The Twilight of Sovereignty, From a World of Rules to a World of Deals

The Twilight of Sovereignty, From a World of Rules to a World of Deals

In the predawn darkness over Caracas, the meticulously orchestrated operation was a spectacle of modern military power. The capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his subsequent extradition to New York, however, was more than a daring raid; it was, in the words of Arghya Sengupta, a “spectacular assault” on the very foundations of the international order that has held, however shakily, since the end of World War II. This event, coupled with audacious American whispers about the annexation of Greenland, signifies a paradigm shift of historic proportions. We are witnessing, in real-time, the accelerated unravelling of the Westphalian and post-war consensus on state sovereignty, moving from an “age of rules to an age of deals.” This crisis is not merely about one rogue action by a superpower; it is the culmination of a prolonged, multifaceted assault on the nation-state, where the flanking maneuvers of Big Tech are now being followed by a full-scale frontal assault by a hegemonic state willing to cast the rulebook aside.

The cornerstone of the post-1945 world order, enshrined in the United Nations Charter, was the prohibition of the use of force and the inviolability of territorial sovereignty. The fundamental rule was simple: no state could attack or interfere in the domestic affairs of another, except in clear self-defense against an armed attack. This framework was designed to prevent the kind of aggressive wars that had ravaged the globe. For eight decades, this system, while frequently violated or stretched (through doctrines like “preemptive strike” or “humanitarian intervention”), maintained a normative power. Violators felt compelled to offer legal justifications, however flimsy, dressing raw power in the garb of legal necessity.

The U.S. action in Venezuela, as Sengupta argues, represents a qualitative break from this tradition. It is an “inflection point” precisely because it discards the legal pretense altogether. The United States did not claim self-defense; Venezuela posed no imminent military threat. It did not seek a UN Security Council resolution. It simply labeled Maduro a “narco-terrorist” and executed a military operation to kidnap a sitting head of state from his own capital. This is not a stretching of international law; it is its explicit negation. When the world’s preeminent military and economic power—a founding architect of the UN system—openly disregards its core tenets, it effectively announces that the era of a rules-based order is over. The principle of territorial sovereignty, already porous, is now “on the chopping block.”

This frontal assault by state power is paralleled and preceded by a more insidious, structural erosion from non-state actors: transnational technology corporations. For years, companies like Apple, Meta, Google, and Amazon have been creating what Sengupta terms “sovereign enclosures.” Through the platforms and codes they write, they govern vast digital territories that transcend national borders. They set their own rules on speech, commerce, privacy, and arbitration, answerable primarily to their headquarters in California rather than to the parliaments of the nations in which their users reside. They control critical infrastructure, from cloud services to communication networks, and wield influence that rivals or surpasses that of many medium-sized states. This “attack on sovereignty from the flanks” has been gradual, normalized through convenience and connectivity. Big Tech has not just challenged state sovereignty; in the digital realm, it has often usurped it, creating a form of private, extraterritorial authority that fragments the classical Westphalian model.

The convergence of these two trends—the state’s brazen disregard for external sovereignty and Big Tech’s erosion of internal sovereignty—creates a perilous new reality. The nation-state, the primary unit of global politics since 1648, is being squeezed from above and below. Its monopoly on legitimate force is challenged by a superpower that acts as judge, jury, and executioner beyond its borders. Its monopoly on law and governance within its borders is challenged by algorithmic rulers in Silicon Valley.

The geopolitical consequence of this breakdown, as Sengupta foresees, is a fundamental reshaping of the world into a “neat East-West split” led by two “hemispheric hegemons.” The United States, having “cast the rulebook aside,” asserts a neo-imperial dominance over the Western Hemisphere, articulated in its National Security Strategy. China, with a “civilisationally different conception of the rule of law,” seeks to structure the Eastern Hemisphere under its own authoritarian, state-capitalist model. Both are fundamentally illiberal in the international sense: one rejects rules in favor of raw power projection, the other subscribes to a rule-by-law system that serves state interest rather than a universal rule-of-law. The post-Cold War binary of a liberal West and an underdeveloped Global South has shattered, replaced by a tense, transactional standoff between two giants who recognize no higher authority.

In this nascent and anarchic “age of deals,” where power alone dictates terms, smaller and middle powers face an existential dilemma. The old guarantees of international law are fading. Alliances may prove fickle if a patron decides its interests are better served by unilateral action. This is a world of heightened risk, but also, as Sengupta posits, a world of potential opportunity for a country like India.

India’s traditional foreign policy cornerstone has been “strategic autonomy”—the ability to make independent decisions based on its own national interest, free from entanglement in alliance blocs. In the old order, this often meant careful non-alignment. In the new disorder, it must mean something more proactive and entrepreneurial. India lacks the economic and military might to directly challenge the hemispheric hegemons. Therefore, its strategy must be one of agile navigation and institutional entrepreneurship.

Sengupta’s prescription is shrewd: India should actively work to “shape the incipient international legal system, one country and geography at a time.” This involves:

1. Filling the Vacuum in the Eastern Hemisphere: As the U.S. and China focus on their core spheres and direct confrontation, spaces like the Indian Ocean Region and sub-Saharan Africa become critical zones of contestation and opportunity. India must deepen its partnerships here—not through coercive deals, but through reliable diplomacy, development partnerships, security cooperation, and infrastructure investment that respects sovereignty. It must position itself as the predictable, rules-engaged power in a region wary of hegemonic overreach.

2. Championing a Reformed Multilateralism: While the old UN system is crippled, the demand for rules and predictability will not disappear. India should lead coalitions of the middle powers and the Global South to advocate for updated, more equitable international frameworks—on digital governance, climate finance, trade, and maritime law. It must become a principal architect of whatever new “rules of the road” emerge, ensuring they are not simply imposed by the strong.

3. Building Digital Sovereignty: To resist the flanking attacks of Big Tech, India must accelerate its project of creating sovereign digital public infrastructure (like Aadhaar, UPI, and ONDC). This builds state capacity, fosters innovation within a national framework, and provides an alternative model to both American corporate platform dominance and Chinese state surveillance capitalism.

4. Investing in Comprehensive National Power: Ultimately, in an age of deals, leverage comes from strength. This requires sustained investment in economic growth, technological prowess, military modernization, and diplomatic capital. Strategic autonomy is meaningless without the strategic substance to back it.

The world that emerges from the rubble of the post-war order will be more volatile, less predictable, and more hierarchical. The kidnapping of Maduro and the fantasy of annexing Greenland are not isolated aberrations; they are the harbingers of this new logic. The nation-state will survive, but its sovereignty will be more contingent, perpetually negotiated between the demands of hemispheric hegemons, the reach of digital empires, and the resilience of its own institutions.

For India, the path is clear but perilous. It cannot retreat into isolation. It must step into the chaotic arena as a determined shaper of its own destiny and, by extension, a shaper of a new order where the interests of middle powers and smaller states are not merely transactional afterthoughts. In the lexicon of this emerging world, where spectacle often substitutes for law, establishing oneself as an indispensable, principled, and powerful dealmaker is the only way to secure not just survival, but a future of dignity and influence. The age of rules may be over, but the age where intelligent, sustained statecraft can forge a measure of justice and stability from chaos is just beginning.

Q&A: Unpacking the Crisis of Sovereignty and India’s Path Forward

Q1: How does the U.S. action in Venezuela represent a fundamental break from the post-WWII international legal order, beyond past interventions?
A1: Past interventions, however controversial (e.g., Iraq 2003, Kosovo 1999), operated within a discourse of international law. States offered legal justifications—self-defense, humanitarian intervention, UN authorization—even if they were widely disputed. The Venezuela operation is qualitatively different because it discards the need for any legal justification altogether. The U.S. made no claim of an imminent armed attack from Venezuela (self-defense), sought no UN mandate, and presented no evidence in an international forum. It unilaterally re-labeled a foreign head of state a “narco-terrorist” and used military force to abduct him. This moves from violating or stretching the rules to openly negating the rule-based system itself, treating sovereignty as entirely conditional on U.S. designation. It signals that for the hegemon, power, not law, is now the sole operative principle.

Q2: What is meant by Big Tech’s creation of “sovereign enclosures,” and how does this attack sovereignty differently from state action?
A2: “Sovereign enclosures” refer to the digital realms governed by transnational tech corporations where their private rules supersede national laws. Platforms like Facebook (Meta) or app stores like Apple’s iOS create walled gardens:

• Rule-Making: They set and enforce community standards, content moderation policies, and terms of service that govern billions of users globally.

• Jurisdiction: Disputes are often resolved through private arbitration dictated by the company, bypassing national court systems.

• Control of Infrastructure: They control the essential digital infrastructure (cloud servers, social graphs, payment systems) on which modern societies and economies run.
  This attacks sovereignty from within and below, eroding the state’s monopoly on law-making, dispute resolution, and control over critical infrastructure within its territory. It’s a silent, commercial, and pervasive erosion, unlike the dramatic military assault on external sovereignty seen in Venezuela.

Q3: The article describes a shift from an “age of rules to an age of deals.” What does this mean for the conduct of international relations?
A3: An “age of rules” implies a common, albeit imperfect, framework (like the UN Charter) that all states reference, providing predictability and a baseline for legitimacy. An “age of deals” means international relations revert to pure power politics and bilateral or transactional arrangements. Outcomes are determined not by pre-agreed law, but by ad-hoc negotiations where leverage (military, economic, diplomatic) is everything. This means:

• Less Predictability: The behavior of powerful states becomes more arbitrary.

• Heightened Insecurity for Weaker States: Their security depends on the fleeting interests of powerful patrons, not on universal principles.

• The End of Universalism: Norms like human rights or sovereign equality become negotiable commodities, not foundational ideals.

• Coalitions of Convenience: Alliances form and dissolve based on immediate strategic calculations, not shared values or long-term legal commitments.

Q4: Why does the author see this moment as an opportunity for India, and what are the specific areas of focus suggested?
A4: The author sees opportunity in the strategic distraction and reputational degradation of the hegemons. While the U.S. and China are engaged in direct rivalry and actions that alienate other nations, a space opens for a credible, alternative partner. India’s opportunity lies in:

1. Geographic Focus: Actively deepening influence in the Indian Ocean Region and sub-Saharan Africa—areas within the “Eastern Hemisphere” where Chinese and American overreach may create demand for a less domineering partner.

2. Institutional Entrepreneurship: Leading efforts to shape new international norms and rules, particularly in digital governance, maritime security, and climate action, positioning itself as a champion of a more equitable, multipolar order.

3. Demonstrating Reliable Partnership: Offering development aid, infrastructure investment (like via the Global South-focused partnership), and security cooperation that respects sovereignty, in contrast to debt-trap diplomacy or coercive regime change.

4. Leveraging Strategic Autonomy: Using its non-aligned stance to mediate, build bridges, and craft issue-based coalitions without being seen as a proxy for either hegemony.

Q5: What is the long-term implication of this dual assault (state and corporate) on the future of the nation-state?
A5: The nation-state will not disappear, but its nature and authority will be fundamentally transformed. We are moving towards a model of “contingent sovereignty.”

• Externally, sovereignty will be respected only when it aligns with a hegemon’s interest or when a state possesses sufficient deterrent power.

• Internally, sovereignty will be shared with or challenged by corporate platforms that govern key aspects of digital life, commerce, and information.
  The state will remain the primary unit for identity, security, and large-scale welfare, but it will have to constantly negotiate its authority in a layered world order. It will need to become more agile, investing in “sovereignty capabilities” like cyber defenses, economic resilience, and strategic diplomacy to maintain agency in this more competitive and fragmented landscape. The classical 20th-century model of the omnipotent, territorially-inviolable nation-state is coming to an end.