Pakistan, More Messenger Than Mediator, The Structural Logic Behind Islamabad’s Role in the US-Iran Conflict

Pakistan, More Messenger Than Mediator, The Structural Logic Behind Islamabad’s Role in the US-Iran Conflict

In the complex web of West Asian diplomacy, where the US-Israel war on Iran has entered its fifth week, a curious role has emerged for an unexpected player. Pakistan, a country often seen as a source of regional instability, has positioned itself as a crucial channel of communication between Washington and Tehran. Its role, however, appears closer to that of a messenger than a mediator, offering both sides a way to indicate intentions without the domestic costs of direct engagement. The sequence of events is revealing: Pakistan’s Chief of Defence Forces, General Asim Munir, spoke to US President Donald Trump on March 22; Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif spoke with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on March 23; and on the same day, Trump announced a five-day pause on targeting Iran’s power plants. The timing was not coincidental.

Pakistan’s ability to occupy this role has less to do with its diplomatic sophistication and more with structural realities that are deeply embedded in its geography, constitution, and military-dominated foreign policy apparatus. The country’s Islamic credentials and geographical positioning make it a crucial player in any conflict involving the Muslim world. Pakistan hosts no American bases—a fact that gives it a degree of distance from the US that is important for its credibility with Tehran—but Trump seems to admire General Munir, a relationship that opens doors in Washington.

Article 40 of the Pakistani Constitution mandates the state to “endeavour to preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among the Muslim countries.” This constitutional framework has entrenched Islamabad’s deep affiliation with the Gulf monarchies and its broader engagement with the Muslim world. It provides a formal, institutional justification for Pakistan’s involvement in conflicts that involve Muslim-majority nations, even when those conflicts also involve non-Muslim powers.

The Pakistani-Iran relationship, meanwhile, operates on the logic of geography. The two countries share a 900-kilometer border in Balochistan, a region already marred by separatism and insurgency on both sides. In January 2024, both sides exchanged hostilities after brief cross-border strikes—a sharp reminder that their relationship is not one of simple friendship but of mutual recognition of shared vulnerabilities. The current war in West Asia threatens to spill over into Balochistan, a prospect that neither Islamabad nor Tehran can afford. This shared concern over the potential spillover of the war has made Pakistan a natural interlocutor.

The outsized role of the Pakistani military, rather than the foreign ministry, in this process reinforces General Munir’s dominance and the state’s securitised approach to foreign policy. Munir’s meeting with Saudi Arabia’s defence minister in Riyadh, and his call with Trump, puts the Pakistani military squarely in the seat of foreign policy interlocutor, with civilian institutions handling secondary tracks like Iranian-French diplomacy. This is where Pakistan’s position differs fundamentally from India’s. New Delhi signals a strategic inclination towards the US-Israel axis while maintaining visible restraint in its pro-Iran rhetoric. India’s foreign policy is conducted by a professional diplomatic service accountable to an elected government. Pakistan’s foreign policy, by contrast, is conducted by its military, accountable only to itself.

The influence Pakistan will hold in any eventual settlement is yet to be determined. It may be minimal; it may be significant. But that will not stop Islamabad from crediting itself for attempting to facilitate an agreement. The Pakistani state has a long history of claiming credit for diplomatic ventures, regardless of their actual impact. This is not Pakistan’s first negotiating venture, and its rentier state characteristics—its reliance on external financial flows and its role as a conduit for Gulf petrodollars—have enabled this position for decades.

In the early 1970s, Pakistan’s mediation facilitated US President Richard Nixon’s historic visit to China. That was a moment of genuine diplomatic achievement, one that reshaped the global balance of power. Pakistan’s role was not accidental; it was the product of its unique position as a country with ties to both Washington and Beijing at a time when the two powers had no direct relations. More recently, Pakistan was a participant in the Taliban-US Doha deal in 2020, a role that reflected its deep entanglement with the Afghan conflict and its ability to talk to all sides.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, had famously said that the US would need Pakistan more than the other way around. That logic, rooted in Pakistan’s geographic position and its Islamic identity, holds true today. The US and Iran need a reliable interlocutor that is not seen as a proxy of the other side. Pakistan fits that description. It is not a US ally in the way that Saudi Arabia or the UAE are, nor is it an Iranian ally in the way that Syria or Hezbollah are. It is something rarer: a country that can talk to both sides without being accused of selling out to either.

But the messenger role is not the same as the mediator role. A mediator proposes solutions, shapes outcomes, and has a stake in the content of the agreement. A messenger merely carries messages. Pakistan’s role in the current crisis appears closer to the latter. The messages it carries—from Washington to Tehran and back—are being shaped by others. The pause in strikes announced by Trump was a US decision, taken after consulting Pakistan, not because of Pakistan. The responses from Tehran will be Iranian decisions, conveyed through Pakistani channels, not determined by them.

This is not to diminish Pakistan’s role. In a conflict as fraught as the US-Iran war, the ability to carry messages reliably, without distortion or delay, is a valuable service. Both sides need to know that their signals are being received and understood. Pakistan provides that service. But it is a service, not a solution.

The structural realities that make Pakistan a useful messenger are the same structural realities that prevent it from being a true mediator. The dominance of the military in foreign policy means that Pakistan’s diplomatic positions are often opaque, shifting with the internal dynamics of the army rather than with a coherent national strategy. The rentier state characteristics that enable Pakistan to play this role also make it dependent on external patrons, reducing its autonomy. The constitutional mandate to maintain fraternal relations with the Muslim world pulls Pakistan towards Tehran, while its economic dependence on the Gulf pulls it towards Washington. These cross-pressures are the source of Pakistan’s utility as a messenger, but they also limit its capacity to act independently.

For India, Pakistan’s role in the conflict is a reminder of the limits of its own strategic autonomy. New Delhi has chosen to stay largely on the sidelines, maintaining relations with both sides while signaling a tilt towards the US-Israel axis. That is a defensible position, but it also means that India has less influence than it might have if it had cultivated the kind of relationships that Pakistan has with both Washington and Tehran. Pakistan’s role is not one that India should envy, but it is one that India should study. In a fractured world, the countries that can talk to all sides are the ones that will shape the outcomes.

The outcome of the current messaging process is anybody’s guess. The war could escalate again after the five-day pause. It could continue for months. It could end tomorrow. But whatever happens, Pakistan’s role as a messenger will have been a factor. It will not be the decisive factor, but it will be a factor. And that, for a country that has struggled for decades to find a coherent role in the world, is no small thing.

Questions and Answers

Q1: What role is Pakistan playing in the US-Iran conflict, and how does it differ from that of a mediator?

A1: Pakistan is playing the role of a messenger, not a mediator. It offers both sides a way to indicate intentions without the domestic costs of direct engagement. A messenger merely carries messages, while a mediator proposes solutions and shapes outcomes. The messages are shaped by Washington and Tehran; Pakistan merely facilitates their exchange.

Q2: What structural factors enable Pakistan to occupy this role?

A2: Several structural factors enable Pakistan’s role:

1. Geographic positioning: Pakistan shares a 900-km border with Iran and is adjacent to the conflict zone.

2. Constitutional mandate: Article 40 mandates fraternal relations with Muslim countries.

3. No US bases: Pakistan hosts no American military bases, giving it credibility with Tehran.

4. Military dominance: The Pakistani military, not the foreign ministry, conducts foreign policy.

5. Rentier state characteristics: Pakistan’s reliance on external financial flows enables this positioning.

Q3: What historical precedents exist for Pakistan’s role as a diplomatic interlocutor?

A3: Pakistan has played similar roles before. In the early 1970s, its mediation facilitated President Nixon’s historic visit to China. More recently, Pakistan was a participant in the Taliban-US Doha deal in 2020. Muhammad Ali Jinnah had also predicted that the US would need Pakistan more than the other way around.

Q4: How does Pakistan’s approach to foreign policy differ from India’s in this conflict?

A4: Pakistan’s foreign policy is conducted by its military, accountable only to itself, with a securitised approach. India’s foreign policy is conducted by a professional diplomatic service accountable to an elected government. India signals a strategic inclination towards the US-Israel axis while maintaining visible restraint in its pro-Iran rhetoric. Pakistan’s role is more direct but also more opaque.

Q5: What are the limitations of Pakistan’s ability to act as a true mediator?

A5: Pakistan’s limitations include:

1. Military dominance: Diplomatic positions are opaque and shift with internal army dynamics.

2. Rentier state characteristics: Dependence on external patrons reduces autonomy.

3. Cross-pressures: Constitutional mandate pulls towards Tehran; economic dependence on the Gulf pulls towards Washington.

4. Messenger vs. mediator: Pakistan carries messages but does not shape the content of agreements. The pause in strikes was a US decision, conveyed through Pakistan, not because of Pakistan.