A Fireworks Tragedy, The Grim Familiarity of Negligence and the Failure of Enforcement

There is a grim familiarity to the series of blasts that ripped through a fireworks assembly unit in Thrissur, Kerala, where workers were preparing fireworks for the Thrissur Pooram, a temple festival famed for its spectacular pyrotechnic display. The explosions have resulted in the death of 14 people and left several injured. The cause of the accident is being investigated—the state government has ordered a judicial inquiry, in addition to the magisterial probe ordered by the district collector. Yet, the frequency of accidents involving fireworks across the country in the past few years alone—including Sunday’s blast in a fireworks unit in Tamil Nadu’s Virudhunagar (which killed 23) and the explosion at a factory in Andhra Pradesh’s Kakinada in February—point not to a series of individual tragedies but to a deeper issue that demands urgent scrutiny. This is not a story of isolated mishaps. It is a story of systemic neglect, regulatory failure, and a culture that treats workers’ lives as expendable in the pursuit of tradition and commerce.

The Scale of the Crisis: A Pattern of Repeated Tragedy

The last major accident involving fireworks in Kerala was in April 2016, when a pyrotechnic display at the Puttingal Devi temple in Kollam went awry, killing 111 people and injuring over 300. Besides the use of illegal fireworks and improper storage, a probe ordered at the time pointed to several administrative lapses, including insufficient oversight in granting licences for the use and display of fireworks. Afterwards, recommendations about licensing, use, and storage were also put forward. A decade on, another major tragedy has struck Kerala. The question must be asked: What has been done to implement those recommendations in the last ten years?

The answer, tragically, appears to be very little. Across the country, fireworks accidents have become a grim regularity. In April 2026 alone, two major incidents have occurred: the Thrissur blast that killed 14, and the Virudhunagar blast that killed 23. In February 2026, an explosion at a factory in Kakinada, Andhra Pradesh, killed multiple workers. In 2023, there were accidents in Unnao (Uttar Pradesh), Hardoi (Uttar Pradesh), and Batala (Punjab). The pattern is consistent: a fireworks unit, often operating in a residential or semi-residential area, storing large quantities of explosive chemicals, with workers crammed into unsafe spaces, handling volatile materials with minimal training and no protective equipment. Then a spark. Then a blast. Then death. Then inquiries. Then recommendations. Then nothing.

The Hazardous Nature of the Fireworks Industry

The hazardous nature of work in the fireworks industry cannot be overstated. Fireworks are, by definition, explosive devices. They contain chemicals that are highly sensitive to friction, heat, and impact. The manufacturing process involves mixing oxidisers, fuels, and binding agents—a combination that, if not handled with extreme care, can ignite spontaneously. The slightest neglect—a metal tool striking a surface, a static spark from synthetic clothing, a worker smoking nearby, improper ventilation allowing dust to accumulate—can lead to disaster.

The industry is also highly seasonal. Demand for fireworks peaks around Diwali (October-November) and during temple festivals such as Thrissur Pooram (April-May). To meet demand, units operate at maximum capacity during these periods, often pushing workers to work longer hours in unsafe conditions. Chemicals are stored in makeshift sheds. Workers are hired on a temporary basis, without training or safety equipment. The emphasis is on output, not safety.

Yet, despite the known risks, the industry remains largely unorganised and under-regulated. A 2019 report by the National Institute of Occupational Health (NIOH) found that the majority of fireworks units in the country—over 95 per cent—were small-scale, unlicensed, or operating in violation of safety norms. The report noted that workers were typically employed without contracts, paid below minimum wage, and exposed to hazardous chemicals without protective gear. The report’s recommendations, like those from the Puttingal inquiry, have not been implemented.

The Regulatory Framework: Existing Laws, Poor Enforcement

India already has a comprehensive legal framework for regulating the fireworks industry. The Explosives Act, 1884, and the Explosives Rules, 2008, govern the manufacture, storage, transport, and sale of fireworks. Licences are required for manufacturing units, with strict guidelines on location (distance from residential areas, schools, hospitals), building specifications (fire-resistant materials, adequate ventilation, separate rooms for different processes), and safety equipment (fire extinguishers, sand buckets, water storage). The rules also prescribe the maximum number of workers allowed per unit, the hours of work (daytime only), and the prohibition of certain hazardous processes.

The Petroleum and Explosives Safety Organisation (PESO) is the central authority responsible for enforcing these rules. State governments also have their own factory inspectorates.

And yet, accidents continue. The problem is not the absence of laws; it is the absence of enforcement. PESO is grossly understaffed. Its inspectors are overworked and under-resourced. Many fireworks units operate without licences, or with licences obtained through bribery. Inspections are infrequent and often forewarned. Violations are met with fines that are trivial compared to the profits.

In the Thrissur case, initial reports suggest that the unit was operating in a densely populated area, in violation of location norms. It is alleged that the unit was storing large quantities of chemicals in unsafe conditions. It is alleged that workers were not provided with protective equipment or safety training. These are not new allegations; they are the same allegations made after every fireworks tragedy. The fact that they keep being made is an indictment of the enforcement system.

The Human Cost: Workers as Disposable Labour

Behind the statistics are real people. The 14 workers who died in Thrissur were not numbers; they were fathers, sons, brothers, and husbands. They were daily-wage labourers, earning a few hundred rupees a day, working in hazardous conditions because they had no other option. They were not told of the risks. They were not provided with safety equipment. They were not covered by insurance. They were, in the eyes of their employers, disposable.

The fireworks industry is a notorious violator of labour laws. Workers are often hired on a daily basis, without written contracts, without Provident Fund (PF) or Employees’ State Insurance (ESI) coverage. They work long hours, often at night, in violation of the Factories Act. They are paid below the minimum wage. Child labour is not uncommon, despite being illegal. When accidents happen, employers often flee, leaving workers and their families with no compensation. The state steps in, providing ex gratia payments of a few lakh rupees—a pittance compared to the loss of a breadwinner.

The Thrissur tragedy must be a wake-up call. It must lead to a crackdown on illegal fireworks units, to rigorous enforcement of safety norms, and to accountability for employers who violate the law. But past tragedies have also been accompanied by promises of action. Those promises have not been kept.

The Role of Tradition and Demand

The fireworks industry exists because there is demand. Fireworks are an integral part of Indian festivals: Diwali, Dussehra, Durga Puja, and, in Kerala, temple festivals like Thrissur Pooram. The spectacular pyrotechnic displays attract tourists and generate revenue. The demand is not going away.

But safety and tradition are not incompatible. Countries like China, Japan, and the United States have vibrant fireworks industries with far fewer accidents. The difference is regulation and enforcement. In China, fireworks manufacturing is highly mechanised, reducing human exposure to hazardous processes. In Japan, safety standards are rigorous, and violations are met with severe penalties. In the United States, the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) issues recalls and bans dangerous products.

India can learn from these examples. The industry needs to be formalised and modernised. Small, illegal units should be closed. Legal units should be incentivised to mechanise and automate hazardous processes. Workers should be trained, equipped, and insured. Inspections should be unannounced and frequent. Penalties should be severe—including imprisonment for employers found guilty of gross negligence.

The Recommendations: From Inquiries to Action

The judicial inquiry ordered by the Kerala government into the Thrissur blast is a welcome step. But India has had many judicial inquiries into fireworks tragedies. The recommendations from the Puttingal inquiry, from the NIOH report, from various high-level committees, have gathered dust. What is needed is not another inquiry; what is needed is action.

Specifically, the government must:

Conduct a nationwide audit of all fireworks manufacturing units to identify unlicensed units, units operating in violation of location norms, and units with unsafe conditions. Unlicensed units should be shut down immediately. Violators should be prosecuted.
Strengthen PESO and state factory inspectorates by increasing staffing, providing training, and ensuring unannounced inspections.
Create a central database of licensed fireworks units, with real-time information on compliance status, inspection reports, and enforcement actions.
Impose severe penalties for violations, including fines that are a substantial percentage of turnover, imprisonment for management, and cancellation of licences.
Mandate worker safety measures, including protective equipment, safety training, insurance coverage, and adherence to work-hour limits.
Incentivise mechanisation through subsidies and low-interest loans for safety upgrades.
Raise public awareness about the risks of illegal fireworks and the importance of buying only from licensed sellers.

Conclusion: Breaking the Cycle of Negligence

The Thrissor blast is not an isolated incident. It is the latest in a long line of fireworks tragedies that have killed hundreds of workers over the past decade. The same patterns recur: illegal units, unsafe conditions, lack of enforcement, inadequate compensation. The same promises are made: inquiries, recommendations, action. And then nothing changes.

The government must break this cycle. It must move beyond inquiries to implementation. It must hold employers accountable. It must protect workers. The 14 workers who died in Thrissur deserve more than condolences. They deserve justice. They deserve a system that ensures their deaths were not in vain. The question is whether the government has the will to deliver it.

Q&A: Fireworks Tragedies and Regulatory Failure in India

Q1: What is the scale of fireworks-related accidents in India, and what patterns recur across these incidents?

A1: The article notes that in April 2026 alone, two major incidents occurred: the Thrissur blast (14 killed) and the Virudhunagar blast (23 killed). In February 2026, an explosion in Kakinada, Andhra Pradesh, killed multiple workers. Previous major accidents include the 2016 Puttingal Devi temple fireworks display (111 killed, over 300 injured) and numerous smaller incidents in Unnao, Hardoi, and Batala. Recurring patterns include: fireworks units operating in residential or semi-residential areas, storage of large quantities of explosive chemicals, workers crammed into unsafe spaces, handling volatile materials without training or protective equipment, use of illegal fireworks, improper storage, administrative lapses in licensing, and inadequate oversight. Probes have pointed to repeated safety violations, but recommendations have not been implemented.

Q2: What is the existing regulatory framework for the fireworks industry in India, and why has it failed?

A2: The existing framework includes the Explosives Act, 1884, and the Explosives Rules, 2008, which govern manufacture, storage, transport, and sale of fireworks. Licences require strict location norms (distance from residential areas, schools, hospitals), building specifications (fire-resistant materials, ventilation), safety equipment (fire extinguishers), and work-hour limits (daytime only). The Petroleum and Explosives Safety Organisation (PESO) is the central enforcing authority, supported by state factory inspectorates. The framework has failed due to: gross understaffing of PESO and inspectorates; ineffective enforcement (inspections are infrequent and often forewarned); corruption (licences obtained through bribery); and trivial fines that are insignificant compared to profits. A 2019 NIOH report found over 95 per cent of fireworks units were small-scale, unlicensed, or operating in violation of safety norms.

Q3: What are the labour violations common in the fireworks industry, and how do they contribute to the death toll?

A3: The fireworks industry is a notorious violator of labour laws. Workers are typically: hired on a daily basis without written contracts; not covered by Provident Fund (PF) or Employees’ State Insurance (ESI); paid below minimum wage; made to work long hours, often at night (violating the Factories Act); exposed to hazardous chemicals without protective equipment; not provided with safety training; and, in some cases, children are employed illegally. The article notes that workers are treated as “disposable.” When accidents happen, employers often flee, leaving workers’ families with no compensation (the state provides ex gratia payments of a few lakh rupees, which is a “pittance compared to the loss of a breadwinner”). The 14 workers who died in Thrissur were daily-wage labourers earning a few hundred rupees a day, with no safety training or protective equipment.

Q4: What international examples does the article cite for improving fireworks safety, and what can India learn from them?

A4: The article cites three examples:

China: Fireworks manufacturing is highly mechanised, reducing human exposure to hazardous processes.
Japan: Safety standards are rigorous, and violations are met with severe penalties.
United States: The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) issues recalls and bans dangerous products.
India can learn by formalising and modernising the industry, closing small illegal units, incentivising legal units to mechanise hazardous processes, providing worker training and equipment, conducting unannounced and frequent inspections, and imposing severe penalties including imprisonment for employers found guilty of gross negligence.

Q5: What specific actions does the article recommend to break the cycle of neglect and prevent future tragedies?

A5: The article recommends seven specific actions:

Conduct a nationwide audit of all fireworks manufacturing units to identify and shut down unlicensed units and those violating location norms, and prosecute violators.
Strengthen PESO and state factory inspectorates by increasing staffing, providing training, and ensuring unannounced inspections.
Create a central database of licensed fireworks units with real-time compliance, inspection, and enforcement data.
Impose severe penalties for violations, including substantial fines (a percentage of turnover), imprisonment for management, and licence cancellation.
Mandate worker safety measures, including protective equipment, safety training, insurance coverage, and adherence to work-hour limits.
Incentivise mechanisation through subsidies and low-interest loans for safety upgrades.
Raise public awareness about the risks of illegal fireworks and the importance of buying from licensed sellers.
The article concludes that the government must move beyond inquiries to implementation, hold employers accountable, and protect workers. The 14 workers who died in Thrissur deserve more than condolences; they deserve justice and a system that ensures their deaths were not in vain.

A Fireworks Tragedy, The Grim Familiarity of Negligence and the Failure of Enforcement