Powering Viksit Bharat, The SHANTI Act and India’s Nuclear Energy Transformation

In her 2025-26 Budget speech, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman announced an audacious target: India’s installed nuclear power generation capacity would rise from its current 8,180 MW to a staggering 1,00,000 MW (100 GW) by 2047—the centenary of India’s independence. To enable this quantum leap, she signalled transformative legislative changes, which culminated in the introduction and rapid passage of the Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Bill in December 2025. The scope of change envisaged is nothing short of revolutionary. For over six decades, all nuclear activity in India—from research and development to reactor construction and operation—had been the exclusive preserve of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and its public sector undertaking, the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL). The SHANTI Act dismantles this monopoly, opening India’s civilian nuclear energy sector to private companies to build, own, and operate nuclear power plants. It grants statutory status to the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), ensuring its independence, and revises the liability framework to encourage both domestic private and foreign investment. In doing so, it repeals the 1962 Atomic Energy Act and the contentious 2010 Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLNDA). Yet, as with any transformative legislation, the promise of 100 GW will depend not on the Act alone but on the nuts and bolts of its implementation—the notification of supportive rules and regulations, consonant with the transformative spirit underlying the SHANTI Act.

The Dual Imperatives: Viksit Bharat and Net-Zero

Two overarching national commitments drive this historic reform. The first is the vision of Viksit Bharat (Developed India) by 2047. As societies climb the development ladder, their nature of energy consumption shifts decisively from traditional biomass and fossil fuels to electricity. In 2024, India’s per capita electricity generation stood at a mere 1,418 kilowatt-hours (kWh) , compared to 7,097 kWh for China and 12,701 kWh for the United States. The OECD average is just above 8,000 kWh. To achieve developed nation status, India must close this vast gap, implying a near-tenfold increase in electricity generation. The second imperative is the commitment to net-zero emissions by 2070. This imposes a parallel shift away from fossil fuel-based power generation towards renewables and other low-carbon options. India has already made remarkable progress: in June 2025, total electricity generating capacity reached 476 GW, with approximately 50% from non-fossil fuel sources. Renewables (solar, wind, hydro, bioenergy) accounted for 227 GW, while nuclear contributed 8.8 GW. Thermal power, primarily coal-based, still accounted for 240 GW.

However, installed capacity tells only part of the story. Renewable sources are intermittent—dependent on time of day, season, and geography. In 2024-25, India generated a total of 1,824 terawatt-hours (TWh). Renewables contributed 403 TWh (22% of generation), while thermal power contributed 1,364 TWh (75% of generation), despite renewables and thermal having roughly equal installed capacity. The reason is simple: thermal and nuclear provide steady, reliable base load power, while renewables require expensive energy storage to deliver at scale. Indeed, renewable capacity growth is now facing headwinds, with projects totalling 40 GW languishing without power-purchase contracts. Conservative estimates indicate that India will need to grow its electricity generating capacity to over 2,000 GW to reach Viksit Bharat levels. Given that renewables are about ten times more land-intensive than thermal power plants, and coal is inconsistent with net-zero, nuclear power remains the preferred, indeed indispensable, baseload option to achieve both development and climate goals.

India’s Nuclear Journey: From Tarapur to the SHANTI Act

India’s first nuclear power reactor went operational in 1969 at Tarapur. Today, NPCIL manages 24 nuclear power plants with an installed capacity of 8,780 MW (one reactor at Rawatbhata has been shut down). The fleet comprises two Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) at Tarapur, two Russian-designed VVERs (pressurised water reactors) at Kudankulam, and the balance being indigenous Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs) . The original PHWR design was 220 MW; this has been successfully indigenised and adapted to 540 MW and 700 MW designs.

India’s PHWR construction cost is approximately $2 million per MW, among the lowest globally for nuclear power. To add 90 GW over the next two decades would require an outlay of over $200 billion (approximately ₹18 lakh crore) —a scale of investment that is simply unachievable through DAE’s annual budget, which has averaged between ₹24,000 crore and ₹26,000 crore in recent years. Private investment, both domestic and foreign, is not merely desirable but essential.

The SHANTI Act creates the legal framework for this private participation. It repeals the 1962 Atomic Energy Act, which had made the DAE the sole authority over all nuclear matters, and the 2010 CLNDA, whose stringent liability provisions (allowing recourse to suppliers) had effectively scared away foreign reactor vendors like Westinghouse and GE-Hitachi. The SHANTI Act replaces these with a modern, investment-friendly framework while maintaining stringent safety and non-proliferation standards.

The Three-Front Strategy for 100 GW

To achieve the 100 GW target, the article outlines a careful, three-front strategy:

Front 1: Large-Scale Reactors from Foreign Collaborations: Three locations have been under consideration for over a decade: Jaitapur in Maharashtra (planned for six reactors of 1,650 MW each based on a French EDF design), Mithi Virdi in Gujarat (six reactors of 1,000 MW using Westinghouse-Toshiba design), and Kovvada in Andhra Pradesh (six reactors of 1,000 MW using GE-Hitachi design). However, these designs are comparatively new to India and have high projected costs—over $5 million per MW, more than double the cost of indigenous PHWRs. China has demonstrated a successful model by building a supporting industry base and planning 33 reactors of 1,000 MW each at below $2 million per MW over ten years. India must similarly focus on indigenising foreign designs to bring down costs.

Front 2: Accelerating Indigenous Small Modular Reactors (SMRs): The government has allocated ₹20,000 crore to research and develop five indigenous models of Small Modular Reactors of 5 MW, 55 MW, and 200 MW capacity by 2033. SMRs are particularly attractive for captive power in energy-intensive industries (steel, cement, petrochemicals, paper) and data centres. They can be factory-built, transported, and installed modularly, reducing construction time and upfront capital. The article suggests that the DAE should identify institutions to accelerate R&D for indigenous SMRs, especially of the molten-salt reactor design, which offers inherent safety features. Another promising research area is the use of thorium cladding with HALEU (High Assay Low Enriched Uranium), which could provide an alternative to the long-gestation Breeder Reactor route, enabling early exploitation of India’s vast thorium reserves.

Front 3: Modularising the Proven 220 MW PHWR for Captive Power: The indigenised 220 MW PHWR model, with 15 units currently operational, is a reliable, proven workhorse. It can be modularised as an economically viable replacement for a number of captive fossil fuel power plants. India’s captive power plant capacity is estimated at 90 GW, with plants of 100 MW and above accounting for two-thirds of that capacity. Many Indian private sector companies have the requisite design, fabrication, and construction experience. With efficient project management, some modularisation, and economies of scale, the time from first pour of concrete to going on stream could be reduced to 40 months. However, existing exclusion zone regulations, designed for multiple reactors at a single large site, will need to be modified for captive single-unit reactors located within industrial complexes.

The Regulatory and Implementation Agenda

The SHANTI Act provides the enabling legislation, but the devil lies in the details of its rules and regulations. Several critical issues must be addressed transparently to attract private investment:

Division of Responsibilities: Conceptually, the SHANTI Act attempts a division between strategic and defence-related nuclear activities (which will remain under DAE’s exclusive control) and civilian power generation (now open to private participation). The rules must make this demarcation clear and credible to investors.
Nuclear Power Tariffs: The pricing framework for nuclear power must be predictable and competitive. Given high upfront capital costs but very low operating costs over a long (60-year) operating life, an appropriate financing and tariff model—perhaps involving long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs) with distribution companies or direct sales to industrial consumers—must be worked out.
Ownership of Nuclear Fuel: Under the old regime, NPCIL owned the fuel and the waste. Under the new model, private operators will need clarity on fuel supply arrangements (including imported uranium) and long-term waste management and decommissioning liabilities.
Insurance and Liability: The 2010 CLNDA had made suppliers liable in the event of an accident, a provision unique to India that foreign vendors found unacceptable. The SHANTI Act must establish a liability framework consistent with international conventions (such as the CSC or Vienna Convention) to restore confidence.
An Autonomous Regulator: Granting statutory status to the AERB is a welcome step. However, the regulator must be genuinely independent—adequately funded, protected from political interference, and staffed by technical experts. Transparency in licensing, inspection, and enforcement will be critical to public and investor confidence.
Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Given the long-term, capital-intensive nature of nuclear projects, a credible, efficient dispute resolution mechanism (including international arbitration for foreign investors) is essential.

Conclusion: A Transformative Promise, An Implementation Test

The SHANTI Act represents a paradigm shift in India’s nuclear energy policy, arguably the most significant since the Atomic Energy Act of 1962. It acknowledges a fundamental reality: without massive private investment, both domestic and foreign, India cannot achieve its Viksit Bharat and net-zero goals. By opening the nuclear sector to private build-own-operate models, repealing the liability law that deterred foreign vendors, and granting autonomy to the regulator, the government has created the enabling framework.

However, frameworks do not build reactors. The next phase—notification of rules, finalisation of tariff and liability frameworks, land acquisition, environmental clearances, technology transfer agreements, and project financing—will determine whether the 100 GW target remains a noble aspiration or becomes a tangible reality. India has demonstrated its capability in PHWR technology and its commitment to non-proliferation. The world has seen its success in solar and wind deployment at scale. The SHANTI Act now offers an opportunity to replicate that success in nuclear power. The challenge is execution, and the prize is nothing less than energy security, sustainable development, and the realisation of Viksit Bharat.

Q&A: The SHANTI Act and India’s Nuclear Energy Future

Q1: What is the SHANTI Act, and why is it considered a transformative piece of legislation for India’s nuclear energy sector?

A1: The Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Act, passed in December 2025, is a landmark law that fundamentally restructures India’s nuclear energy landscape. For over six decades, all nuclear activity—research, development, reactor construction, and operation—was the exclusive preserve of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and its public sector undertaking, NPCIL. The SHANTI Act dismantles this monopoly by:

Allowing private companies (both domestic and foreign) to build, own, and operate nuclear power plants.
Granting statutory status to the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) , ensuring its independence from the DAE.
Repealing the 2010 Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLNDA) , whose stringent supplier-liability provisions had deterred foreign vendors.
Repealing the 1962 Atomic Energy Act to enable private participation.
It is transformative because it opens a previously closed, strategic sector to private capital and expertise, essential for achieving the target of 100 GW nuclear capacity by 2047.

Q2: What are the two national imperatives driving India’s push for nuclear power expansion?

A2: Two overarching national commitments drive the nuclear expansion:

Viksit Bharat (Developed India) by 2047: India’s per capita electricity generation is currently 1,418 kWh, far below China’s 7,097 kWh and the OECD average of ~8,000 kWh. Achieving developed nation status will require a near-tenfold increase in electricity generation, implying a need for over 2,000 GW of installed capacity.
Net-Zero Emissions by 2070: This requires a shift away from fossil fuels. While renewables (solar, wind) are expanding rapidly, they are intermittent and land-intensive (10x more land than thermal plants). Nuclear power provides steady, reliable baseload power without carbon emissions. Given that renewable projects totalling 40 GW are currently languishing without power-purchase contracts due to intermittency issues, nuclear is indispensable for meeting both development and climate goals simultaneously.

Q3: What is India’s current nuclear power capacity and cost structure, and what is the investment required to reach 100 GW?

A3: India currently has 24 operational nuclear power plants with an installed capacity of approximately 8,780 MW. The indigenous Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor (PHWR) design—successfully scaled from 220 MW to 540 MW and 700 MW—has a construction cost of approximately $2 million per MW, among the lowest globally. To add 90 GW of new capacity by 2047 would require an outlay of over $200 billion (approximately ₹18 lakh crore) . The DAE’s annual budget has averaged only ₹24,000-26,000 crore in recent years, making it impossible to finance this expansion through public funds alone. Hence, private investment (domestic and foreign) is not merely desirable but absolutely essential—a key driver of the SHANTI Act.

Q4: What is the “three-front strategy” outlined to achieve the 100 GW target?

A4: The three-front strategy comprises:

Front 1 (Large-Scale Foreign Designs): Sites at Jaitapur (French EDF design, 1,650 MW each), Mithi Virdi (Westinghouse, 1,000 MW), and Kovvada (GE-Hitachi, 1,000 MW) have been under consideration for over a decade. These designs must be indigenised to bring down costs from the current ~$5 million per MW to competitive levels, following China’s model of building a domestic supply chain.
Front 2 (Indigenous Small Modular Reactors – SMRs): The government has allocated ₹20,000 crore to develop SMRs of 5 MW, 55 MW, and 200 MW by 2033. SMRs are ideal for captive power in energy-intensive industries (steel, cement, petrochemicals, data centres). Research priorities include molten-salt reactor designs and thorium-HALEU fuel cycles to exploit India’s thorium reserves.
Front 3 (Modularising the Proven 220 MW PHWR): The indigenised 220 MW PHWR (15 units operational) is a reliable workhorse. It can be modularised as an economically viable replacement for captive fossil fuel power plants. With efficient project management, construction time could be reduced to 40 months, though exclusion zone regulations will need modification for single-unit captive plants.

Q5: What are the key regulatory and implementation challenges that will determine whether the SHANTI Act delivers on its promise?

A5: The SHANTI Act creates the enabling framework, but success depends on transparent, investor-friendly rules and regulations. Key challenges include:

Division of Responsibilities: Clearly demarcating strategic/defence-related nuclear activities (remaining with DAE) from civilian power generation (open to private participation).
Nuclear Power Tariffs: Establishing a predictable pricing framework, likely involving long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs) or direct sales to industrial consumers, given high upfront capital costs and low operating costs over a 60-year life.
Ownership of Nuclear Fuel and Waste: Clarifying fuel supply arrangements (including imported uranium) and long-term waste management and decommissioning liabilities for private operators.
Insurance and Liability: Replacing the 2010 CLNDA (which made suppliers liable) with a framework consistent with international conventions (CSC or Vienna Convention) to restore foreign vendor confidence.
Autonomous Regulator: Ensuring the newly statutory AERB is genuinely independent, adequately funded, and technically competent, with transparent licensing and enforcement processes.
Dispute Settlement: Establishing a credible, efficient mechanism, including international arbitration for foreign investors.
Without addressing these implementation details, the promise of the SHANTI Act may remain unfulfilled.

Powering Viksit Bharat, The SHANTI Act and India’s Nuclear Energy Transformation