The Unusual Office, How the Constitution Permits a Chief Minister Without a Legislative Seat
In the intricate dance of Indian democracy, where political fortune can shift overnight, a fascinating and often misunderstood constitutional provision has repeatedly come into play: the ability to appoint a Chief Minister who is not an elected member of the state legislature. This scenario, most recently highlighted by the appointment of Sunetra Pawar as Deputy Chief Minister of Maharashtra in 2025, underscores a deliberate flexibility embedded within India’s founding document—a flexibility born not of oversight, but of pragmatic foresight. The legal journey from constitutional text to settled law, forged in the crucible of the politically volatile late 1960s, reveals a foundational principle: executive leadership must sometimes precede, rather than follow, legislative membership to ensure stable governance.
The Constitutional Blueprint: Article 164(4)
The legal cornerstone of this practice is Article 164(4) of the Indian Constitution. It states, “A Minister who for any period of six consecutive months is not a member of the Legislature of the State shall at the expiration of that period cease to be a Minister.” This clause is the key that unlocks the possibility. It does not require a minister, including the Chief Minister, to be a legislator at the time of appointment. Instead, it provides a six-month grace period to secure a seat, either through election to the Legislative Assembly or nomination to the Legislative Council. This provision acknowledges that in a parliamentary system, the executive must be drawn from the legislature, but it allows for a temporary disconnect to handle political exigencies, coalition dynamics, or the need for expert leadership.
The Crucible of the 1960s: Bihar’s Pioneering Precedent
The theoretical provision was first tested in the turbulent political waters of the late 1960s, an era marked by the weakening of the Congress party’s hegemony and the rise of unstable coalition politics. The first significant test occurred in Bihar in 1968.
After the 1967 elections, Bihar saw its first non-Congress government—a Samyukta Vidhayak Dal (SVD) coalition of socialists, Jana Sangh members, and others. The government, led by Mahamaya Prasad Sinha, proved fragile. Internal disagreements and splits led to its collapse, paving the way for Bindeshwari Prasad Mandal, a towering OBC leader who had formed the Shoshit Dal, to stake a claim with Congress support. There was, however, a formidable hurdle: Mandal was not a member of either house of the Bihar legislature.
The political architects of the time devised an ingenious, two-step solution that respected the letter of the Constitution while achieving their political objective. On January 28, 1968, Satish Prasad Singh, a 37-year-old MLA from Parbatta and a Mandal associate, was sworn in as Chief Minister. Singh’s tenure had a singular, pre-determined purpose. Two days later, he facilitated Mandal’s nomination to the Bihar Legislative Council. With that achieved, Singh resigned on February 2, 1968, after a mere five-day tenure, making him one of the shortest-serving CMs in Indian history. Mandal then assumed the office, now constitutionally compliant as a member of the legislature. This episode was a masterclass in political maneuvering within constitutional bounds, setting a practical precedent for using Article 164(4).
The Judicial Test: Uttar Pradesh and the Supreme Court’s Verdict
While Bihar demonstrated the political use of the provision, it fell to Uttar Pradesh to provide the definitive legal test, culminating in a landmark Supreme Court judgment.
The political landscape of UP in 1970 was equally fractured. Charan Singh’s Bharatiya Kranti Dal (BKD) government, propped up by Indira Gandhi’s Congress (R), fell after BKD MPs voted against a key government bill. President’s Rule was imposed. When it was lifted, a new coalition of the BKD, Jana Sangh, Congress (O), and others took shape. The chosen leader for this precarious alliance was Tribhuvan Narain Singh, a seasoned politician and a member of the Rajya Sabha from the Congress (O). On October 18, 1970, he was sworn in as Chief Minister without being an MLA or MLC in UP.
His appointment was immediately challenged. Within the assembly, Congress (R) leader Narain Dutt Tiwari questioned his legitimacy. More significantly, a Lucknow resident, Har Sharan Verma, filed a petition in the Allahabad High Court, arguing that Singh’s appointment was unconstitutional. The High Court dismissed the plea, but Verma appealed to the Supreme Court.
On March 16, 1971, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court delivered a unanimous and unambiguous verdict. The Court upheld Singh’s appointment, firmly establishing three critical principles:
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A person can be validly appointed as a Chief Minister without being a member of either house of the state legislature at the time of appointment.
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Article 164(4) applies expressly to the Chief Minister, as the Chief Minister is the foremost among ministers.
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Such an appointment is constitutionally valid for a period of up to six months, during which the individual must secure membership of the legislature.
This judgment, in the case of Har Sharan Verma v. Tribhuvan Narain Singh, settled the law once and for all. It affirmed that the Constitution intentionally created this temporal bridge between executive responsibility and legislative membership to accommodate real-world political complexities.
The Irony of Victory: A Legal Win but a Political Loss
The Supreme Court’s ruling was a personal legal victory for Tribhuvan Narain Singh, but it could not guarantee his political survival. To comply with the six-month deadline, he contested a by-election from the Maniram (Gorakhpur Urban) assembly seat in early 1971. In a dramatic turn, he lost the election. This defeat made his position untenable. Shortly after, on March 30, 1971, during a debate on the Governor’s address, his government was defeated on amendments moved by none other than Narain Dutt Tiwari. Singh resigned, his tenure having been secured by the court but undone by the electorate. His case perfectly illustrated the dual requirement: constitutional permission is necessary, but a political mandate is indispensable for long-term survival.
The Legacy and Modern Applications
The 1971 Supreme Court verdict paved the way for this practice to become an accepted tool in India’s political playbook. Several Chief Ministers since have taken oath while not being legislators, using the six-month window to contest a by-election. Notable examples include:
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Chimanbhai Patel in Gujarat (1990)
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N. D. Tiwari himself in Andhra Pradesh (1983)
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Sikkim’s Pawan Kumar Chamling (1994) – who won his by-election and went on to become India’s longest-serving CM.
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Manohar Parrikar in Goa (2017) – who moved from the Union Defence Ministry to state leadership.
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Maharashtra’s Eknath Shinde (2022) – whose appointment was immediately followed by a by-election victory.
The provision is not without its critics. Detractors argue it can undermine democratic accountability, allowing “parachute” leaders or backroom powerbrokers to assume power without a direct mandate from the people. The spectacle of a “five-day CM” like Satish Prasad Singh can appear as a cynical manipulation of constitutional machinery.
However, proponents, including constitutional experts, defend it as a necessary safety valve. It prevents a constitutional crisis in situations where a coalition’s consensus candidate is not a legislator, or when a party wishes to bring in a leader of national stature or administrative expertise from outside the immediate legislature. It allows for political stability during transitions, ensuring a government can be formed without immediate recourse to fresh elections.
The Maharashtra Context: Sunetra Pawar’s Appointment
The letter by Wardha lawyer Harshvardhan Godghate regarding Sunetra Pawar’s appointment as Deputy CM of Maharashtra in 2025 reignited public debate on this very issue. The lawyer’s discomfort echoes a classic democratic unease with unelected executives. However, as history and law demonstrate, her appointment is squarely within the constitutional framework established by Article 164(4) and fortified by the Supreme Court’s 1971 ruling. As a minister, she has six months to secure membership of the Maharashtra Legislature, most likely through a by-election or a seat in the Legislative Council.
Conclusion: A Deliberate Flexibility
The saga of the “Chief Minister without a seat” is a testament to the sophistication of the Indian Constitution. The framers, led by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, anticipated the need for flexibility in a diverse and politically dynamic nation. The provision in Article 164(4), tested in Bihar, validated by the Supreme Court in Uttar Pradesh, and utilized across states since, represents a pragmatic reconciliation of two democratic ideals: the principle of executive accountability to the legislature and the practical necessity of facilitating stable government formation.
It is a mechanism that trusts the political process to eventually align the executive with the will of the electorate, while providing a critical buffer against immediate instability. As long as coalitions and political uncertainties are features of Indian democracy, this six-month constitutional bridge will remain a vital, if occasionally contentious, feature of its governance landscape.
Q&A
Q1: What is the specific constitutional provision that allows a person to become a Chief Minister without being an MLA or MLC?
A1: The provision is Article 164(4) of the Indian Constitution. It states that a minister (which includes the Chief Minister) who is not a member of the state legislature at the time of appointment can hold office for a maximum period of six consecutive months. They must secure membership of either the Legislative Assembly or the Legislative Council within this six-month period, or else they must resign from the ministerial post.
Q2: Which historical case first tested this provision politically, and what was the unique maneuver used?
A2: The provision was first tested politically in Bihar in 1968. To make Bindeshwari Prasad Mandal (who was not a legislator) the Chief Minister, his associate Satish Prasad Singh, an MLA, was sworn in as CM for a pre-planned short tenure of just five days. Singh’s first act was to facilitate Mandal’s nomination to the Legislative Council. Once Mandal became an MLC, Singh resigned, and Mandal assumed the office of Chief Minister, thus complying with the constitution.
Q3: What was the landmark Supreme Court judgment that definitively settled the law on this issue?
A3: The landmark judgment was delivered by the Supreme Court on March 16, 1971, in the case of Har Sharan Verma v. Tribhuvan Narain Singh. The Court upheld the appointment of Tribhuvan Narain Singh as Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh despite him not being an MLA or MLC. It ruled that Article 164(4) expressly applies to Chief Ministers and that such an appointment is constitutionally valid for up to six months.
Q4: What happened to Chief Minister Tribhuvan Narain Singh after the Supreme Court upheld his appointment?
A4: Despite winning the legal battle, Singh faced a political defeat. To comply with the six-month rule, he contested a by-election from the Maniram (Gorakhpur Urban) seat but lost. This electoral loss made his position unsustainable. His government was subsequently defeated in the assembly on a motion, forcing him to resign shortly after the Supreme Court verdict, demonstrating that constitutional validity does not guarantee political longevity.
Q5: Why is this constitutional flexibility considered important for India’s parliamentary democracy?
A5: This flexibility is considered a crucial safety valve for political stability. It allows for government formation in scenarios where the consensus candidate of a coalition or party is not a sitting legislator, when an experienced leader needs to be brought in from outside, or to prevent a constitutional crisis during sudden political realignments. It balances the principle of executive accountability to the legislature with the practical need for continuous and stable governance, giving the system time to align the executive’s political mandate with the electorate’s will through a by-election.
