The Dhaka Reset, BNP’s Landslide, the Jamaat’s Rise, and India’s Delicate Balancing Act in a New Bangladesh

The Dhaka Reset, BNP’s Landslide, the Jamaat’s Rise, and India’s Delicate Balancing Act in a New Bangladesh

The election results are in, and they have delivered a decisive verdict. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), led by Tarique Rahman, has secured a commanding two-thirds majority in the 300-seat Parliament, marking the first election since the dramatic events of August 2024 that ended Sheikh Hasina’s 15-year rule. The Jamaat-e-Islami-led alliance, including the student-origin National Citizen Party (NCP), has emerged as the principal opposition with over 70 seats. The Awami League, the party that led Bangladesh to independence 54 years ago, contested but was reduced to a marginal presence—a humbling outcome for a political force that has shaped the nation’s history.

For Bangladesh, this election represents a fundamental political realignment. For India, it poses a complex and delicate challenge. Prime Minister Narendra Modi was among the first global leaders to congratulate Tarique Rahman, signalling New Delhi’s desire for a swift reset after 18 turbulent months under the interim administration of Muhammad Yunus. The BNP leadership has reciprocated, stating its commitment to “cordial ties with India” and affirming that it will “not privilege or discriminate against any country.” The building blocks for a renewed relationship are thus in place.

But the building blocks are not the whole structure. Beneath the surface of electoral outcomes lie deeper currents that will shape the future of India-Bangladesh relations: the unresolved question of Sheikh Hasina’s presence in India, the rise of the Jamaat-e-Islami as a significant opposition force, the implications for Bangladesh’s 10% Hindu minority, and the challenge of insulating core areas of cooperation—trade, water, energy, connectivity—from the vicissitudes of day-to-day politics. The path to a stable, productive relationship is visible, but it is narrow and requires careful navigation.

Part I: The Verdict—A BNP Landslide with Complications

The BNP’s two-thirds majority is a sweeping mandate. It gives the party and its likely prime minister, Tarique Rahman, the parliamentary strength to govern without coalition partners and to implement their vision for Bangladesh. For a party that has been out of power for nearly two decades, this is a moment of vindication and opportunity.

But the composition of the opposition complicates the picture. The Jamaat-e-Islami-led alliance, with over 70 seats, will form the principal opposition. The Jamaat’s history is deeply problematic: its collaboration with the Pakistani occupation army during the 1971 Liberation War remains an indelible stain on its record. Its foundational ideology is Islamist, raising questions about its commitment to secularism, minority rights, and the pluralistic vision that animated Bangladesh’s birth.

During the election campaign, the Jamaat took a “calibrated view” of India, with its chief, Shafiqur Rahman, speaking of relations with New Delhi as a priority. This was a tactical shift, designed to broaden the party’s appeal and avoid the anti-India mobilisation that has characterised its past campaigns. But whether this pre-election stance will translate into post-election behaviour is uncertain. The Jamaat now faces a choice: continue on a path of pragmatic engagement, or revert to the radical politics that have defined its identity.

The presence of the student-led NCP within the opposition alliance adds another layer of complexity. The NCP, which played a visible role in the street mobilisations of 2024, has been openly antagonistic towards India. Its failure to translate street presence into electoral success is a relief for New Delhi, but its inclusion in the opposition means that anti-India voices will have a platform in Parliament.

Part II: The Hasina Factor—An Unresolved Complication

Sheikh Hasina’s presence in India is perhaps the most immediate and sensitive issue facing the new relationship. The former prime minister, who fled Bangladesh in August 2024 as the student uprising gathered force, has been residing in India since. For the BNP, her presence is a provocation—a reminder of the party that dominated Bangladeshi politics for 15 years and a potential rallying point for Awami League loyalists.

For India, the situation is fraught with difficulty. Hasina was a close partner of successive Indian governments. Under her leadership, India-Bangladesh relations reached unprecedented levels of cooperation on security, connectivity, trade, and energy. Granting her asylum or refuge was, in the immediate aftermath of her departure, a humanitarian and diplomatic necessity. But her continued presence now complicates efforts to build a new relationship with the BNP government.

The editorial acknowledges this as a “hurdle” and suggests that “New Delhi and Dhaka will need to find a workaround and protect bilateral ties.” What might such a workaround look like? Options could include:

• Discreet relocation: Facilitating Hasina’s move to a third country, if she is willing and a suitable destination can be found.

• Low-profile presence: Ensuring that her stay in India is as low-key as possible, with no public appearances or political activities that could be construed as interference in Bangladeshi politics.

• Diplomatic understanding: Reaching a quiet understanding with the BNP government that India will not allow its territory to be used for anti-Bangladesh activities, and that Hasina’s presence will not be allowed to disrupt bilateral ties.

None of these options is easy. Each carries political risks for both sides. But the alternative—allowing the Hasina issue to fester and poison the relationship—is worse.

Part III: The Minority Question—Hindu Bangladeshis Between Hope and Fear

Bangladesh’s Hindu minority, comprising approximately 10% of the population, has historically been vulnerable to political volatility. In times of tension, they have faced discrimination, violence, and displacement. Their fate is not just a humanitarian concern; it is a direct influence on India-Bangladesh relations, given the deep cultural, familial, and emotional connections between Hindus on both sides of the border.

The election results offer both hope and grounds for caution. The BNP’s campaign rhetoric was notably inclusive, with Tarique Rahman speaking of building a nation “safe and inclusive for all citizens, irrespective of faith and religion.” This is a positive signal. But the BNP’s past record on minority protection is mixed, and its alliance history with the Jamaat raises concerns about its willingness to confront communal forces.

The Jamaat’s significant presence in Parliament is the greater source of anxiety. The party’s ideology is inherently majoritarian, and its history includes complicity in violence against minorities. Its leaders have, in the past, made statements that inflame communal tensions. If the Jamaat uses its parliamentary platform to push a radical agenda, the consequences for Hindus could be severe.

The BNP’s response to any such agenda will be a critical test. Will it isolate the Jamaat and defend minority rights? Or will it accommodate communal politics in the interest of parliamentary management? The answer will shape not only the lives of millions of Bangladeshi Hindus but also the trajectory of India-Bangladesh relations.

Part IV: The Awami League’s Future—A Force in Waiting

The Awami League’s electoral humiliation should not obscure its enduring significance. The party that led Bangladesh to independence, that produced its founding father Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, that governed for 15 years under Sheikh Hasina, remains a force with deep roots in Bangladeshi society. Its supporters are demoralised but not vanquished. Its organisational network, while damaged, still exists.

How the BNP government engages with the Awami League will be closely watched. The temptation in winner-takes-all political systems is to marginalise the opposition, to treat electoral victory as a mandate for domination rather than governance. This temptation is particularly strong when the defeated party is associated with a long period of rule and when personal animosities run deep.

But a strategy of exclusion carries risks. It deepens political polarisation, alienates the Awami League’s substantial support base, and creates conditions for instability. It also affects India’s calculations. The Awami League’s “India lens” will be shaped by how it is treated. A party that is marginalised and persecuted will naturally become more antagonistic towards a country perceived as aligning with its opponents.

The wiser course, for both the BNP and India, is to encourage an inclusive politics that gives the Awami League a stake in the democratic process while ensuring that it cannot disrupt the relationship. This is easier said than done, but it is the direction in which both countries should work.

Part V: Guardrailing the Relationship—Protecting Core Interests from Political Volatility

The editorial makes a crucial point: it is “imperative for New Delhi and Dhaka to guardrail substantive parts of the relationship—trade, water, travel, energy and investment—from day-to-day politics.” This is the most important strategic insight for the period ahead.

The logic is simple. Political relationships between governments fluctuate. Leaders change. Parties rise and fall. But the underlying interests that bind countries together—economic complementarity, geographic proximity, shared security concerns, people-to-people ties—are more durable. If these interests are embedded in institutions, agreements, and practices that transcend any particular government, they can survive political volatility.

How can this be done?

• Trade: Move from ad hoc trade arrangements to a comprehensive economic partnership agreement that locks in preferential access, reduces non-tariff barriers, and creates dispute resolution mechanisms.

• Water: Build on the existing framework of water-sharing agreements to create a permanent commission with technical expertise and binding dispute resolution authority.

• Energy: Integrate power grids and develop cross-border energy infrastructure that creates mutual dependence and shared benefits.

• Connectivity: Operationalise the transit and connectivity agreements that have been negotiated but not fully implemented, creating physical links that are costly to reverse.

• Investment: Encourage Indian investment in Bangladesh that creates jobs and economic opportunities, giving Bangladeshis a stake in continued cooperation.

• Security: Maintain institutionalised security dialogue that continues regardless of the political weather, focusing on shared threats from terrorism, extremism, and organised crime.

The goal is to create a relationship that is too big to fail—so deeply integrated, so mutually beneficial, that no government on either side can afford to let it deteriorate.

Part VI: The Zero-Tolerance Imperative—Terrorism and Radical Agendas

The editorial also emphasises the importance of a “policy of zero tolerance for terrorism and radical agendas.” This is not a demand that India imposes on Bangladesh; it is a principle that serves Bangladesh’s own interests.

Terrorism and extremism are not external threats; they are internal cancers. They destroy social cohesion, deter investment, distort politics, and create conditions for instability. A Bangladesh that tolerates radical agendas is a Bangladesh that undermines its own prosperity and security.

For India, the stakes are obvious. Cross-border terrorism has been a recurring threat. Insurgent groups operating in India’s Northeast have historically used Bangladeshi territory. Radical ideologies respect no borders. A stable, moderate Bangladesh is in India’s direct security interest.

But the language matters. “Zero tolerance” should not be code for repression or for targeting minorities. It should mean a consistent, principled opposition to violence and extremism, applied equally to all groups, regardless of ideology or identity. It should mean building state capacity to prevent terrorism, prosecute terrorists, and counter radical narratives. And it should mean working with India, and with other partners, to address shared threats.

Conclusion: A New Beginning, A Fragile Hope

The election in Bangladesh has opened a new chapter. The BNP’s landslide victory offers an opportunity to reset a relationship that has been strained by 18 months of interim rule and years of political polarisation. Prime Minister Modi’s early congratulatory message, and the BNP’s reciprocating statements, suggest that both sides recognise the opportunity and are prepared to seize it.

But opportunities are not guarantees. The path ahead is lined with obstacles: the Hasina factor, the Jamaat’s parliamentary presence, the minority question, the Awami League’s future, and the challenge of insulating core interests from political volatility. Navigating these obstacles will require wisdom, restraint, and a long-term perspective from both New Delhi and Dhaka.

The stakes could not be higher. Bangladesh is India’s largest neighbour after China and Pakistan. It sits at the hinge of India’s eastern frontier and its Act East ambitions. A stable, prosperous, cooperative Bangladesh is vital for India’s security, economy, and regional standing. An unstable, impoverished, adversarial Bangladesh is a nightmare scenario.

The election results have created the conditions for a new beginning. Whether that beginning leads to a sustained and productive relationship depends on the choices that leaders in both countries make in the months and years ahead. The hope is that they choose wisely.

Q&A: Bangladesh’s Election and India’s Response

Q1: What was the outcome of Bangladesh’s election, and what does it mean for the country’s political landscape?

A1: The election produced a decisive result:

Overall significance: The election marks a fundamental political realignment, ending 15 years of Awami League dominance and ushering in a new era of BNP-led governance. It is the first election since the August 2024 student uprising that toppled Sheikh Hasina.

Q2: What signals have India and the BNP sent about their desire to reset relations?

A2: Both sides have signalled a desire for a fresh start:

The bottom line: The “building blocks are thus in place for a reset.” Both sides recognise the opportunity and have signalled willingness to seize it.

Q3: What are the main obstacles to a smooth India-Bangladesh relationship under the new government?

A3: Several obstacles complicate the path:

The assessment: The path is “narrow and requires careful navigation.” Success depends on wisdom and restraint from both sides.

Q4: What does the editorial mean by “guardrailing substantive parts of the relationship,” and how can this be achieved?

A4: “Guardrailing” means protecting core areas of cooperation from political volatility—embedding them in institutions, agreements, and practices that transcend any particular government.

The goal: Create a relationship “too big to fail”—so deeply integrated and mutually beneficial that no government can afford to let it deteriorate.

Q5: What are the implications of the election outcome for Bangladesh’s Hindu minority, and why does this matter for India?

A5: Bangladesh’s Hindu minority (approx. 10% of population) has historically been vulnerable to political volatility. The election outcome has mixed implications:

Why this matters for India:

• Deep cultural, familial, and emotional connections between Hindus on both sides of border.

• Treatment of minorities directly influences Indian public opinion and political discourse.

• Communal violence triggers refugee flows, destabilising border regions.

• India’s credibility as a pluralistic democracy is affected by how its neighbour treats its minorities.

The bottom line: The fate of Bangladeshi Hindus is “not just a humanitarian concern; it is a direct influence on India-Bangladesh relations.”