The Unraveling of Rojava, Syria’s Kurds Caught in a Geopolitical Vise

The Unraveling of Rojava, Syria’s Kurds Caught in a Geopolitical Vise

The dramatic collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 was heralded as the potential endgame for Syria’s brutal, multi-sided civil war. The rise of Ahmed al-Sharaa—a former jihadist turned pragmatic statesman—as interim leader, promising an inclusive government, offered a fragile hope. Yet, just over a year later, that hope is being violently extinguished in the dust of northeast Syria. Here, a new and decisive conflict has erupted, pitting the reconstituted Syrian government against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), threatening to dismantle the hard-won and revolutionary autonomous project known as Rojava. This latest flare-up is not a spontaneous eruption but the culmination of a calculated geopolitical realignment, where the Kurds—once indispensable Western allies in the fight against the Islamic State—are being sacrificed on the altar of regional stability and great power convenience. The struggle for Syria’s Kurdish region encapsulates a tragic narrative of betrayed promises, shifting alliances, and the relentless pursuit of centralized power at the expense of minority rights.

The Foundation and Fragility of Rojava

To understand the current crisis, one must revisit the genesis of Kurdish autonomy. Syria’s Kurds, comprising roughly 10% of the population, have long been marginalized, denied citizenship, and suppressed culturally and politically. The chaos of the 2011 civil war provided an unexpected opening. As the Assad regime withdrew its forces from the northeast to defend its core territories, and as Arab rebel groups focused on fighting Damascus, a power vacuum emerged. Into this void stepped the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the Kurdish militia.

The YPG’s moment of transformation came with the rise of the Islamic State (IS). While the world watched in horror, the YPG, and its broader multi-ethnic coalition, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), became the most effective and committed ground force against the Caliphate. With critical air support and military aid from the United States-led coalition, the SDF liberated vast swathes of eastern Syria, including the IS capital of Raqqa in 2017. In the territories they freed, they didn’t simply restore the old order; they built a new one. The Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES), commonly called Rojava, was established, implementing a unique system of decentralized, direct democracy with a strong emphasis on gender equality and ethnic pluralism.

For years, this arrangement held in a tense, de facto equilibrium. The Assad regime, preoccupied with survival, tacitly tolerated Kurdish autonomy as it focused on crushing other rebels. The U.S. saw the SDF as a cheap, effective proxy to degrade IS without deploying its own troops en masse. Turkey, however, viewed this entire project with apocalyptic alarm, seeing the YPG—and its political wing, the Democratic Union Party (PYD)—as an existential threat, inextricably linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has waged a decades-long insurgency inside Turkey.

The Sharaa Gambit: Centralization Through Coercion and Concession

The fall of Assad and the rise of Ahmed al-Sharaa fundamentally altered this fragile balance. Sharaa, the former leader of the jihadist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), underwent a remarkable rebranding. Shedding his extremist image, he positioned himself as a national unifier, securing a degree of international recognition, including a landmark visit to Washington in November 2025 to meet President Trump. This rehabilitation was sealed when Syria announced it would join the U.S.-led anti-IS coalition.

Emboldened, Sharaa turned his attention to the unfinished business of state consolidation. His objective was unambiguous: to end Kurdish autonomy and reassert Damascus’s sovereignty over every inch of Syrian territory. His strategy, however, was sophisticated and two-pronged, blending coercive force with tactical cultural concessions.

1. The Carrot: Cultural Recognition Without Political Power: In January 2026, even as his forces clashed with the SDF, Sharaa issued a decree formally recognizing Kurdish as a “national language,” offering citizenship to stateless Kurds, and declaring the Kurdish New Year (Newroz) a national holiday. This was a masterstroke of political theater. It aimed to placate Kurdish cultural aspirations while entirely sidestepping their core political demand: self-rule. The message was clear: you can be Kurds within a centralized Syrian state, but you cannot have a state within a state.

2. The Stick: Military Encroachment and Forced Integration: Concurrently, Sharaa demanded the full integration of the SDF’s military and administrative structures into the Syrian state. The “Shaara-Abdi agreement” (named for Sharaa and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi) promised a roadmap for this integration but quickly stalled. The irreconcilable conflict was over control: Damascus insisted on deploying its troops in Kurdish areas and integrating SDF fighters individually into the national army, which would dismantle the Kurds’ organized defensive capacity. The Kurds, understandably, saw this as a recipe for the slow-motion annihilation of their autonomy. When talks failed, Sharaa’s forces moved militarily.

The Collapse of the SDF’s Southern Front and the Ceasefire Ultimatum

The Syrian Arab Army’s offensive was swift and effective, exploiting the SDF’s vulnerabilities. The SDF’s control over areas like Aleppo’s Arab neighborhoods and the provinces of Raqqa and Deir al-Zour was always tenuous. These were predominantly Arab regions liberated from IS, held not by deep-seated Kurdish nationalism but by a fragile, transactional alliance with local Arab tribes within the SDF framework. As government forces advanced in early January 2026, this alliance crumbled. Reports confirmed Arab militia components breaking ranks with YPG commanders, leading to a rapid SDF collapse across eastern Syria.

The fall of these territories was a strategic and symbolic catastrophe. It deprived the Kurds of economically vital oil and gas fields in Deir al-Zour and the symbolic prize of Raqqa. The chaos even led to dozens of IS prisoners escaping from a SDF-run jail in Hassaka, a grim reminder of the persistent jihadist threat that Kurdish forces had long contained.

Backed into a corner, Commander Mazloum Abdi agreed to a ceasefire on January 18. The terms were nothing short of a surrender ultimatum, demanding the SDF:

• Hand over Raqqa and Deir al-Zour provinces “administratively and militarily.”

• Integrate all institutions in al-Hassaka into government structures.

• Surrender all border crossings and energy fields.

• Expel all non-Syrian PKK members from Syria.

In return, the agreement paid lip service to “protect the special character of the Kurdish areas”—a deliberately vague phrase that offers little concrete guarantee. The core dispute remains unresolved: the SDF is willing to cede the Arab-majority territories but is digging in to defend the Kurdish heartland of Kobane, al-Hassaka, and Qamishli, refusing the deployment of Syrian troops there. Sharaa, however, insists on a monopoly of force. The ceasefire is not peace; it is a tense interlude before the next, possibly final, confrontation.

The Great Power Betrayal: Why the U.S. Stepped Back and Turkey Leaned In

The Kurdish predicament is magnified by a devastating geopolitical betrayal. Their erstwhile patron, the United States, has fundamentally recalculated its interests.

• The U.S. Pivot to Damascus: With IS territorially defeated and a “rehabilitated” Sharaa in power in Damascus, the U.S. no longer sees the SDF as a strategic necessity. Maintaining a relationship with the Kurds had become a diplomatic irritant, alienating NATO ally Turkey. Washington’s warming ties with Sharaa—a stunning reversal for a former designated terrorist with a $10 million bounty—are driven by a desire for a “stable,” centralized Syrian government that can act as a counterweight to Iranian and Russian influence. In this cold calculus, a unified Syria under Sharaa is more valuable to U.S. regional strategy than the preservation of Kurdish autonomy. The approximately 900 U.S. troops remaining in northeast Syria now seem less like a protective shield for the Kurds and more like a bargaining chip in wider U.S.-Damascus negotiations.

• Turkey’s Unwavering Hostility: Ankara’s position is unambiguous and driven by deep-seated national security fears. Turkey views the YPG/PYD as an extension of the PKK and has long sought to destroy their autonomous zone. Ankara was a key backer of Sharaa’s integration plan. With a fragile peace process underway domestically with the PKK, the Turkish government believes that crushing the SDF across its border will weaken the Kurdish movement’s regional momentum and strengthen Ankara’s hand in negotiations. Turkey’s goal is a Kurdish region stripped of military and political power, fully subservient to a Damascus regime that is itself within Turkey’s sphere of influence.

The convergence of U.S. and Turkish interests on strengthening a centralized Syrian state has created a perfect storm for the Kurds. They are left isolated, their once-powerful international advocacy fading in the face of realpolitik.

What Lies Ahead: Siege, Resistance, and an Uncertain Future

The situation on the ground is one of grim determination mixed with desperation. Kurdish representatives speak of a “general mobilisation.” The symbolic city of Kobane—where the YPG famously broke the IS siege in 2015—is reported to be under a new siege, this time by Syrian government forces. Kurdish fighters are fortifying positions in their core territories, preparing for a last stand.

The path forward is fraught with bleak possibilities:

1. A Negotiated Diminution: The most likely, yet painful, outcome is a negotiated settlement where the Kurds retain limited cultural rights and some local administrative control in a handful of cities, but lose their military autonomy, their resource wealth, and their expansive territory. Rojava as a revolutionary project would be dead.

2. Resumption of Full-Scale War: If negotiations over troop deployments completely break down, Sharaa’s forces, possibly with tacit Turkish backing, could launch a final assault on Kobane and Qamishli. This would trigger a bloody, urban conflict with high civilian casualties.

3. Internal Fracture and Insurgency: The SDF itself could fracture under pressure, with some factions accepting integration while hardline YPG elements melt away to wage a prolonged guerrilla campaign, potentially dragging the region back into a cycle of instability that could allow for an IS resurgence.

Conclusion: The Price of Stability

The crisis in Syria’s Kurdish region is a stark lesson in the fleeting nature of geopolitical alliances and the high price minorities often pay for “stability.” The Kurds of Rojava built a remarkable, if imperfect, experiment in democracy amidst the ruins of war and were instrumental in defeating one of the most barbaric forces of the 21st century. Their reward is not security or gratitude, but abandonment and an ultimatum to disarm. Their struggle is a microcosm of a broader Middle Eastern tragedy, where the aspirations of peoples without states are perpetually subordinated to the interests of regional powers and global players seeking manageable, centralized order. The fate of Rojava will be decided not just on the battlefields of northeast Syria, but in the corridors of power in Washington, Ankara, and Damascus, where the Kurdish dream of autonomy is being quietly bargained away.

Q&A: The Crisis in Syria’s Kurdish Region

Q1: What is Rojava, and how was it established?

A1: Rojava, officially the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES), is the self-governing region established by Syria’s Kurds during the civil war. It was founded after the Syrian regime withdrew forces from the northeast in 2012. Its military wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and later the broader Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), became the main ground ally of the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State (IS). After liberating territories from IS (including Raqqa), the SDF administered these areas, building a unique system based on decentralized democracy, ethnic pluralism, and gender equality, creating a de facto autonomous region distinct from Damascus.

Q2: Why has fighting broken out between the Syrian government and the Kurdish-led SDF in 2026?

A2: Fighting erupted after the collapse of the “Shaara-Abdi agreement.” The new Syrian interim leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, demanded the full military and administrative integration of the SDF and the Kurdish autonomous administration into the Syrian state. The Kurds resisted, fearing this would mean the end of their self-rule. When talks stalled, Sharaa’s forces launched a military offensive in January 2026, quickly seizing SDF-held Arab-majority areas in Aleppo, Raqqa, and Deir al-Zour, pushing the SDF back to its Kurdish heartland and triggering the current crisis.

Q3: How have the positions of the United States and Turkey contributed to this crisis?

A3: The shifting positions of these external powers have directly enabled the Syrian government’s offensive.

• United States: Having rehabilitated former jihadist leader Ahmed al-Sharaa as a partner, the U.S. now prioritizes a centralized Syrian state to counter Iran and Russia. It no longer sees the SDF as strategically vital post-IS and has warmed relations with Damascus, effectively withdrawing its diplomatic shield from the Kurds.

• Turkey: Ankara views the YPG/SDF as a terrorist extension of the PKK. It strongly backs Sharaa’s plan to dismantle Kurdish autonomy, believing a weakened Syrian Kurdish movement will strengthen Turkey’s hand in its own domestic Kurdish peace process. The U.S.-Turkey consensus on supporting a strong central government in Damascus has left the Kurds isolated and vulnerable.

Q4: What are the key demands of the January 18 ceasefire agreement, and why is it fragile?

A4: The ceasefire agreement demands the SDF:

• Hand over Raqqa and Deir al-Zour provinces fully.

• Integrate all administrative institutions in al-Hassaka.

• Surrender border crossings and oil/gas fields.

• Expel foreign PKK members.
  In return, it vaguely promises to “protect the special character of the Kurdish areas.” The fragility stems from the unresolved core issue: military control. The SDF is willing to cede the Arab territories but refuses to allow Syrian government troops into the Kurdish-majority cities like Kobane and Qamishli or to dismantle its military structure. Sharaa insists on exactly that. This fundamental disagreement makes the ceasefire a temporary pause, not a sustainable peace.

Q5: What are the potential outcomes for Syria’s Kurds following this crisis?

A5: The future is perilous and could unfold in several ways:

1. Diminished Autonomy: A negotiated settlement where Kurds retain cultural rights and limited local administration but lose their military, most of their territory, and their economic resources, effectively ending the Rojava project.

2. Renewed War: A collapse of talks leading to a Syrian government/Turkish assault on Kurdish strongholds, causing a destructive urban war.

3. Insurgency: The disintegration of the SDF could lead to a return to guerrilla warfare by hardline factions, creating prolonged instability and potentially allowing for an IS resurgence in the chaos.
   The most likely outcome is a version of the first, where Kurdish autonomy is severely curtailed in the name of Syrian “unity” and regional stability.