The PSLV Anomalies, A Test for India’s Space Ambitions and Transparency

The PSLV Anomalies, A Test for India’s Space Ambitions and Transparency

The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), long celebrated for its remarkable consistency and “frugal engineering” prowess, finds itself at a critical juncture. A second consecutive failure of its workhorse Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV), missions C61 and C62, has cast an uncharacteristic shadow over the agency’s reliability. These back-to-back anomalies, both involving the rocket’s third stage (PS3), represent more than a technical hiccup; they constitute a significant test of India’s expanding space ambitions, its burgeoning commercial launch business, and its commitment to institutional transparency. The unfolding narrative, pieced together from official statements, foreign agency reports, and expert analysis, reveals a story of technical mystery, procedural scrutiny, and a growing public clamor for answers that challenge ISRO’s traditionally insular post-failure protocols.

The Anomalies Unfold: C61 and C62

The sequence of events paints a picture of troubling similarity. On May 18, 2025, the PSLV-C61 mission, carrying the EOS-9 satellite, failed after a nominal first and second stage burn. ISRO’s terse announcement cited a “drop in chamber pressure in the third-stage motor case,” leading to a mission abort. The rocket and its precious payload were lost.

Just over seven months later, on January 12, the PSLV-C62 mission lifted off from Sriharikota carrying the primary EOS-N1 surveillance satellite and 15 co-passenger satellites, including a significant foreign payload, Thailand’s THEOS-2A. Initially, the launch appeared nominal. However, near the end of the PS3 stage burn, mission control observed a “disturbance in the vehicle roll rates,” followed by a deviation in the flight path. As ISRO Chairman S. V. Narayanan described it, the rocket began spinning uncontrollably, veering off course. Unlike C61’s pressure drop, C62’s primary symptom was an attitude-control failure late in the same stage.

The immediate consequence, as confirmed by Thailand’s Geo-Informatics and Space Technology Development Agency (GISTDA), was catastrophic: the vehicle failed to achieve orbit. The rocket and all its satellites were expected to fall back and burn up over the southern Indian Ocean. This marked a sobering first: while the PSLV had experienced three previous failures in its long history, C62 was its first failure while carrying commercial customer satellites, dealing a direct blow to the credibility of NewSpace India Limited (NSIL), ISRO’s commercial arm.

The Failure Analysis Committee: Process and Secrecy

Following the C61 failure, Chairman Narayanan constituted a Failure Analysis Committee (FAC). As the report clarifies, an FAC is not a standing body but an ad-hoc panel of experts—drawn from within ISRO, academia, and sometimes including former chairmen—convened specifically to investigate a major mission failure. Its mandate is forensically rigorous: to reconstruct the event chain using telemetry data, hardware analysis (where possible), and engineer testimonies, identify the root cause, and recommend corrective actions before the vehicle is cleared for a “return to flight.”

The FAC’s final report is submitted to the Department of Space, which operates directly under the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). Historically, ISRO’s handling of FAC findings has varied. After high-profile failures like the GSLV-F10 mission in 2021, the agency issued detailed public statements summarizing the FAC’s technical conclusions (e.g., identifying a leaking valve in the cryogenic stage). This practice fostered public confidence and demonstrated accountability.

The aftermath of PSLV-C61 has broken from this precedent. Despite the FAC submitting its report to the PMO in mid-2025, the report has not been cleared for public release as of January 2026. No detailed summary statement has been issued. The only public hint came indirectly in November 2025, when Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre director A. Rajarajan, during an unrelated lecture, attributed the loss to a “slight manufacturing error.” This opacity has fueled criticism, particularly after the C62 failure exhibited symptoms in the same vehicle stage. Independent experts and space observers have questioned the wisdom of withholding the C61 findings, arguing that transparency is essential for maintaining trust among international customers, domestic private partners, and the taxpaying public.

The Stakes: Commercial, Strategic, and Reputational

The PSLV’s reliability is the cornerstone upon which much of India’s modern space economy is being built. The consecutive failures threaten this foundation on multiple fronts:

1. Commercial Launch Business: NSIL has aggressively marketed the PSLV as a reliable, cost-effective ride-share option for small satellites. The C62 mission, with its international payloads, was a flagship demonstration of this capability. Its failure, and the loss of insured customer satellites like THEOS-2A, directly impacts NSIL’s bottom line and its ability to attract future foreign contracts. Insurance premiums for launches on Indian rockets are likely to skyrocket, eroding their cost advantage.

2. Strategic Autonomy: The primary payload on C62, EOS-N1, was a surveillance satellite for the Defence Electronics Company. The loss of such a strategic asset represents a tangible national security setback and delays the enhancement of India’s indigenous intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.

3. The “Indian Space” Brand: ISRO has cultivated a global reputation for frugality and success. The PSLV, with a success rate of over 95% prior to this streak, was a symbol of this brand. Two failures in quick succession, especially with unresolved and undisclosed causes, tarnish this hard-earned reputation. It raises uncomfortable questions about quality control, supply chain management, and systemic oversight in an era where ISRO is attempting to scale up launch frequency dramatically.

4. Private Sector Morale: Indian private space companies, which had placed payloads on C62, reportedly did not have insurance. They must now absorb the full financial and developmental cost of the loss. For startups operating on thin margins, this can be crippling and may deter them from relying on Indian launch services in the future, potentially pushing them toward foreign providers.

Parallels and Pressing Questions

The resemblance between the C61 and C62 anomalies is impossible to ignore. Both involved decisive failures in the PS3 stage after nominal early flight. While the symptoms differed (chamber pressure drop vs. roll disturbance), the stage of occurrence points to a potential common vulnerability—whether in the stage’s propulsion system, its avionics, its structural integrity, or the interaction between them.

This raises urgent, interconnected questions:

• Is there a systemic flaw in the PS3 stage? Could a “slight manufacturing error” (as hinted for C61) be a symptom of a broader quality assurance issue as production rates increase?

• Were the corrective actions from the C61 FAC inadequate or improperly implemented? If the C61 root cause was identified and addressed, why did C62 fail in a similar context? If actions were pending, should C62 have flown?

• What is the rationale for secrecy? National security concerns over the EOS-N1 payload may be cited, but the PSLV’s design is not secret. Withholding the technical cause of a launch vehicle failure, especially one affecting international partners, is increasingly seen as anachronistic in a global commercial ecosystem that values transparency.

The case of the GSLV-F10 FAC report, which was publicly summarized, shows that ISRO can be transparent without compromising security. The current silence suggests either a finding of exceptional sensitivity or an internal institutional shift towards greater secrecy—a shift that may prove counterproductive.

The Path Forward: Technical Rigor and Institutional Openness

For ISRO to navigate this crisis, it must operate on two parallel tracks: one of uncompromising technical rectification, and another of deliberate communication.

Technically, a new, comprehensive FAC for the C62 mission is imperative. It must work in conjunction with the findings (however classified) of the C61 FAC to determine if the failures are linked. Every component of the PS3 stage—from the S7 motor’s propellant grain and nozzle to the stage’s inertial guidance system, thrust vector control mechanisms, and interface with the fourth stage—must undergo microscopic scrutiny. The “return to flight” of the PSLV must be predicated on unequivocal confidence, not just a fix for the last observed error. This may require a period of grounding for in-depth review, potentially delaying a crowded launch manifest.

Institutionally, ISRO and the PMO must reconsider their communication strategy. A detailed, anonymized technical summary of the C61 findings, and eventually the C62 findings, should be released. This would:

• Reassure global customers and partners of ISRO’s commitment to root-cause analysis and corrective action.

• Allow the global aerospace community to provide insights, fostering collaborative problem-solving.

• Maintain public trust and demonstrate that a publicly-funded agency is accountable for its setbacks.

• Set a precedent for the growing Indian private space sector, emphasizing that transparency and safety are non-negotiable pillars of spaceflight.

Conclusion: A Defining Moment for ISRO

The PSLV anomalies are not merely failures of machinery; they are a stress test for ISRO’s organizational culture as it transitions from a primarily government-focused R&D agency to a key player in a competitive, global commercial space market. The agency’s legendary resilience was built on learning from public failures like the early ASLV launches. Reverting to a culture of secrecy in the face of commercial and strategic setbacks would be a retrograde step.

How ISRO handles the investigation, communicates its findings, and engineers the PSLV’s comeback will define its trajectory for the next decade. It must prove that its engineering rigor can diagnose and cure the ailment in its most trusted vehicle. More importantly, it must demonstrate that its institutional maturity matches its technical ambitions, embracing the transparency required to be a true leader in the new space age. The world is not just watching the next PSLV launch; it is watching how India’s space program conducts itself under pressure. The recovery of trust may be a more complex mission than the return to flight.

Q&A: The PSLV-C61 & C62 Anomalies and ISRO’s Response

Q1: What were the specific anomalies that caused the PSLV-C61 and C62 mission failures?
A1: The failures, while both occurring in the rocket’s third stage (PS3), presented different symptoms. PSLV-C61 (May 2025) failed due to a sudden “drop in chamber pressure in the third-stage motor case” during the PS3 burn, leading to a loss of thrust and mission abort. PSLV-C62 (January 2026) experienced a “disturbance in the vehicle roll rates” near the end of the PS3 burn, causing the rocket to spin uncontrollably and deviate from its flight path, preventing it from reaching orbit. Both anomalies were decisive and occurred after nominal performance of the earlier stages.

Q2: What is a Failure Analysis Committee (FAC), and what is the status of the FAC report for PSLV-C61?
A2: An FAC is an ad-hoc committee of experts convened by the ISRO Chairman after a major mission failure. It includes ISRO insiders, academics, and sometimes former chairmen. Its role is to forensically determine the root cause and recommend corrective actions. The FAC for PSLV-C61 submitted its report to the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) in mid-2025. However, as of January 2026, the PMO has not cleared it for public release, and ISRO has not issued its customary detailed public summary. This lack of transparency marks a break from past practice after failures like GSLV-F10.

Q3: Why are these consecutive PSLV failures considered particularly damaging for India’s space program?
A3: The failures strike at multiple core objectives:

• Commercial Viability: C62 was the PSLV’s first failure with paying commercial customer satellites on board (including Thailand’s THEOS-2A). This directly undermines the credibility of ISRO’s commercial arm, NSIL, and will likely increase insurance costs, eroding India’s cost-advantage in the global launch market.

• Strategic Setback: The primary payload on C62 was EOS-N1, a defense surveillance satellite. Its loss delays a key strategic capability.

• Reputational Damage: The PSLV’s ~95% success rate was a flagship of ISRO’s “frugal engineering” brand. Two quick, unexplained failures tarnish this hard-won reputation and raise questions about quality control during scaling.

• Private Sector Impact: Indian private space firms that lost uninsured payloads on C62 face severe financial strain, potentially shaking their confidence in domestic launch services.

Q4: What has been the response from international partners involved in the C62 mission?
A4: Thailand’s space agency, GISTDA, provided the most definitive public assessment. They confirmed the mission failure, stated that the rocket and satellites would burn up over the southern Indian Ocean, and noted that their THEOS-2A satellite was insured. This external confirmation highlighted the severity of the failure before ISRO itself declared it. The Spanish co-developer of the KID re-entry demonstrator payload also reported receiving “off-nominal” data for a few minutes post-anomaly. The professional but public statements from customers increase pressure on ISRO for accountability.

Q5: What should ISRO’s path forward be to recover from this crisis?
A5: ISRO needs a dual-track approach:

1. Technical Rigor: Constitute a thorough FAC for C62 and integrate its findings with the (still-secret) C61 analysis. A comprehensive review of the entire PS3 stage—manufacturing, assembly, testing, and flight systems—is essential. The PSLV must be grounded until the root cause is conclusively identified and corrected, even if it delays the launch calendar.

2. Institutional Transparency: The PMO and ISRO should authorize the release of a detailed technical summary of the FAC findings for both missions, redacting only genuinely sensitive information. This is critical to rebuilding trust with international clients, the domestic private sector, and the public. Demonstrating a culture of open learning from failure is paramount for a agency aspiring to be a global commercial and strategic leader in space.