When Hospitals Become Fire Hazards, The SCB Medical College Tragedy and India’s Recurring Safety Crisis
A Fire at Odisha’s Oldest Hospital Kills 12 and Injures 14, Exposing the Deadly Consequences of Administrative Negligence, Delayed Upgradation, and Routine Safety Failures
The Odisha government lost little time in announcing a judicial probe into the fire at SCB Medical College and Hospital on Monday that killed 12 and left 14 with serious injuries, along with compensation for their families. Given that the hospital is run by the state government, it must now enable the single-member (a district judge) commission that has been appointed to conduct a thorough probe that reveals all points of failure so that those responsible for the fire are brought to book.
But probes, however thorough, cannot bring back the dead. They cannot undo the trauma of the injured or the grief of families who lost loved ones in a facility that was supposed to heal, not harm. The tragedy at SCB Medical College is not an isolated incident; it is part of a grim pattern that has repeated itself across India for years. Hospitals, meant to be sanctuaries of healing, have too often become death traps.
The Ageing Infrastructure
The tragedy is a telling indictment of the poor upkeep of the state’s oldest hospital, established in 1944. A facility this old is sure to have serious deficiencies in terms of modern safety standards. Built eight decades ago, before modern fire safety codes existed, before the understanding of hospital fire risks had evolved, the infrastructure has simply not kept pace with the demands placed upon it.
The 2019 decision to upgrade the hospital into a “world-class, AIIMS-plus” facility would seem the right prescription—only if implementation had matched ambition. The ₹4,400-crore project suffered several delays, with the deadline postponed from July 2024 to December 2025 and then to July 2026—earning stinging rebukes from the Odisha High Court. Meanwhile, the safety of the hospital’s crumbling infrastructure seems to have taken a backseat.
This is the paradox of India’s public health infrastructure: grand plans, ambitious targets, and repeated delays. While officials speak of “world-class” facilities, the existing infrastructure continues to decay. While deadlines are pushed forward, patients and staff continue to occupy buildings that were not designed for modern healthcare, let alone for fire safety.
The Routine Failures
The state fire services administration pointed out that the last fire safety audit, conducted well over a year ago, had suggested several measures. There appear to have been some shocking failures of routine operation as well—the control valve of the automatic sprinkler system being closed and the fire alarm switched off.
These are not failures of planning; they are failures of basic operation. An automatic sprinkler system that has its control valve closed is not a sprinkler system; it is a decoration. A fire alarm that is switched off is not an alarm; it is a piece of inert hardware. When these systems are in place but not operational, the failure is not one of resources but of responsibility.
Who closed the valve? Who switched off the alarm? Who was responsible for ensuring that these systems were functional? These questions must be answered by the judicial probe. But even before the probe reports, it is clear that the hospital’s safety systems were not working as intended. And when safety systems fail, people die.
A National Pattern
Most past instances of hospital fires—across the country—highlight a volatile mix of hospitals’ particular vulnerability to such accidents and strings of administrative lapses. Hospitals are uniquely vulnerable to fire. They contain large quantities of combustible material: oxygen cylinders, medical gases, linens, cleaning supplies. They are often overcrowded, with patients in corridors and stairwells. Many patients cannot move on their own; they depend on staff to evacuate them. Fire exits are often locked or blocked. Staff are not trained in evacuation procedures.
This vulnerability is compounded by administrative lapses. Fire safety audits are conducted but not acted upon. Equipment is installed but not maintained. Training is provided but not practiced. The result is a system that appears to be prepared but is, in reality, waiting for disaster.
The SCB Medical College fire is not the first such tragedy. In 2011, a fire at AMRI Hospital in Kolkata killed 93 people—one of the worst hospital fires in Indian history. In 2016, a fire at a private hospital in Bhubaneswar killed 21. In 2019, a fire at a government hospital in Gujarat killed 18. In 2020, a fire at a COVID-19 hospital in Ahmedabad killed 8. The list goes on.
Each tragedy produces a familiar response: a probe, compensation, promises of action. But the pattern repeats because the underlying failures are never fully addressed.
The Vulnerable Patients
What makes hospital fires particularly devastating is the nature of the patients. Unlike other fires, where people can flee, hospital patients are often immobile, dependent on ventilators, IV lines, and constant care. They cannot walk down stairs. They cannot navigate smoke-filled corridors. They cannot help themselves.
In the SCB Medical College fire, many of the victims were in the ICU. These are patients who were already critically ill, already fighting for their lives. They were in a hospital precisely because they needed the kind of care that cannot be provided at home. And in that place of care, they died—not from their illnesses, but from a fire that should have been prevented.
This is the moral horror of hospital fires. They kill people who are already vulnerable, already suffering, already dependent on the system for their survival. When that system fails, it is not just a failure of administration; it is a betrayal of trust.
The Administrative Culpability
The state government must now put the pending upgradation work on the fast track, address vulnerabilities in existing infrastructure at the earliest, and book the administrators culpable for the disaster. These are not separate tasks; they are connected. The same officials who delayed the upgradation, who ignored safety audits, who allowed sprinkler valves to remain closed and alarms switched off, must be held accountable.
Accountability is not merely punitive; it is preventive. When officials know that negligence will have consequences, they are more likely to take their responsibilities seriously. When they know that delays and failures will be investigated and punished, they are more likely to prioritise safety over convenience.
But accountability must extend beyond individual officials. The systems that allowed these failures must be reformed. Fire safety audits must be conducted regularly, and their recommendations must be implemented. Equipment must be maintained and tested. Staff must be trained and drills must be practiced. These are not optional extras; they are essential components of hospital management.
The Financial Cost
The financial cost of hospital fires is also significant. The SCB Medical College upgradation project was already costing ₹4,400 crore—a substantial investment. But the cost of the fire, in terms of lives lost, injuries suffered, and damage to infrastructure, is also substantial. And there is the cost of litigation, compensation, and the inevitable delays that will result from the tragedy.
Prevention is cheaper than response. Maintaining safety systems is cheaper than rebuilding after a fire. Training staff is cheaper than paying compensation. Yet governments consistently underinvest in safety, only to pay much more after disaster strikes.
This is not a rational allocation of resources; it is a failure of priorities. Safety is treated as an expense to be minimised rather than an investment to be protected. The result is that when disasters occur, the costs are far higher than the savings from neglecting safety.
The Way Forward
Other states would do well to take note of the SCB Medical College tragedy. Not because the disaster is unique, but because it is typical. Hospitals across India face the same combination of ageing infrastructure, overcrowding, and administrative neglect. The conditions that led to this fire exist in countless facilities across the country.
State governments must conduct comprehensive fire safety audits of all hospitals. They must ensure that these audits are acted upon, not merely filed away. They must allocate resources for safety upgrades. They must train staff in evacuation procedures. They must ensure that fire safety equipment is functional. And they must hold officials accountable when they fail.
The Union government also has a role to play. It can set standards for hospital fire safety, provide technical assistance to states, and make funding conditional on compliance. It can support research into hospital fire safety and disseminate best practices. It can ensure that the lessons of past tragedies are learned and applied.
Conclusion: A Promise Betrayed
The fire at SCB Medical College is a tragedy. But it is also a verdict—on the state of India’s public health infrastructure, on the priorities of its administrators, on the failures of its regulatory systems. It is a verdict that has been delivered before, in Kolkata, in Bhubaneswar, in Ahmedabad, and in too many other places. And until the underlying causes are addressed, it will be delivered again.
The Odisha government has announced a probe. It has promised compensation. It has spoken of fast-tracking upgradation. These are necessary steps, but they are not sufficient. What is needed is a fundamental shift in how we think about hospital safety—not as an optional extra, but as an essential component of healthcare delivery. Not as a cost to be minimised, but as a condition of care.
The patients who died in the fire at SCB Medical College trusted the hospital to keep them safe. They came to be healed, and they were not. That is a betrayal of the most basic promise that a hospital makes to its patients. And it is a betrayal that must never be allowed to happen again.
Q&A: Unpacking the SCB Medical College Fire Tragedy
Q1: What happened at SCB Medical College and Hospital in Odisha?
A: A fire broke out at SCB Medical College and Hospital, Odisha’s oldest hospital (established in 1944), killing 12 people and seriously injuring 14. Many victims were in the ICU—patients who were already critically ill and dependent on the hospital for survival. The state government announced a judicial probe by a single-member (district judge) commission and compensation for the victims’ families.
Q2: What factors contributed to the tragedy?
A: Several factors combined to create the disaster. The hospital’s ageing infrastructure (dating from 1944) lacked modern safety standards. A ₹4,400-crore upgradation project, approved in 2019, faced repeated delays—deadlines postponed from July 2024 to December 2025 to July 2026. The last fire safety audit, conducted over a year ago, had suggested measures that were apparently not implemented. Most shocking were routine operational failures: the automatic sprinkler system’s control valve was closed, and the fire alarm was switched off—rendering both safety systems useless.
Q3: Why are hospitals particularly vulnerable to fire?
A: Hospitals have unique vulnerabilities: they contain large quantities of combustible materials (oxygen cylinders, medical gases, linens, cleaning supplies); they are often overcrowded, with patients in corridors and stairwells; many patients cannot move on their own, depending on staff for evacuation; fire exits are often locked or blocked; and staff are frequently not trained in evacuation procedures. These factors combine to make hospitals more vulnerable to fire and more difficult to evacuate.
Q4: What pattern of hospital fires has India witnessed?
A: The SCB Medical College fire is part of a grim national pattern. In 2011, a fire at AMRI Hospital in Kolkata killed 93 people. In 2016, a fire at a private hospital in Bhubaneswar killed 21. In 2019, a fire at a government hospital in Gujarat killed 18. In 2020, a fire at a COVID-19 hospital in Ahmedabad killed 8. Each tragedy produces a probe and promises of action, but the underlying failures—ageing infrastructure, administrative neglect, routine safety lapses—recur.
Q5: What actions are needed to prevent future hospital fires?
A: Several urgent actions are required: comprehensive fire safety audits of all hospitals with enforceable timelines for implementing recommendations; ensuring safety equipment is functional (sprinklers, alarms) and maintained; training staff in evacuation procedures and conducting regular drills; holding administrators accountable for negligence; fast-tracking hospital upgradation projects; and reforming the systems that allow routine safety failures to persist. The Union government can support by setting standards, providing technical assistance, and making funding conditional on compliance.66
