Air Power Deters, But Enduring Outcomes Need More, Lessons from the Iran Campaign for India’s Military Doctrine
As the US-Israel Air Campaign Against Iran Demonstrates Both the Power and Limits of Aerial Retribution, India Must Reexamine Its Own Military Priorities
The US-Israel air campaign against Iran highlights both the power and the limits of air-delivered retribution. Air strikes can penetrate deep, hit critical nodes with precision, and signal resolve within hours—yet even with this intense barrage, few serious observers believe Tehran’s regime will fall to just bombs and missiles.
This is the paradox of modern air power. It is visible, dramatic, and satisfying to domestic audiences who demand retribution against foes. It can degrade capabilities, destroy infrastructure, and send unmistakable signals of resolve. But it cannot, by itself, achieve the enduring political outcomes that wars are fought to secure. It cannot occupy territory, cannot hold ground, cannot convert fleeting tactical advantages into lasting strategic gains.
While acknowledging the prowess of air power, military historian T.R. Fehrenbach articulated the importance of boots on the ground over bombs in the sky. His observation, drawn from the Korean War experience, remains relevant: “You may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life—but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legion did, by putting your young men into the mud.”
That logic frames the central question for India: Air power can punish and deter, but who will convert those fleeting effects into enduring political outcomes?
The Allure and Limits of Air Power
Air power has become critical to contemporary statecraft. It satisfies domestic expectations for visible retribution and sends deterrent signals to foes, while avoiding the political costs of full-scale ground wars. When a nation is attacked or provoked, the instinctive response is to strike back from the air—to show that aggression carries consequences, that the nation’s honour is intact, that the blood of its soldiers will be avenged.
India has experience with this dynamic. In May 2025, the Indian Air Force conducted long-range strikes at will, forcing Pakistan to seek a ceasefire. The operation demonstrated India’s capability to penetrate deep into enemy territory and strike with precision. It sent a clear message about the costs of cross-border terrorism.
However, the outcomes of air power are also easier to question. As arguments following the Balakot strikes in 2019 demonstrated, observers can doubt the degree of damage inflicted, despite the value of the strike’s political signal. The adversary has significant incentives to downplay losses. Satellite imagery can be contested. Casualty figures can be disputed. Narrative warfare becomes as important as kinetic warfare.
Air campaigns can be operationally successful and tactically beneficial, but claims of “victory” remain vulnerable to narrative warfare. For India, this means swift air retribution cannot be the single foundation upon which military victory is built. It must be part of a broader strategy that integrates all elements of national power.
The Primacy of Contact Warfare
In the Russia-Ukraine conflict, every movement on the frontline is regarded as a strategic milestone. The war has demonstrated that even in an age of drones, satellites, and precision missiles, the outcome is ultimately determined by soldiers on the ground. Territory is taken and held by infantry, not by bombs.
Similarly, the purpose in Kargil was not to punish Pakistan from the air—it was to remove Pakistani intruders and restore the Line of Control’s integrity. That required soldiers to climb mountains, clear bunkers, and engage in close-quarters combat. Air power supported the effort, but it did not substitute for it.
Gaining territory requires superiority in contact warfare. The Army’s primary objective is to win contact battles, then occupy and protect captured territory. This is not a glamorous mission. It does not produce dramatic videos of precision strikes. It involves mud, blood, and the relentless grind of close combat. But it is essential.
Land forces worldwide often face a temptation to prioritise “strategic” capabilities—long-range missiles, advanced stand-off systems, platforms that can strike deep behind enemy lines. These capabilities are valuable, but they come at a cost. When an army acts like a second air force, it risks being under-equipped in the infantry and artillery that actually win wars.
The Importance of Clear Roles
Clear roles are the solution to this dilemma. The Air Force and authorised tri-service strategic forces should be responsible for long-range deep strike operations. That is their mission, their expertise, their raison d’être. They should be equipped and trained to perform it at the highest level.
The Army should prioritise suppressing enemy artillery, neutralising local reserves, and enabling manoeuvre over pursuing independent strategic strikes. Its focus must remain on the contact battle—on the soldiers who will cross the Line of Control or the International Border, on the artillery that will support them, on the logistics that will sustain them.
The Navy must avoid becoming a small “air force at sea” at the cost of underinvesting in submarines, anti-submarine warfare, logistics, and upkeep. Its mission is control of the seas, protection of sea lanes, and projection of power from the oceans. Aircraft carriers are important, but they are not the entirety of naval power.
These distinctions are not bureaucratic turf battles. They reflect fundamental differences in mission, capability, and doctrine. A force designed for one mission cannot simply be repurposed for another without losing effectiveness in its primary role.
The Indigenisation Opportunity
India’s indigenisation effort offers an opportunity to align technology, doctrine, and budgets. The Army can create a soldier-centric ecosystem by incorporating reliable indigenous small arms, night sights, integrated infantry radios, armoured and mine-protected vehicles, artillery, loitering munitions, counter-drone systems, and field-ready software tools.
These capabilities may not be as glamorous as long-range missiles or stealth aircraft. They do not produce the same political theatre. But they will be more important in the next crisis than any long-range platform. A soldier with a reliable rifle, functioning communications, and protection against enemy fire is worth more than a squadron of aircraft that cannot influence the contact battle.
The focus on indigenisation also builds strategic autonomy. Dependence on foreign suppliers for critical military equipment is a vulnerability that adversaries can exploit. Building domestic capacity in the systems that matter most for contact warfare reduces this vulnerability and strengthens India’s ability to act independently.
The Army’s Essential Mission
The Army’s ability to march into hostile territory when directed is important. This is not a relic of 20th-century warfare; it is a continuing requirement of national security. No matter how advanced air power becomes, there will always be situations where only boots on the ground can achieve the desired outcome.
This does not mean India should prepare for large-scale conventional invasions. It means the Army must retain the capability to conduct offensive operations when ordered, to seize and hold territory, to defeat enemy forces in contact. This capability is the ultimate guarantee of national security—the assurance that if diplomacy fails, if deterrence collapses, if war comes, the nation has the means to prevail.
Together, the services must embrace technology while remaining true to their basic missions. Technology can enhance capabilities, but it cannot substitute for them. A drone can provide surveillance, but it cannot hold ground. A missile can strike a target, but it cannot consolidate gains. Only soldiers, sailors, and airmen operating in their core domains can achieve enduring outcomes.
Conclusion: The Hard Qualities of Close Combat
The US-Israel air campaign against Iran will be studied for years. It will reveal much about the capabilities of modern air power, about precision strike, about the integration of air and space assets. But it will also reveal the limits of air power—the things that bombs and missiles cannot achieve, no matter how accurate or powerful.
For India, the lesson is clear. Air power is essential for deterrence and punishment. It can signal resolve, degrade capabilities, and create conditions for success. But it cannot substitute for the hard, vital qualities of close combat that have always determined victories in wars.
The Army, above all, must invest in those qualities. It must ensure its soldiers are equipped, trained, and led to prevail in contact battles. It must maintain the ability to march into hostile territory when directed. It must be ready to do what air power cannot: convert fleeting tactical advantages into lasting strategic outcomes.
This is not a rejection of air power. It is a recognition of its limits. And for a nation that faces diverse threats across its borders, that recognition is essential to building a military capable of defending the nation in all circumstances.
Q&A: Unpacking the Role of Air Power in Modern Warfare
Q1: What are the limits of air power demonstrated by the US-Israel campaign against Iran?
A: While air strikes can penetrate deep, hit critical nodes with precision, and signal resolve within hours, they cannot by themselves achieve regime change or enduring political outcomes. Military historian T.R. Fehrenbach’s observation remains relevant: “You may fly over a land forever… but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground.” Air power can degrade capabilities but cannot occupy territory, hold ground, or convert fleeting tactical advantages into lasting strategic gains.
Q2: What lessons does India’s experience with air strikes offer?
A: In May 2025, the IAF conducted long-range strikes that forced Pakistan to seek a ceasefire, demonstrating air power’s deterrent value. However, the Balakot experience showed that outcomes of air power are vulnerable to narrative warfare—adversaries can downplay losses, and observers can doubt damage inflicted. Air campaigns can be operationally successful, but claims of “victory” remain contestable. Swift air retribution cannot be the single foundation for military victory.
Q3: How does the Russia-Ukraine conflict illustrate the importance of contact warfare?
A: The conflict has demonstrated that even with drones, satellites, and precision missiles, outcomes are ultimately determined by soldiers on the ground. Every frontline movement is regarded as a strategic milestone because territory is taken and held by infantry, not bombs. This reinforces the principle that gaining territory requires superiority in contact warfare—the Army’s primary objective must be winning contact battles, then occupying and protecting captured territory.
Q4: What risks arise when armies prioritise “strategic” capabilities over infantry and artillery?
A: Land forces worldwide often prioritise long-range missiles and advanced stand-off systems, but when an army acts like a second air force, it risks being under-equipped in infantry and artillery that actually win wars. Clear roles are essential: the Air Force handles long-range deep strikes; the Army prioritises suppressing enemy artillery, neutralising local reserves, and enabling manoeuvre. The Navy must avoid becoming a small “air force at sea” at the cost of submarines, anti-submarine warfare, and logistics.
Q5: How should India’s indigenisation effort align with military doctrine?
A: India’s indigenisation effort offers an opportunity to align technology, doctrine, and budgets. The Army should focus on creating a soldier-centric ecosystem with reliable indigenous small arms, night sights, integrated infantry radios, armoured vehicles, artillery, loitering munitions, counter-drone systems, and field-ready software. These capabilities will be more important in the next crisis than any long-range platform. Building domestic capacity in systems essential for contact warfare strengthens strategic autonomy and reduces vulnerability to foreign suppliers.
