The Restored Government and the Unrestored State, Manipur at a Political Crossroads

The Restored Government and the Unrestored State, Manipur at a Political Crossroads

The formation of a new BJP-led government in Manipur under Chief Minister Yumnam Khemchand Singh, after nearly a year of President’s Rule, is being officially narrated in Delhi as a constitutional necessity and a return to democratic normalcy. Yet, on the ground in Manipur, this “restoration” rings hollow for many, particularly in the Kuki and Zomi-dominated hill districts. The installation of a “popular government” has not resolved the fundamental political and ethnic crisis that erupted into devastating violence on May 3, 2023; instead, it has starkly exposed the gap between procedural democracy and substantive justice, between administrative control and genuine political settlement. Manipur’s new government inherits not a healed state, but a physically and psychologically partitioned one, where the very idea of a unified political community lies in tatters.

This current affair analysis delves into the complex realities behind the formation of Manipur’s new government. It argues that the move, while ending a prolonged constitutional interregnum, primarily addresses the internal political paralysis of the BJP rather than the existential grievances of Manipur’s people. By prioritizing government formation over a courageous political settlement, the Centre has outsourced the immense burden of reconciliation to a state administration with severely circumscribed powers, setting the stage for a fragile and potentially untenable peace.

Part 1: The Anatomy of Delay: Political Paralysis, Not Prudent Caution

The nearly year-long President’s Rule was consistently justified by the Centre as a period necessary for restoring law and order and creating conditions conducive to stable governance. However, as the article poignantly notes, “What the prolonged delay revealed was something narrower.” The impasse was not rooted in an earnest assessment of ground conditions or a dedicated effort to broker peace with displaced Kuki and Zomi communities. Instead, it was driven by an internal factional struggle within the state BJP, with legislators reportedly unable for months to agree on a leadership candidate acceptable to both the central leadership and various internal camps.

This revelation is crucial. It transforms the narrative from one of strategic, necessary central oversight to one of mere political indecision. The “Constitutional constraints” were a convenient facade for a party squabble. The moment this internal equation was solved with the selection of Khemchand Singh, “the path to a popular government cleared quickly,” dismantling the earlier justifications for delay. This sequence exposes a cynical calculus: the immense suffering of displaced citizens, the fractured social fabric, and the stalled political dialogue were all subordinated to the ruling party’s internal logistics of power-sharing.

During this period, President’s Rule served a specific purpose for the Centre: it “tightened administrative control and centralised security decisions.” While relief and rehabilitation lagged and political talks stalled, the security apparatus was firmly in the hands of the Union government. The “pressure to normalise governance” mentioned in the article is thus a dual pressure: the constitutional clock was ticking, but more importantly, the political cost of an indefinitely suspended democracy was mounting. The formation of a government became a box-ticking exercise to signal a return to routine, even if the underlying crisis remained utterly unroutine.

Part 2: The Inherited Terrain: A State Segmented, A Trust Eroded

The new Chief Minister and his cabinet do not assume office over a normal state. They inherit what the writer accurately terms an “unresolved terrain.” The physical segmentation of Manipur is the most visible legacy of the violence. The buffer zones, manned by central forces, have effectively become internal borders. The Imphal Valley (Meitei-majority) and the hill districts (Kuki-Zomi majority) exist in a state of de facto separation. Free movement, a fundamental right of citizenship, “still depends on negotiation and informal permission.” Thousands remain internally displaced, living in relief camps that have morphed into semi-permanent settlements, too fearful to return to their burnt homes in ethnically hostile territory.

Beyond the physical divide lies a cavernous trust deficit. The article correctly identifies that the violence of May 2023 “did not arise from the absence of institutions. It grew out of a prolonged failure of leadership.” For years preceding the explosion, the hill communities had felt a progressive alienation from the state apparatus dominated by the valley. Decisions on land, forest rights, identity, and development were perceived as coercive and majoritarian, eroding the social contract. “By the time violence broke out, trust in the state had already thinned.” The violence did not create this distrust; it was its catastrophic culmination.

A “popular government” led by the same party that presided over this systemic failure now asks for trust. For the Kuki and Zomi communities, this is a profound ask. Their conditional willingness to engage, as noted in the article—demanding written commitments, timelines, and movement on a political arrangement—is a testament not to hope, but to a desperate need for tangible, enforceable guarantees. Their marches against government formation before a settlement underscore their belief that electoral politics, in its current form, cannot offer them protection. They see the restored government not as a neutral arbiter but as a partisan entity, historically aligned with majoritarian Meitei interests.

Part 3: The Architecture of Limited Power: A Government Within Boundaries

Perhaps the most critical constraint on the new government is its severely limited agency on the core issues driving the conflict. The Centre, by restoring the government while postponing a political settlement, has created a peculiar and challenging dynamic. The new state leadership is now saddled with the day-to-day burdens of governance—administration, delivery of services, managing a brittle peace—and the expectation of fostering reconciliation.

However, the real levers of power needed for a lasting settlement remain firmly in Delhi’s grasp. As the article states, “Negotiations with armed groups, decisions around administrative reconfiguration, and questions of territorial security remain tightly held elsewhere.” The most sensitive political questions—whether about a separate administration for the Kukis (as many groups now demand), constitutional safeguards, or a radical restructuring of governance—are beyond the purview of the state government. Its mandate is to manage, not to fundamentally resolve.

This creates an almost impossible situation. The state government will be the visible face of authority, bearing the brunt of public frustration from all sides, yet lacking the constitutional and political authority to address the root causes of that frustration. It is being asked to administer reconciliation without being empowered to dictate its terms. This “limited room to act” ensures that the popular government, despite its democratic credentials, will operate “within boundaries it did not draw,” boundaries set by the security-centric and politically cautious approach of the Union government.

Part 4: The Demand for Direction vs. The Politics of Postponement

Proponents of the government’s formation offer a straightforward democratic argument: “democratic life cannot remain suspended indefinitely.” Elected representatives must be in place to assume responsibility and give people a voice. This argument is logically sound in a normal political context. But Manipur is not in a normal context. Its recent history, as the writer observes, “shows how little mere presence can achieve.”

The previous government was “present” but presided over the systemic alienation that led to violence. Presence without purposeful, courageous, and inclusive political action is meaningless. The people of Manipur, across communities, are not under the illusion that a new Chief Minister can instantly solve decades-old animosities. “They are asking for direction and for clarity,” the article notes. They seek an assurance—a credible, public roadmap out of the crisis.

The Centre’s current approach of government-first, settlement-later is a classic strategy of political postponement. It hopes that the normalisation of daily governance will lower temperatures and create conditions for a less contentious negotiation later. The risk, however, is profound. By not coupling government formation with a clear, publicly acknowledged framework for political talks, it signals that the substantive issues of identity, security, and belonging are not urgent. For the hill communities, this confirms their worst fears: that the Indian state is more interested in imposing a superficial administrative calm than in engaging with their core political aspirations. This can further radicalise positions, making a future settlement even harder to achieve.

Part 5: The Road Ahead: Between Management and Resolution

The immediate future for Manipur’s new government will be one of precarious balance. It will need to:

1. Deliver Tangible Governance: Effectively administer both the valley and the hills, ensuring equitable distribution of resources and restarting development projects, to build some minimal credibility.

2. Facilitate Return and Rehabilitation: Actively and safely facilitate the return of IDPs to their original homes, a process fraught with logistical and symbolic challenges.

3. Act as an Honest Broker: Position itself as a facilitator for dialogue between communities and between hill leaders and the Centre, despite its perceived partisan history.

However, the long-term path to peace will be decided not in Imphal but in Delhi. The Union government must move beyond a purely security-management approach. It needs to:

• Articulate a Clear Political Framework: Publicly commit to a time-bound, structured political dialogue involving all stakeholders, with all options on the table.

• Empower an Impartial Mediator: Consider appointing a credible, independent group or individual to mediate talks, moving beyond the current format of meetings with Union ministers.

• Address the Constitutional Imagination: Engage seriously with the hills’ longstanding grievances about their place within Manipur’s political structure, examining models of autonomy and power-sharing without pre-judging outcomes.

Conclusion: Restoration or Reckoning?

The formation of Manipur’s government is a necessary step, but it is only a step on a very long and difficult road. As the writer concludes, this moment “will show whether the restoration of government marks the beginning of political repair, or another exercise in moving forward without reckoning.”

Currently, the evidence points toward the latter. The delay was about party politics, not peacemaking. The new government’s powers are circumscribed on the vital issues. The deep, historical wounds remain unaddressed. True political repair requires a reckoning with the past failures of leadership and a courageous engagement with the future’s difficult possibilities. It demands that Delhi treats Manipur not merely as a law-and-order problem to be managed, but as a political community in crisis, deserving of a settlement that is just, inclusive, and durable. Until that reckoning begins, the “popular government” in Imphal will be a vessel of authority navigating in a sea of unresolved anguish, its popular mandate fractured and its restorative power deeply in question.

Q&A

Q1: What was the real reason behind the nearly year-long delay in forming a government in Manipur, according to the analysis?
A1: The analysis argues that the primary reason was not the need to restore law and order or facilitate reconciliation, as officially stated. Instead, it was due to an internal factional struggle within the state BJP. Party legislators reportedly could not agree on a consensus candidate for chief minister for months. The constitutional period of President’s Rule provided a cover for this political paralysis. The government was formed quickly once this internal leadership dispute was resolved, exposing the earlier justifications for delay as pretextual.

Q2: How has the conflict physically and socially transformed Manipur, which the new government now inherits?
A2: The new government inherits a physically and socially segmented state. Buffer zones manned by security forces have created de facto borders between the Meitei-majority Imphal Valley and the Kuki-Zomi majority hill districts. Free movement is severely restricted, relying on negotiations. Thousands of citizens remain internally displaced, living in relief camps as long-term addresses, unable to return home safely. Beyond the physical divide, there is a profound erosion of trust between hill communities and the state apparatus, which is seen as historically biased and coercive.

Q3: Why is the new state government’s power considered to be “limited” or operating within “boundaries it did not draw”?
A3: While the state government is responsible for day-to-day governance and the immense task of fostering local reconciliation, the key political and security levers remain with the Union government. Critical issues such as negotiations with armed ethnic groups, any potential administrative reconfiguration of the state (like a separate administration for Kuki areas), and matters of territorial security are all tightly controlled by the Centre in Delhi. The state government must manage the consequences of the conflict but lacks the authority to fundamentally alter the political structures that contributed to it.

Q4: What are the Kuki and Zomi communities demanding as a condition for engaging with the new government, and what does this signify?
A4: These communities have signaled a conditional willingness to engage, demanding written commitments, a defined timeline, and concrete movement on a political settlement within the life of the current Assembly. This signifies a deep distrust of verbal promises and the normal political process. Their demands reflect a need for enforceable guarantees and a clear roadmap, showing they view the government formation with skepticism and believe true security will come only from a political agreement, not merely from an elected administration.

Q5: What is the core critique of the Centre’s strategy of forming a government first and postponing a political settlement?
A5: The critique is that this strategy prioritizes the appearance of democratic normalcy over substantive political healing. It is a form of postponement that hopes administrative management will reduce tensions. The risk is that it fails to address the root causes of the conflict—issues of identity, belonging, and political alienation. By not initiating a parallel, credible political dialogue, it signals to the hill communities that their core aspirations are not being taken seriously. This could deepen alienation, entrench divisions, and make a future comprehensive settlement even more difficult to achieve, potentially storing up greater instability for the future.