The Fraying Fabric, Parliamentary Erosion, Federal Strain, and the Unfinished Work of India’s Constitutional Promise

The Fraying Fabric, Parliamentary Erosion, Federal Strain, and the Unfinished Work of India’s Constitutional Promise

The annual observance of Constitution Day on November 26, followed closely by the commemoration of B.R. Ambedkar’s death anniversary on December 6, frames a period of profound national reflection. Sandwiched between these dates is the Winter Session of Parliament—a juxtaposition that is deeply symbolic, even ironic. It invites a critical audit not of ceremonial patriotism, but of the living, breathing health of the republic that the Constitution birthed and Ambedkar so meticulously architected. The central argument posited, and one that demands urgent engagement, is that the foundational pillars of India’s democracy—a robust, deliberative Parliament and a cooperative, balanced federal structure—are undergoing severe, perhaps unprecedented, strain. This is not merely a political contest; it is a constitutional crisis in slow motion, threatening to hollow out the very essence of the system Ambedkar and the Constituent Assembly so carefully designed to prevent the concentration of power.

Ambedkar’s Vision: The Rejection of Presidentialism and the Embrace of Accountability

To understand the gravity of the present divergence, one must first return to the Constituent Assembly debates. B.R. Ambedkar, the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, was unequivocal in his defense of the parliamentary system over a presidential one. His reasoning was rooted in a deep suspicion of untrammelled authority. In a vast, diverse, and newly independent nation riddled with social and economic inequalities, he argued that a system where “the executive is continuously responsible to the legislature” was indispensable. This was not an abstract preference. It was a deliberate safeguard. The parliamentary model, with its requirement of collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers to the Lok Sabha, was chosen precisely because it dispersed power, mandated constant accountability through debate and questioning, and ensured that the executive’s mandate was perpetually contingent on the confidence of the people’s elected representatives. Ambedkar’s genius lay in engineering a system where no single individual or institution could become “supreme”; sovereignty was to reside in a complex, interlocking web of checks and balances between the legislature, executive, and judiciary, and between the Union and the States.

The Shrinking Sabha: From Deliberation to Diktat

The most glaring evidence of systemic erosion lies in the quantitative and qualitative decline of Parliament itself. The data is stark and alarming. The First Lok Sabha (1952-57) met for an average of 135 days a year; a commitment to deliberation befitting a nascent republic. By the 17th Lok Sabha (2019-2024), this number had plummeted to a historic low of 55 sitting days per year. This is not a gentle decline; it is a collapse. A legislature that meets for barely two months in a year cannot, by any stretch, fulfill its constitutional roles of legislation, scrutiny, and representing the people’s will.

This collapse in duration is compounded by a deliberate degradation in quality. The 17th Lok Sabha passed 179 bills (excluding finance bills). A shocking 35% of these were approved after less than one hour of debate. Furthermore, only 16% of bills were referred to Parliamentary Standing Committees—the specialized, cross-party bodies designed to conduct detailed clause-by-clause scrutiny, hear experts, and build consensus. The Standing Committee system was India’s innovative answer to the need for detailed legislative review in a complex polity. Its sidelining represents a conscious move away from deliberation and toward executive fiat.

The government, armed with a strong majority, has perfected a method of governance by legislation-as-ordinance: rapid, unilateral, and impervious to substantive challenge. Crucial, transformative laws—from agricultural reforms (later repealed) to changes in citizenship laws, criminal codes, and the restructuring of Jammu and Kashmir—have been pushed through with minimal parliamentary engagement. This transforms Parliament from a sovereign deliberative body into a rubber stamp, a venue for ceremonial endorsement rather than genuine law-making. Ambedkar’s fear, articulated in his final speech to the Constituent Assembly, is materializing: the preference for “grammar” over the “life” of the Constitution, where the forms of democracy are maintained while its substance—debate, dissent, and deliberation—is drained away.

The Silencing of Dissent: Disruption, Suspension, and the New Normal

The decline is further evidenced in the treatment of dissent and opposition within Parliament. While disruptions by opposition parties have been a feature of parliamentary politics, a new and disquieting trend has emerged: orchestrated disruptions by treasury bench members to drown out opposition voices, followed by the mass suspension of opposition MPs for “misconduct.” The Winter Session of 2023 saw an unprecedented 146 MPs suspended for demanding a discussion on a security breach. This tactic weaponizes parliamentary rules to physically remove criticism from the chamber, creating a sanitized environment where the government’s narrative goes unchallenged. It negates the very purpose of Question Hour, Zero Hour, and debates—the tools through which the executive is held to account. When the opposition is not just outvoted but silenced and excluded, Parliament ceases to be a forum for the nation’s diverse voices and becomes a monologue of power.

The Assault on Federalism: From Union of States to Unitary Command

Parallel to the hollowing out of Parliament is the systematic weakening of India’s federal compact. Ambedkar described India as a “Union of States,” a carefully chosen phrase denoting an indestructible union of destructible states, with both tiers deriving power directly from the Constitution. Today, this federal balance is under visible, deliberate strain.

1. Fiscal Centralization: As discussed in previous analyses, the effective fiscal space of states is shrinking due to the proliferation of non-sharable cesses, reduced tax devolution weightage, and the uncertainties of the post-compensation GST regime. States are increasingly financially tethered to the Centre, forced to compete for grants tied to centrally designed schemes (like the Aspirational Districts Programme) that may not align with their unique priorities.

2. The Instrumentalization of Constitutional Offices: The office of the Governor, intended to be an impartial constitutional bridge, has frequently been accused of acting as an agent of the ruling party at the Centre. This manifests in sitting on bills passed by state legislatures for inordinate periods, interfering in university administrations, and, most controversially, leveraging authority in hung assemblies in ways perceived as partisan. This transforms a constitutional safeguard into a tool of political obstruction.

3. Weaponization of Central Agencies: The selective use of central investigative agencies like the Enforcement Directorate (ED), Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), and Income Tax Department against political opponents, particularly in opposition-ruled states, has become a dominant theme. The dramatic rise in cases filed by the ED under the current regime, overwhelmingly targeting opposition leaders, creates a chilling “politics of intimidation.” It allows the Centre to keep state governments off-balance, destabilize opponents, and project an image of endemic corruption only outside its own fold. This strikes at the heart of federal autonomy, making the exercise of a divergent political mandate in a state a perilous undertaking.

4. The Demise of Cooperative Forums: Institutions designed for inter-governmental dialogue, like the Inter-State Council mandated under Article 263, have been rendered moribund. This forum, meant to discuss issues of common interest and resolve disputes, has been consistently sidelined, preferring unilateralism from the Centre over cooperative federalism.

The Path to Restoration: Reclaiming the Constitutional Spirit

Reversing this decline requires a multi-frontal effort that is political, ideological, and legal. It begins with recognizing that the problem is not merely one of political style but of constitutional substance.

1. The 100-Day Parliament Mandate: The most concrete, immediately implementable reform is to legally mandate a minimum of 100 sitting days for Parliament each calendar year. This cannot be left to the discretion of the government of the day. A constitutional amendment or a binding law must institutionalize this floor. More days would automatically create space for:

• Pre-legislative scrutiny: Mandatory publication of bills for public comment.

• Committee Revival: Guaranteed referral of all major bills to Standing Committees.

• Meaningful Debate: Adequate time for clause-by-clause discussion and genuine engagement with opposition amendments.

• Oversight: Strengthened Question Hour and more debates on matters of public importance.

2. Empowering State Fiscal Autonomy: The 16th Finance Commission must act as a bulwark for federalism. It must recommend a cap on cesses and surcharges, ensure a predictable and buoyant devolution formula, and propose mechanisms to stabilize state GST revenues. The GST Council must operate as a truly federal body where states negotiate as equals, not as supplicants.

3. Depoliticizing Constitutional Offices and Agencies: Clear, transparent, and time-bound conventions must be established for Governors to act on state bills. A bipartisan committee should be involved in the appointment of Governors, CBI/ED Directors, and Election Commissioners to insulate these offices from perceived executive capture. The operational autonomy of agencies must be legally fortified.

4. Civic Vigilance and Judicial Guardianship: Ultimately, the Constitution is only as strong as the citizens’ resolve to defend it. This requires an ideological reaffirmation of constitutional morality—secularism, fraternity, liberty, and equality—over majoritarian populism. It also requires the judiciary to robustly defend the basic structure of the Constitution, acting as a vigilant check against executive and legislative overreach that undermines federalism or parliamentary democracy.

Conclusion: Beyond Celebration to Vigilance

Constitution Day and Ambedkar Jayanti are not mere dates on the calendar; they are annual audits. The audit for 2023 reveals an institution—Parliament—in a state of advanced atrophy and a principle—federalism—under sustained assault. The gap between Ambedkar’s envisaged republic of reasoned deliberation and shared sovereignty and the current reality of centralized authority and diminished accountability is widening dangerously.

Ambedkar’s warning echoes down the decades: “We must…observe the caution which John Stuart Mill has given to all who are interested in the maintenance of democracy, namely, not ‘to lay their liberties at the feet of even a great man, or to trust him with powers which enable him to subvert their institutions.’” The celebration of the Constitution is meaningless if it is not accompanied by the daily, vigilant work of holding power to account, reinvigorating institutions, and defending the delicate, pluralistic balance upon which the Indian Republic stands. The strength of our democracy will be measured not by the silence of its chambers or the uniformity of its political landscape, but by the rigour of its debates, the independence of its institutions, and the courage to constantly course-correct toward the constitutional promise of justice, liberty, equality, and fraternity for all.

Q&A: Deepening the Understanding of India’s Constitutional Crisis

Q1: Ambedkar explicitly warned against placing faith in a “great man” over institutions. How does the current political culture, with its emphasis on a supreme, charismatic leader, contradict this core constitutional principle?

A1: Ambedkar’s philosophy was deeply institutional. He believed democracy’s survival depended on procedures, laws, and distributed power, not personalities. The current political culture, characterized by a highly centralized leadership model, directly contradicts this. Governance is frequently framed as the direct delivery of benefits by a central figure, bypassing the credit and agency of local governments, MPs, and MLAs. Parliamentary debates are often replaced by monologic addresses. Policy is announced via social media or executive decree rather than emerging from parliamentary deliberation. This cult of personality systematically weakens institutions—the Cabinet becomes a rubber stamp, the Parliament a venue for acclamation, and the party a vehicle for the leader’s will. It creates a system where accountability flows upward to the individual leader, not downward to Parliament or the people through their local representatives, fundamentally inverting Ambedkar’s model of continuous responsibility.

Q2: The sidelining of Parliamentary Standing Committees is cited as a critical failure. What specific functions do these committees perform, and what is lost when they are bypassed?

A2: Parliamentary Standing Committees are mini-parliaments with cross-party representation, meant for detailed, technical scrutiny away from the partisan theatrics of the House. Their key functions include:

• Detailed Examination: Conducting clause-by-clause analysis of bills.

• Expert Consultation: Summoning ministers, bureaucrats, domain experts, academics, and stakeholders for testimony.

• Building Consensus: Working behind the scenes to negotiate amendments and find common ground across party lines.

• Oversight: Reviewing budgets and policies of assigned ministries.
  When bypassed, the nation loses:

• Legislative Quality: Bills passed are often riddled with unforeseen flaws and drafting errors.

• Stakeholder Input: The voices of those affected by the law (farmers, businesses, civil society) are excluded.

• Bipartisan Ownership: Laws become seen as partisan impositions rather than national policy, leading to social unrest and judicial challenge (e.g., the farm laws).

• Executive Accountability: Ministers and departments escape rigorous, informed questioning on policy details.

Q3: How does the alleged “weaponization” of central agencies like the ED threaten the operational autonomy of state governments in India’s federal system?

A3: The threat is multi-faceted and profound:

• Political Destabilization: The targeting of a sitting Chief Minister, cabinet ministers, or influential MLAs with investigations creates a constant atmosphere of crisis, distracting from governance and administration.

• Chilling Effect on Bureaucracy: State-level bureaucrats may become reluctant to implement policies or approve files if they fear being entangled in politically motivated investigations, leading to administrative paralysis.

• Resource Diversion: State governments must divert legal and administrative resources to fight central agencies in courts, depleting the energy and funds meant for public welfare.

• Electoral Manipulation: Timing investigations to coincide with elections disqualifies opponents, tarnishes their public image, and creates an uneven playing field.
  This transforms federalism from a system of shared sovereignty into one of hierarchical control, where the Centre uses its investigative monopoly to police political thought and action in the states, severely constraining their autonomy to pursue policies that differ from the Centre’s ideological or economic agenda.

Q4: The Inter-State Council is a constitutional body under Article 263. Why has it failed to act as an effective forum for federal dialogue, and what reforms could revive it?

A4: The Inter-State Council (ISC) has failed due to political neglect and design flaws:

• At the Pleasure of the Centre: It is convened at the discretion of the President (effectively the Union government), which has no incentive to call meetings on contentious issues where states might unite against it.

• Lack of Regularity: It has met sporadically, with huge gaps between sessions, preventing the development of a sustained dialogue culture.

• Non-Binding Outcomes: Its recommendations are advisory, giving the Union government an easy way to ignore consensus reached by states.

• Bureaucratic Composition: It is often dominated by chief ministers and central ministers, lacking independent technical secretariat support.
  Reforms for revival could include:

• Mandatory Meetings: Constitutional amendment to mandate at least two meetings per year.

• Independent Secretariat: A permanent, expert secretariat (like the GST Council’s) to prepare agendas and follow up on decisions.

• Substantive Agenda Setting: Allowing states to collectively place items on the agenda.

• Greater Weight to Recommendations: Legally requiring the Centre to table an action-taken report in Parliament on ISC recommendations, forcing political justification for inaction.

Q5: Beyond the 100-day mandate, what other procedural reforms could restore Parliament’s role as a deliberative body rather than a “rubber stamp”?

A5: Several procedural reforms are crucial:

• Mandatory Pre-Legislative Consultation Policy (PLCP): A law requiring all bills (except money bills and emergencies) to be published in draft form for at least 30 days for public feedback, with a summary of comments received presented to Parliament.

• “Queen’s Consent” Rule: Adopting a convention where the government does not move the guillotine (voting without discussion) on any bill unless the opposition agrees that debate has been exhausted.

• Strengthening the Opposition: Legislating a statutory role for the Leader of the Opposition with guaranteed time, right to convene debates, and membership in key committees, irrespective of numerical strength.

• Reforming the Anti-Defection Law: Amending the 10th Schedule to exempt all votes except the no-confidence motion and money bills from its purview. This would restore MPs’ freedom to vote based on conscience and constituency interest on legislative matters, breaking the party whip’s absolute control and enabling genuine debate.

• Live Transcription & Access: Making verbatim, searchable transcripts of debates available in real-time to enhance public scrutiny and MP accountability.