The Rentier Army, Deconstructing Pakistan’s Strategic Identity and its Inevitable Pivot from Palestine to Israel

In the complex and often contradictory theater of international relations, few nations present a more perplexing case study than Pakistan. A self-proclaimed Islamic republic, its foreign policy and military actions have frequently appeared at odds with the ideological foundations it professes. A recent, dramatic development has thrown this paradox into sharp relief: Pakistan’s swift and “breathless” endorsement of a US-Israeli peace plan for Gaza, a move that signals a potential, seismic shift in its diplomatic posture. This action is not an anomaly but the logical culmination of a decades-long pattern, one that reveals the true nature of the Pakistani state. As argued in Shekhar Gupta’s two-part analysis “How Pakistan thinks,” the nation’s army is not an ideological force for the Muslim Ummah but a “rentier army”—a mercenary entity available to the highest bidder. Its recent pivot towards Israel, at the potential expense of the Palestinian cause, is a stark confirmation that the core of Pakistan’s national identity is not Islam, but a deep-seated anti-Indianism, a strategic imperative that overrides all other ideological commitments.

This article will dissect the historical evidence supporting the “rentier army” thesis, trace the trajectory leading to Pakistan’s potential recognition of Israel, and argue that this realignment exposes the fundamental, often unstated, driver of Pakistani statecraft: a nationalism defined not by what it stands for, but by what it stands against.

Part I: The Swift Pivot – From Rhetorical Support to Strategic Endorsement

The trigger for this renewed examination was a prescient prediction: that Pakistan would recognize Israel through an “Abraham Accords-like” agreement long before it would achieve a lasting peace with its nuclear-armed neighbor, India. This prediction materialized with startling speed. Following the announcement of a 20-point resolution for Gaza by former US President Donald Trump, alongside Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Pakistan became the first Islamic nation to offer its “fullest support.”

The reaction from Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif was, in the words of the analysis, “breathless in praise and obsequious,” resembling the deference of a “minor feudal lord addressing the big badshah” (emperor). This fawning was publicly acknowledged and appreciated by Trump, who described Sharif’s words as “most beautiful.” The alacrity of this endorsement was notable; even India, a strategic partner of Israel, took a full day to express support, likely to ensure Netanyahu’s full backing.

While there were subsequent whispers of “buyer’s remorse” from Pakistani officials claiming the final plan differed from what they were shown, the initial, unequivocal support stands as a monumental shift. This move is not merely a diplomatic maneuver but a profound ideological departure, one that demands an understanding of Pakistan’s historical behavior on the global stage.

Part II: The Rentier Army Thesis – A Historical Audit of Pakistani Military Expediency

If Pakistan were the Islamic republic its constitution claims it to be, one would expect its formidable military to have been deployed in defense of Muslim causes, particularly those involving the sanctity of Islamic holy sites or the plight of fellow Muslims. A historical audit, however, reveals a consistent pattern of strategic expediency over ideological solidarity.

  • Jordan (1970) and Saudi Arabia (1979): Pakistani forces were deployed to Jordan to help King Hussein quell a Palestinian revolt and to Saudi Arabia to help retake the Grand Mosque in Mecca from insurgents. In both instances, the Pakistani military acted not to support a pan-Islamic cause, but to protect entrenched monarchical power from internal Muslim challenges.

  • The Yom Kippur War (1973): While Pakistan did send air force contingents to Jordan during this conflict, the analysis clarifies this was not an ideological stand against Israel. It was rooted in a pre-existing, pragmatic military partnership with Jordan, which had reciprocated by transferring fighter jets to Pakistan during the 1971 war with India.

  • The Gulf War (1990-91): Pakistan sent troops to Saudi Arabia not to defend Muslim Iraq, but to protect the Saudi kingdom from Saddam Hussein’s forces after the invasion of Kuwait. The mission was to defend a wealthy patron, not an Islamic principle.

  • The Afghan Jihads: Pakistan’s military and intelligence apparatus played a pivotal role in the two major conflicts in Afghanistan, but on diametrically opposite sides. In the 1980s, it supported the US-backed Mujahideen against the Soviet Union. Post-9/11, it became a “stalwart ally” of the United States against the very Taliban it had helped create. In both cases, it collected billions in military and economic aid, effectively renting its strategic location and proxy forces to a superpower.

This pattern leads to an inescapable conclusion: the Pakistani military is a “rentier force,” its loyalty available for “cash, kind, or strategic benefit.” It has never been deployed to aid Iran or its proxies like the Houthis, who face bombardment from a US-Israeli-Arab coalition. Its support for the Palestinian cause has historically been limited to “noises here and there”—strong rhetoric at forums like the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), particularly when instrumentalized to criticize India over Kashmir, but never translating into tangible military or significant economic support.

Part III: The Ideological Core – Anti-Indianism as the True National Narrative

If Islam is not the operational ideology driving the Pakistani state, what is? The analysis posits that the true foundational ideology of Pakistan is anti-Indianism (read anti-Hinduism). This is not a secondary feature but the central pillar of its national identity, a unifying force that justifies the military’s dominant role in politics and society.

This core tenet explains several otherwise perplexing aspects of Pakistani policy:

  1. The Inability to Make Peace with India: Any Pakistani leader who has genuinely sought lasting peace with India—whether the elected Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto or the military dictator Pervez Musharraf—has been politically neutered, exiled, or assassinated. Peace with India is seen as an existential threat to the very raison d’être of the state, which is defined by its opposition to India.

  2. The Willingness to Abandon Fellow Muslims: To sustain the confrontation with a much larger neighbor, Pakistan requires powerful patrons and financial resources. This necessitates a foreign policy of extreme pragmatism. Supporting the Palestinian cause rhetorically is cost-free; acting on it is not. When a choice must be made between ideological purity and the strategic and economic benefits of aligning with a US-Israeli-Saudi axis, the “rentier army” will always choose the latter. Abandoning the Palestinians is a small price to pay for the capital needed to maintain the primary struggle against India.

  3. The Enduring Power of the Military: The military establishment justifies its preeminent position by presenting itself as the guardian of the nation against the “Hindu” threat from the East. A permanent state of hostility with India ensures the army’s budget, political power, and commercial interests remain unchallenged. A normalized relationship with India would fundamentally undermine the military’s domestic supremacy.

Part IV: The Historical and Literary Precedent – From Jinnah to Manto

This analysis is bolstered by historical precedent. The founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, held a position on Palestine that was fundamentally opposed to Zionism. He advocated for Palestine to be restored to its “original” inhabitants and suggested that a Jewish state, if necessary, should be established in Europe. The current pivot represents a complete reversal of this founding principle.

Furthermore, the fickle nature of Pakistani popular sentiment on the issue was brilliantly captured by the satirical writer Saadat Hasan Manto in the late 1940s. Observing daily processions in Lahore vowing to liberate Palestine, Manto wryly suggested they take a shortcut through Regal Square. This anecdote underscores that for Pakistan, support for Palestine has often been a form of “cosplay”—a performative and farcical strategic posturing that costs nothing and achieves little, while serving as a useful outlet for public sentiment that can be easily manipulated and redirected.

Conclusion: The Inevitable Denouement and its Regional Implications

Pakistan’s swift endorsement of the Trump-Netanyahu Gaza plan is not a diplomatic misstep but a strategic revelation. It confirms that the Pakistani state, as owned and operated by its military, is ultimately a pragmatic, survivalist entity. Its ideological claims are subservient to the needs of its “rentier” army and the overarching goal of sustaining its conflict with India.

The potential recognition of Israel is the logical next step in this calculus. It offers a pathway to deeper engagement with the United States, access to advanced military technology (potentially circumventing US Congress restrictions), economic benefits from Gulf allies who are themselves normalizing ties with Israel, and a chance to present a modern, moderate image to the world.

For India, this development is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it validates the long-held understanding that Pakistan’s primary driver is anti-Indianism, not Islamic solidarity. On the other, it could lead to a more potent and internationally legitimized adversary, should Pakistan leverage its new alliances to bolster its military and diplomatic standing. For the wider Muslim world, it is a stark lesson in realpolitik, demonstrating that in the arena of international relations, national interest, as defined by a powerful military establishment, will invariably trump religious brotherhood. The “rentier army” has placed its bid, and the price is the abandonment of a cause it never truly served.

Q&A: Understanding Pakistan’s “Rentier Army” and its Pivot on Israel

Q1: What is meant by the term “rentier army” in the context of Pakistan’s military?
A1: A “rentier army” describes a military force that leases out its services, strategic location, or proxy influence to the highest bidder, whether for financial aid, military hardware, or strategic patronage, rather than being deployed primarily for national defense or ideological causes. In Pakistan’s case, this means its military has historically acted as a mercenary force for powers like the United States and wealthy Arab nations, fighting in conflicts from Jordan and Afghanistan to the Gulf, not for Islamic solidarity, but for the economic and strategic benefits provided by its patrons.

Q2: Why is Pakistan’s swift endorsement of the US-Israeli Gaza plan seen as a significant ideological shift?
A2: Pakistan was founded as an Islamic republic, and its official ideology and historical rhetoric have been strongly supportive of the Palestinian cause. Its rapid and effusive endorsement of a plan that is widely seen as cementing Israeli control over Gaza and burying the two-state solution represents a fundamental break from this stated ideological position. It signals that strategic and economic calculations now completely override its professed commitment to the Muslim Ummah, particularly on the central issue of Palestine.

Q3: How does the history of Pakistan’s military deployments in the Middle East support the “rentier” argument?
A3: The history shows a consistent pattern of serving the interests of paying patrons, not Islamic causes:

  • In Jordan (1970) and Saudi Arabia (1979), it protected ruling monarchies from internal Muslim challengers.

  • Its involvement in the Yom Kippur War was based on a reciprocal military pact with Jordan, not anti-Israeli ideology.

  • In Afghanistan, it fought on both sides of the conflict—first with the US-backed Mujahideen and later against the Taliban—collecting billions in aid each time.
    This record demonstrates that the army’s loyalty is for rent, not dedicated to a unified Islamic cause.

Q4: If not Islam, what is the article’s argument for the true core ideology of the Pakistani state?
A4: The article argues that the true, operational ideology of Pakistan is anti-Indianism (or anti-Hinduism). This foundational principle is what truly unifies the state and justifies the military’s dominant role. Every other foreign policy position, including its relationship with the Muslim world and now Israel, is subordinated to the primary objective of sustaining the confrontation with India. This is why leaders seeking peace with India are systematically punished, as peace is seen as a threat to the nation’s core identity.

Q5: What are the potential regional implications of Pakistan moving toward recognizing Israel?
A5: The implications are profound:

  • For India: It could lead to a more resourceful adversary if Pakistan gains greater access to US military technology and deeper alliances with Israel’s new Arab partners. It also forces India to recalibrate its own diplomatic strategies in the Middle East.

  • For the Muslim World: It deeply fractures the unified Muslim front on Palestine, following similar moves by UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco, and undermines the legitimacy of the Palestinian cause in international forums.

  • For Pakistan itself: It represents a final, stark admission that its foreign policy is driven purely by realpolitik and the financial needs of its military establishment,彻底 abandoning any pretense of being a leader of the Islamic world.

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