SCOTUS Blocks TOTUS by POTUS, The Limits of Executive Power and the Debate Over Judicial Overreach
Approx the news report, “US Hikes Tariff as India Reviews Twists in Tale” (Feb 22), in an affirmation of independence and institutionalised checks and balances, the Supreme Court of the United States has struck down the reciprocal tariffs of the United States imposed by the President of the United States without congressional approval on almost all its trading partners. A different kettle of fish, Trump doubled down on imposing more tariffs. His unilateral, whimsical and maverick-style decisions show the flawed nature of his tangled web of trade policies, compounding the confusion on the trade front. India should go beyond “studying the implications of US tariff moves” and insist on renegotiating the recent interim trade deal with the US on an equal footing.
This letter captures a moment of constitutional significance. The US Supreme Court’s ruling is not just about tariffs; it is about the fundamental principle that even the most powerful executive must operate within the bounds of law. The court affirmed that the power to tax—the power of the purse—belongs to Congress, not to the president acting unilaterally.
Yet the ruling also reveals the limits of judicial intervention. Trump immediately announced new tariffs under different legal authorities. The game continues, only the rules have shifted slightly.
The Tariff Tango
For India, the implications are direct. The interim trade deal negotiated with the US was based on a framework of reciprocal tariffs that have now been struck down. The primary US concession—reducing tariffs from 25% to 18%—no longer exists in its original form. India is now studying the implications, but studying is not enough.
As the letter argues, India should insist on renegotiating the deal on equal footing. The basis of the agreement has changed; the terms should change accordingly. This is not confrontation; it is simple contract law. When one party’s commitments become impossible or fundamentally altered, the other party has the right to seek modification.
India has leverage. The US wants access to Indian markets. It wants Indian cooperation on strategic issues. It wants to sell more to India. These are bargaining chips. They should be used.
The Freebies Debate
A second letter shifts the focus from international trade to domestic governance. This refers to “Nothing But Appeasement: SC Slams Freebies Before Polls” by Raghav Ohri (Feb 20). The Supreme Court has expressed distaste for governments’ free rice, laptops, bus passes and doles in fancy envelopes.
The letter raises a fundamental question about judicial role: If fiscal indiscipline is its worry, we have auditors, finance commissions, CAG reports and parliamentary committees—an entire ecosystem built to haul in governments. And if electoral rudiments be its concern, it is the Election Commission’s remit to police illicit romance between voter and politician.
Should courts don robes of a moral tutor to chastise elected governments from being overly electoral? This is but judicial minimalism: maximal sermons with minimal mandate. In a freely voting democracy, the voter and politician alone draw up a compact. Should courts be setting curated menus that include only judicially approved austerity platter?
The question is not whether freebies are good or bad policy. It is whether courts are the appropriate institution to police them. Fiscal responsibility is ultimately the responsibility of elected governments, accountable to voters. If voters choose to reward parties that offer generous welfare schemes, that is their right. If those schemes lead to fiscal stress, voters will eventually hold governments accountable—or not.
Judicial intervention in this domain risks crossing the line from constitutional interpretation to policy prescription. It risks substituting judicial judgment for democratic choice.
The Case for Distinction
A third response offers a more measured view. Pre-election freebies have become routine, and their long-term cost is being questioned. When subsidies crowd out capital expenditure, it is ordinary citizens who suffer due to crumbling roads, anaemic hospitals and tottering schools.
The solution lies not in banning welfare but in distinguishing genuine social support from electoral bribes. A statutory framework requiring fiscal impact assessments before announcing such schemes would be a reasonable starting point. Voters, too, must hold governments accountable beyond election season.
This approach respects democratic choice while demanding transparency. It does not ban welfare; it requires that welfare schemes be costed, that their fiscal implications be understood, that voters have the information they need to make informed choices. This is not judicial overreach; it is good governance.
The Common Thread
What connects these two seemingly disparate issues—US tariffs and Indian freebies—is the question of institutional limits. In both cases, courts are being asked to intervene in areas that have traditionally been the preserve of elected branches.
In the US case, the Supreme Court rightly checked executive overreach, affirming that the power to tax belongs to Congress. In the Indian case, the question is whether courts should similarly check what some see as legislative overreach in the form of pre-election giveaways.
The answer may lie in the distinction between process and substance. Courts can legitimately insist on proper process—that Congress authorise tariffs, that fiscal impacts be assessed. They cannot legitimately substitute their judgment for that of elected branches on the substance of policy.
Conclusion: The Role of Courts
Courts exist to enforce the rules of the game, not to play the game themselves. They ensure that executives do not exceed their authority, that legislatures follow proper procedures, that fundamental rights are protected. But they do not, or should not, determine what constitutes good policy.
The US Supreme Court’s tariff ruling is a textbook example of appropriate judicial intervention. It struck down executive action that exceeded constitutional authority, without dictating what tariff policy should be.
The Indian debate over freebies is more complex. To the extent that courts insist on fiscal transparency and impact assessments, they are enforcing process. To the extent they seek to ban certain categories of welfare, they risk overreach.
The wisest path, in both countries, is for courts to focus on process and leave substance to the democratic process. That is what the rule of law requires.
Q&A: Unpacking the Letters
Q1: What did the US Supreme Court rule regarding Trump’s tariffs?
The Supreme Court struck down reciprocal tariffs imposed by President Trump under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), holding that the president exceeded his authority by imposing tariffs without congressional approval. The court affirmed that the power to tax—the power of the purse—belongs to Congress. However, Trump has announced new tariffs under other legal provisions.
Q2: How should India respond to the US tariff ruling?
The letter argues that India should go beyond “studying the implications” and insist on renegotiating the recent interim trade deal on equal footing. The basis of the agreement—reciprocal tariff reductions—has fundamentally changed with the court ruling. India has leverage through market access and strategic cooperation, and should use it to seek modified terms.
Q3: What is the debate about judicial intervention in freebies?
The Supreme Court has expressed disapproval of pre-election freebies like free rice, laptops, and cash doles. Critics argue this is judicial overreach—fiscal discipline is the domain of auditors, finance commissions, and parliamentary committees; electoral matters belong to the Election Commission. Courts should not substitute their judgment for democratic choice about welfare policies.
Q4: What alternative approach to freebies is proposed?
A statutory framework requiring fiscal impact assessments before announcing welfare schemes would be a reasonable starting point. This would distinguish genuine social support from electoral bribes without banning welfare outright. Voters would have the information needed to make informed choices, and governments would remain accountable for fiscal consequences.
Q5: What common thread connects these two issues?
Both raise questions about institutional limits. In the US, the Supreme Court appropriately checked executive overreach. In India, the question is whether courts should similarly check what some see as legislative overreach through freebies. The wisest approach in both cases is for courts to focus on enforcing proper process rather than dictating substantive policy outcomes.
