Israel war against Iran. Trump has explicitly threatened Iranian nuclear facilities at Bushehr, Natanz, Fordow, Isfahan, and Arak, claiming to have “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions. The US and Israel have bombed the surroundings of the Bushehr reactor, which is a civilian facility. In response, Iran has attacked the surroundings of Israel’s Dimona nuclear installation and threatened to take out the Barakah nuclear plants in the UAE. The article argues that the Additional Protocols of 1977, which were supposed to protect civilian nuclear facilities, have been rendered toothless by the very nuclear powers that drafted them, creating loopholes that allow attacks if a “civil facility” supports “the enemy’s war efforts” and if there is no “massive radiation leak”—an impossible standard that only becomes operational after immense suffering has already been inflicted.
Q4: Why has the India-Pakistan agreement endured for nearly four decades despite wars and crises?
A4: The agreement has endured because it is in both countries’ self-interest. Attacking a nuclear facility would be an act of madness: it would invite retaliation in kind, cause catastrophic civilian casualties (hundreds of thousands dead, land uninhabitable for decades), end any international sympathy, and would not achieve any military objective worth the cost. The agreement survived the Kargil War (1999), the 2001-2002 military standoff, the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the overt nuclearisation of both countries (1998), changes of governments, the rise of Hindutva and Islamist politics, and periodic crises. By taking the nuclear facility attack option off the table, the agreement made both countries safer. The article argues that this is the core lesson: “nuclear danger could not be eliminated, but it could be managed,” and “ambiguity was the enemy of restraint.”
Q5: What lesson does the article suggest Donald Trump should learn from Rajiv Gandhi’s example?
A5: The article suggests that Trump’s “rhetoric of annihilation” legitimises the very nuclear threats the world has spent seven decades trying to contain. If the US threatens to annihilate a civilisation, what moral authority does it have to prevent others from doing the same? If the US and Israel attack nuclear facilities, what stops Iran from doing the same? The India-Pakistan agreement offers a different model: mutual restraint, reciprocal transparency (annual exchange of facility coordinates), and the recognition that “some lines should never be crossed.” The article concludes that while the agreement has not brought peace to the subcontinent, it has “prevented one particular nightmare from coming true.” In a nuclear-armed world, “that is no small achievement.” The article ends with a quotation from Mahatma Gandhi: when asked “What do you think of Western civilisation?” he replied, “I think that might be a good idea!”—a gentle reminder that civilisation, including the restraint not to annihilate one’s enemies, is something that must be consciously chosen and actively maintained. Trump, the article implies, would do well to consider that.
