Bangladesh at a Crossroads, The Rise of Anti-Indianism and the Specter of a New Pakistan

Introduction: A Pivotal Shift in South Asian Geopolitics

The dramatic ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in 2024 marked a watershed moment not only for Bangladesh’s domestic politics but for the entire strategic landscape of South Asia. In the months that followed, a relationship once hailed as a “golden chapter” of bilateral ties—characterized by a settled land boundary, robust connectivity, and security cooperation—has spiraled into a vortex of mutual suspicion, diplomatic rancor, and public vitriol. The central, alarming question now posed by analysts is: Is Bangladesh becoming the new Pakistan for India? This inquiry goes beyond mere rhetoric; it probes whether Bangladesh, under its current interim regime and amid a surging Islamist political wave, is adopting the foundational traits of its erstwhile western wing: a state where hostility towards India becomes a central plank of national identity and foreign policy. This analysis delves into the historical roots of anti-Indian sentiment, the catalytic events following Hasina’s fall, the actors fueling the fire, and the profound implications for regional stability.

The Unraveling of a Partnership: From Golden Chapter to Tit-for-Tat

The decline has been stark and rapid. The bilateral rapport nurtured over Hasina’s long tenure, which saw India as the midwife and guarantor of Bangladesh’s independence in 1971, has given way to a transactional and adversarial dynamic.

Diplomatic Deterioration: The diplomatic tool of summoning high commissioners—once reserved for acute crises—has become commonplace. The closure of Indian visa centers in Bangladesh and heightened security around diplomatic missions signify a breakdown in basic consular trust. These actions are not abstract policy shifts but responses to tangible threats: mob attacks on the Indian Visa Center and Indian Cultural Centre in Dhaka, and demonstrations targeting the Assistant High Commission in Chittagong following the killing of Islamic preacher and political figure Sharif Osman Hadi. In Delhi, reciprocal demonstrations highlighted the lynching of a Hindu man, Ananta Das, in Bangladesh, illustrating how domestic incidents now instantly inflame bilateral tensions.

The Strategic Rhetoric Shift: More concerning than diplomatic spats is the emergence of a threatening strategic rhetoric from elements within Bangladesh. Claims of a “Greater Bangla” irredentism, assertions of guardianship over the Bay of Bengal to challenge Indian naval primacy, and even explicit threats to “cut off the Siliguri Corridor” (India’s vulnerable territorial link to its northeastern states) echo tactics long associated with Pakistan. The comments by figures like Major General (Retd) ALM Fazlur Rahman—suggesting a joint Bangladesh-China occupation of India’s northeast in the event of a India-Pakistan conflict—represent a dangerous escalation, explicitly linking Bangladesh’s posture to India’s most sensitive national security anxieties and inviting Chinese involvement.

The Historical Underpinnings: The Dual Narrative of 1971

To understand the current surge, one must confront the contested history of Bangladesh’s birth. India’s role in 1971 is viewed through two irreconcilable prisms within Bangladesh.

The Secular-Liberation Narrative: For the Awami League and its supporters, India is the heroic ally that provided refuge to 10 million Bangladeshis, trained the Mukti Bahini, and finally intervened militarily to defeat the Pakistani army, enabling liberation. This narrative emphasizes linguistic and cultural affinity with Indian Bengal and a shared vision of secular democracy.

The Islamist-Pakistani Narrative: This competing narrative, nurtured by Islamist parties like Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) and sections of the military-intellectual elite, systematically downplays India’s humanitarian and strategic sacrifice. It portrays 1971 not as a liberation but as a “division of Pakistan,” engineered by a “hegemonic and expansionist” India to weaken the Muslim world. India’s support is framed not as altruistic but as a cynical power play. This narrative, as the article notes, has “deeper roots” and is “supported by Bangladeshi elites.” It deliberately severs the cultural-linguistic link with West Bengal, portraying it as a Hindu ploy, and instead emphasizes pan-Islamic solidarity with Pakistan. Former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s 2011 observation—that a quarter of Bangladesh’s population swears by JeI and is “very anti-Indian” and “in the clutches… of the ISI”—appears prescient.

Catalysts and Actors: Fueling the Flames of Anti-Indianism

The fall of Hasina removed the primary dam holding back these historical resentments. The current climate is not spontaneous but engineered by a confluence of actors for specific political ends.

1. The Islamist Political Engine: With the Awami League banned and secular forces suppressed, Islamist groups like Jamaat-e-Islami have moved to center stage. They are the most vocal architects of the new anti-India discourse. By directing public anger over governance failures, economic woes, and political repression during Hasina’s rule towards India, they achieve multiple goals: they deflect blame, consolidate a populist platform, and realign Bangladesh’s ideological compass away from secular Bengali nationalism and towards Islamic identity. Social media, flooded with claims that India shelters both Hasina and Hadi’s killers, serves as their megaphone. The rhetoric is extreme, even fantasizing about Pakistani and Chinese missiles “teaching India a lesson.”

2. The Interim Regime’s Calculus: The current administration, while not monolithic, contains factions that see utility in this anti-India posture. By tolerating and sometimes echoing this rhetoric, they distance themselves from the perceived pro-India bias of the Hasina era, legitimize themselves in the eyes of a radicalized street, and seek to extract concessions from a concerned India. The re-investigation of historical events like the 2009 BDR mutiny to pin blame on India exemplifies this revisionist, India-centric blame game.

3. Pakistan’s Opportunistic Embrace: Pakistan has seized this moment with alacrity. After decades of shame and bitterness over 1971, it sees a historic opportunity to rehabilitate itself in Dhaka and strategically encircle India. Expressions of “solidarity,” whether over cricket or political disputes, are calculated moves to marginalize Indian influence and foster a new Islamabad-Dhaka axis. This external encouragement empowers anti-India voices within Bangladesh.

4. The Weaponization of Culture and Sport: The controversy over cricketer Mustafizur Rahman being barred from the Indian Premier League (IPL) and the subsequent Bangladeshi threat to boycott the T20 World Cup co-hosted by India is a telling microcosm. It shows how easily bilateral grievances can spill into apolitical arenas, poisoning people-to-people ties. Pakistan’s offer to join the boycott transformed a sports administration issue into a geopolitical statement of Islamic solidarity against India.

The “New Pakistan” Thesis: Similarities and Critical Differences

The analogy of Bangladesh as the “new Pakistan” is compelling but requires nuanced examination.

Similarities:

State-Sanctioned Hostility: Like Pakistan, anti-Indianism appears to be evolving from a political tool to a potential element of state policy under the interim regime, shaping diplomatic and strategic postures.
Territorial Irredentism: Echoing Pakistan’s claims on Kashmir, elements in Bangladesh are now voicing claims on India’s northeast, explicitly challenging territorial integrity.
Proxy War & ISI Shadow: The suspected role of Pakistani ISI in nurturing anti-India groups and narratives in Bangladesh mirrors its historic playbook in Kashmir and Punjab.
The China Factor: Both Pakistan and (the emerging) Bangladesh view closer ties with China as a strategic counterbalance to India, inviting Beijing into the heart of South Asian rivalries.
Instrumentalization of Islam: The use of Islamic identity to forge a national consensus defined in opposition to “Hindu India” is a core strategy shared by the establishments in both Islamabad and (sections of) Dhaka.

Critical Differences:

Civilizational and Cultural Ties: The shared Bengali language, culture, and history with eastern India is a bond of unparalleled depth with no equivalent in India-Pakistan relations. This is a powerful, organic buffer against permanent estrangement.
Absence of an Existential Dispute: There is no single, raw, territorial dispute like Kashmir that has fueled three wars. The bilateral issues—water sharing, migration, trade—are complex but inherently negotiable.
Economic Interdependence: Bangladesh’s economy is deeply intertwined with India’s as a major trade partner and a recipient of crucial transit routes. This interdependence creates strong stakeholders for stability on both sides.
Democratic Legacy: Despite current upheaval, Bangladesh has a powerful legacy of secular democracy and a vibrant civil society that rejects extremism. Pakistan’s history is dominated by direct military rule.

The Road Ahead: Implications and Imperatives

The current trajectory poses severe risks.

For India: It faces a nightmare scenario of a two-and-a-half-front situation (Pakistan, China, and a hostile Bangladesh), complicating defense planning. The security of the culturally connected but geographically tenuous northeastern states becomes paramount. India’s regional leadership and connectivity projects (like the BBIN initiative) suffer a major setback.

For Bangladesh: Embracing an anti-India foreign policy is self-defeating. It jeopardizes economic growth, scares away investment, and risks turning the country into a pawn in the great power rivalry between India and China. It also dangerously empowers radical Islamist forces that ultimately threaten Bangladesh’s own pluralistic social fabric.

For the Region: South Asia’s stability, already fragile, is further undermined. The prospects for meaningful regional cooperation under SAARC become even more remote.

The Imperative of Pragmatic Diplomacy: The article concludes by emphasizing the need to “inject pragmatism” into the relationship. This requires:

India: Must exercise strategic patience, avoiding escalatory rhetoric. It should privately communicate clear red lines on security while keeping channels open with all political factions. It must continue to be the larger, more stable neighbor, emphasizing the undeniable benefits of partnership.
Bangladesh’s Civil Society & Future Governments: Responsible political forces must eventually re-emerge and recognize that defining national identity in opposition to a giant neighbor is a path to perpetual insecurity. The economic and cultural logic of cooperation is overwhelming.
International Community: Should discourage any external powers (namely Pakistan and China) from exploiting Bangladesh’s instability to foment permanent hostility with India.

Conclusion: A Test of Statecraft and Shared Destiny

The question “Is Bangladesh the new Pakistan?” is less a definitive statement and more a dire warning of a possible future. Bangladesh is at an ideological and strategic crossroads. One path, fueled by historical revisionism, electoral Islamism, and external manipulation, leads towards a replication of the toxic, zero-sum dynamic that has defined India-Pakistan relations for 75 years—a path of perpetual tension and stunted potential.

The other path, though currently obscured, leads back to the pragmatic realization of shared destiny that defined the spirit of 1971. It is the path of managing disputes through dialogue, leveraging connectivity for mutual prosperity, and recognizing that a strong, stable, and sovereign Bangladesh is in India’s fundamental interest, and vice-versa.

The coming months, especially through the election period, will be critical. The interim regime’s choices, the election’s outcome, and India’s response will determine whether the current crisis is a temporary detour or a permanent derailment. The forces of geography, economy, and culture ultimately favor partnership. But as history shows, politics can defy logic for a long time. Navigating this period will require the highest level of statecraft from both nations to ensure that the last bastion of regional harmony in South Asia does not crumble.

Q&A on Bangladesh-India Relations and the ‘New Pakistan’ Analogy

Q1: What are the key events that have caused the recent sharp downturn in India-Bangladesh relations?
A1: The downturn was triggered by the ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in 2024, which removed a strongly pro-India leader. Specific escalatory events include:

Mob attacks on Indian diplomatic missions (Visa Centre, Cultural Centre) in Dhaka.
The killing of Islamic figure Sharif Osman Hadi and subsequent anti-India protests blaming India.
A tit-for-tat summoning of high commissioners and closure of visa centers.
The rise of irredentist rhetoric from some Bangladeshi figures threatening India’s territorial integrity, including claims on the Northeast and the Siliguri Corridor.
The cricket controversy involving Mustafizur Rahman’s IPL ban and Bangladesh’s threatened World Cup boycott, supported by Pakistan.

Q2: According to the analysis, what are the two competing historical narratives about India’s role in Bangladesh’s 1971 liberation, and how do they influence current politics?
A2:

Narrative 1 (Secular-Liberation): Championed by the Awami League, this views India as a heroic ally that provided refuge, trained freedom fighters, and militarily intervened to secure Bangladesh’s independence. It emphasizes shared cultural-linguistic ties and secular democracy.
Narrative 2 (Islamist-Pakistani): Promoted by Jamaat-e-Islami and certain elites, this downplays India’s sacrifice. It frames 1971 as a “division of Pakistan” engineered by a “hegemonic” India, portraying its support as cynical rather than altruistic. This narrative fuels anti-Indianism by arguing that India’s friendship with the Awami League (like Hasina) proves its desire to control Bangladesh.

Q3: Who are the main actors driving the current wave of anti-Indianism in Bangladesh, and what are their motivations?
A3:

Jamaat-e-Islami and Islamist Groups: They use anti-India rhetoric to rally support, deflect from domestic issues, realign national identity towards Islam and away from secular Bengali nationalism, and erase the legacy of 1971 where they collaborated with Pakistan.
Factions within the Interim Regime: Some elements use anti-India posturing to legitimize themselves after ousting the pro-India Hasina, appeal to a radicalized base, and potentially gain diplomatic leverage.
Pakistan’s ISI: Sees a strategic opportunity to weaken India by nurturing anti-India sentiment and building a new alliance with Dhaka, avenging 1971.
Certain Intellectual & Military Elites: Their long-held belief in India’s hegemonic intentions finds new expression in the current political vacuum.

Q4: In what ways is Bangladesh exhibiting traits similar to Pakistan in its relationship with India?
A4: The “New Pakistan” analogy points to emerging similarities:

Hostility as Policy: Anti-Indianism shifting from political rhetoric to a potential element of state foreign policy.
Territorial Claims: Voicing irredentist claims on Indian territory (Northeast), akin to Pakistan on Kashmir.
External Alliance for Balance: Seeking a closer “all-weather” partnership with China to counter India.
Proxy Narratives & Security Threats: Alleged use of non-state actors and ISI-style tactics to fuel dissent within India, and basing national security planning on opposition to India.
Instrumentalizing Religion: Using Islamic solidarity (with Pakistan) as a unifying national ideology against a perceived Hindu India.

Q5: What are the critical differences between Bangladesh and Pakistan that might prevent a complete replication of the India-Pakistan rivalry?
A5: Fundamental differences offer hope:

Civilizational-Cultural Bonds: The deep, organic shared Bengali language and culture with Indian Bengal has no parallel in India-Pakistan relations and acts as a powerful societal glue.
No Kashmir-like Flashpoint: The bilateral disputes are over resources and borders, not an existential, identity-based territorial dispute that has triggered multiple wars.
Economic Interdependence: Bangladesh’s economy is deeply linked to India through trade, transit, and investment, creating strong pro-stability business constituencies.
Democratic and Pluralistic Legacy: Despite current turmoil, Bangladesh has a stronger history of secular democracy and civil society resilience compared to Pakistan’s military-dominated polity. The spirit of the 1971 Liberation War remains a potent counter-narrative to Islamist revisionism.

Bangladesh at a Crossroads, The Rise of Anti-Indianism and the Specter of a New Pakistan